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This study examines the Western-originated International Relations (IR) con-
cept of Soft Power in the context of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In order 
to bring more nuance to the particular localised phenomena, the thesis presents 
three different approaches to the study of soft power: qualitative rhetorical anal-
ysis, media analysis and automated sentiment analysis. The results show that soft 
power is envisioned within the PRC as a political tool for international and do-
mestic use, that the economy is where China has the most soft power potential in 
Western media, and that the PRC soft power policies are driven by emotions ra-
ther than rational calculation, guided by perception of disrespect. 
The contribution of the study is thus divided into three parts. Firstly, a dis-
course analysis of relevant Chinese academic journal articles published on the 
Mainland in Chinese 2000-2015 (n=31) shows that soft power rhetoric aims at na-
tional identity formation using such category arguments as ‘Anti-Westernisation’ 
and ‘cultural security’. In essence, the analysed soft power rhetoric formulates 
Chinese culture as being under threat from globalisation and Westernisation.  
Secondly, the study applies media analysis to interpret popular culture pro-
duced by the PRC public diplomacy bureaucracy. The results find negative dis-
positions vis-à-vis ‘self’ and ‘other’, as well as in-group/out-group symbolism in 
the analysed popular culture texts.  
Thirdly, to quantify China’s Western media image as part of its soft power 
push, the study applies an automated dictionary method to analyse two Reuters 
news article corpora covering the years 1996–1997 and 2008–2009 (n=1,400,000). 
Using automated content classification, the data is first geocoded into China-, Ja-
pan-, South Korea-, Taiwan-, and Hong Kong-related coverage and then further 
categorised into cultural, political, and economic topics. An automated sentiment 
analysis is applied to each category to quantify the tendency of the articles. The 
results emphasise the importance of economy in China related coverage, 
whereby the assumption of Chinese public diplomacy is not supported: no cate-
gorical negative Western media slant against China in comparison to other East 
Asian regions is found. 
The study demonstrates that the phenomenon referred to as soft power within 
the PRC tackles the challenges of modernisation and progress by placing empha-
sis on cultural safety and national image construction amid the perceived threats 
of globalisation and Westernisation. This is seen as an answer for the Chinese 
state in search of national identity, legitimacy and communal acceptance, still 




Tässä väitöstutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Yhdysvalloista periytyvää kansain-
välisten suhteiden käsitettä pehmeä voima (soft power) Kiinan kansantasavallan 
kontekstissa.  
Tutkimus laajentaa olemassa olevaa kirjallisuutta pääosin kolmella tavalla. 
Ensinnäkin tutkimuksessa esitetään, että pehmeä voima käsitetään Kiinan kan-
santasavallassa sekä kotimaiseen että kansainväliseen käyttöön soveltuvana työ-
kaluna. Toiseksi tutkimus näyttää että Kiinalla on talouden saralla lännessä vah-
vin pehmeän voiman potentiaali. Kolmanneksi tutkimus lisää ymmärrystä Kii-
nan kansantasavallan julkisen diplomatian toimista, jotka tulosten valossa näyt-
täytyvät enemmän tunnepitoisilta kuin rationaalisilta, joita ohjaa käsitys epäkun-
nioituksesta Kiinaa kohtaan. 
Monitieteisessä tutkimuksessa käytetään sekä määrällisiä että laadullisia me-
netelmiä. Siinä esitetään kolme eri empiiristä metodia pehmeän voiman analy-
sointiin: kvalitatiivinen retoriikka-analyysi, media-analyysi ja automaattinen 
sentimenttianalyysi.  
Retoriikka-analyysin aineistona tutkimus tarkastelee kiinankielisiä Kiinassa 
vuosina 2000 – 2015 julkaistuja pehmeään voimaan liittyviä tutkimusartikkeleita 
(N=31). Tulosten mukaan pehmeään voimaan liittyvä retoriikka perustuu kate-
goria-argumenteille ”länsimaisen kulttuurin vastustaminen” ja ”Kiinan kulttuu-
rinen turvallisuus”. 
Media-analyysi tarkastelee sekä kiinalaisia että länsimaissa tuotettuja yhteis-
tuotantoelokuvia ”poliittisina teksteinä”. Tutkimuksen mukaan teksteissä tuote-
taan negatiivisia dispositiota ”itsen” ja ”toisen” välille sekä symbolista ryhmä-
ajattelua.  
Automaattisessa sisältö-analyysisissä tarkastellaan kansainvälisen uutistoi-
misto Reutersin kahta arkistoa vuosilta 1996-1997 ja 2008-2009 (N=1,400,000). 
Tutkimus korostaa talouteen liittyvän uutisoinnin merkitystä Kiinan koko-
naisuutiskuvassa. Tarkasteluvälillä Kiinaan liittyvän uutisoinnin sävy todetaan 
lisäksi suhteellisen positiiviseksi. Huomio on merkittävä sen suhteen, että Kiinan 
kansantasavallan julkinen diplomatia vaikuttaa lähtevän oletuksesta, jonka mu-
kaan läntinen lehdistö demonisoi Kiinaa. 
Väitöstutkimus osoittaa, että ilmiö johon viitataan pehmeänä voimana Kiinan 
kansantasavallan sisällä, pyrkii minimoimaan modernisaation tuomia haasteita 









Figure 1  The theoretical model of the influences on public opinion of China 
  in the US. 
Figure 2  Theoretical model of the predispositions that influence an actor’s 
  decision mak-ing regarding public diplomacy efforts. 
Figure 3  The components of the model marked in bold that are empirically 
  analysed in this dissertation. 
Figure 4 Annual Cinema Box Office Revenues (China/US). 
Figure 5  Annual Number of Cinema Screens (China/US) 
Figure 6  Soft Power-Related Journal Publications and conference  
  proceeings in Mainland China 
Figure 7  An exaggerated example of sentiment distributions and ROC 




Table 1  The precision of automated classification as evaluated by  
  the mjority of human annotators. 
Table 2  The overall document counts, absolute ranks, relative ranks (the 
  percentage of countries with equal or better rank) and AUC  
  values for each analysed country and corpus. 
Table 3  The document counts, absolute ranks, relative ranks (the  
  percentage of countries with equal or better rank), and AUC  
  values for each analysed country and corpus in each thematic  

























DISCLAIMER: Chapter 7.1.2. “The Quantification” has been written in entirety by 
Juho Heimonen, Department of Information Sciences, University of Turku. The method 
presented in Chapter 7 has been designed together with the present author, Juho Heimo-
nen, and Professor Tapio Pahikkala. 
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INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH CONTEXT AND ARGUMENT 
 The purpose of this study is to explore the United States (US)-originated International 
Relations (IR) adaptation ‘Soft Power’ in the context of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). As the key theoretical concept of the study, I apply the notion of ‘struggle for 
recognition’, most notably advanced by Axel Hoenneth (1991, 1992, 1995, 2003, 2016). 
Both soft power and recognition seeking are well explored subjects among China studies 
and political science, respectively (Fanon, 1967; Bull, 1984; Haacke, 2005; Greenhill, 
2008; Wang and Lu 2008; Hunter 2009; Nel, 2010; Montgomery 2010; Barabantseva 
2011; Callahan 2011; Vyas 2011; Barr 2012; Mierzejewski 2012; Scott 2012; Zhang 
2012; Callahan 2015; Ringmar, 2002, 2015). To the best of my knowledge, however, no 
study to date has approached the political phenomenon that is referred to as ‘soft power’ 
in China using the struggle for recognition as the principal theoretical frame. The appli-
cation, however, is appropriate as it potentially gives insight into those cultural factors 
that drive China’s soft power enthusiasm and the underlining assumptions that guide it. 
As the title of the dissertation implies, in this study I am not interested in China’s soft 
power per se, but rather aim to show how the phenomenon can help understand China’s 
struggle for international recognition. 
While in the field of Area Studies, theoretically the study builds on the English school 
(ES) of international relations (IR). The reason for this is simple: ES, or as it is otherwise 
known, the international society approach by definition assumes the global arena as a 
‘society of states’, a notion which opens up possibilities to apply social theories to the 
12 
 
international level (Nel, 2010: 963).1  Therefore, in applying the key concept of ‘struggle 
for recognition’, I draw from social psychology in further conceptualising the PRC soft 
power communication into perception and propensity components. As specific research 
questions, I will ask 1) what underlining perceptions guide the Chinese soft power phe-
nomenon, and 2) what type of propensities the perceptions introduce into China’s soft 
power communication. 
The practical issue that emerges from these theoretical points concerns the Western 
news media image of China. While the PRC has been polishing its international image in 
various forms before and after 1978, a turning point in the development of its international 
media relations took place in 2003 (Zhang, 2012). While there is an argument to be made 
that PRC public diplomacy is media-centric where particular attention is given to Western 
news reporting (Wang, 2008; Shambaugh, 2013; Creemers, 2015), in the dissertation I 
therefore focus on the aggregate impact of China’s public diplomacy efforts over the last 
two decades as gauged through Western press coverage.  
Although China’s media image is a well-explored subject, the conceptual and empiri-
cal challenges of quantifying an aggregate impact are recognised inside and outside China 
(Gilboa, 2001, 2002, 2008; Han 2010; Jones et al. 2011). Consequently, no large-scale 
                                                 
1 This is not limited to the ES: similar approaches have also been discussed, among others, within 
psychology. Samuels for instance (1996) raises the question of whether what he calls depth psy-
chology can contribute to political debates by treating those phenomena as objects of analysis, in 
other words, treating the “world as a client”. Samuels has a twofold objective: on the one hand to 
make a psychological contribution to social science and social theory and, on the other, to bridge 
an understanding of the political world with the theories of psychology. Samuels is particularly 
interested in dealing between the “fantasies of the political world and the politics of the fantasy 
world” (Samuels, 1996: 4). Here the political metaphors depict personality and vice versa. The 
government signifies the ego, citizens’ constellations of objective relations, and social problems 
psychopathology. 
Also Clarke (2006) discusses the nature of “psychoanalytic sociology” and the implication the 
theory has for a “psycho-social method”. The view of Clark is that neither sociology nor psychol-
ogy provides a more conclusive explanation of the world than the other, but the combination can 
contribute to a better understanding of the social and political world. By overviewing literature, 
Clarke (2006) argues that psychoanalytical sociology in its interdisciplinary form, including ele-
ments from sociology, social constructionism, interactionism and psychoanalysis, has the ability 
to explain “complex social processes” (Clark 2006: 1153-1155). 
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empirical studies have examined the changes in Western media coverage pre- and post-
policy change. Therefore, in this dissertation I aim 3) to quantify, on an aggregate level, 
the sentiment of China’s Western news coverage and 4) through topic detection, to clarify 
what specific news topics influence the Western media image of China. 
The application of Axel Hoenneth’s (1991, 1992, 1995, 2003, 2015) ‘struggle for 
recognition’ to the soft power phenomenon in China seems justified for a number of rea-
sons. First, national mentalities and narratives have specific relevance in the context of 
East Asia where turbulence from the colonial era, the ending of the Second World War 
and the Cold War still affect domestic and international politics. The situation is different 
to that of the West, where the anxieties of the past have less political currency. Moreover, 
for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in charge of China, the ending of international 
communism and the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology brought inevitable exis-
tential anxiety and thus problems of governance: the political legitimacy of a communist 
elite running state-led capitalism remains thin. As my final research question, therefore, 
I make an attempt to sum up the analysis by asking 5) what type of disrespect does the 
Chinese soft power phenomenon address? 
With this in mind, my central thesis is that China’s soft power and public diplomacy 
communication seems to be emotional rather than rational, driven by a perception of dis-
respect, an out-group bias, and an outright cultivation of an enemy image. Consequently, 
I argue that there does exist a gap between Chinese expectations and how China is actu-
ally portrayed in mainstream Western media. Making a departure from the conventional 
assumption, in the dissertation I aim to show that the gap rather exists between expecta-
tions of critical portrayal and an overall quite neutral reality. In attempting to make the 
case, I borrow the methodological pluralism of the ES in employing a historical review, 
a rhetorical analysis, a media analysis, and an automated sentiment analysis.  
The rationale for choosing these methods is data-driven. First of all, adhering to noto-
rious secrecy, PRC officials seldom give in-depth interviews or publish policy papers or 
memos for research purposes, posing challenges for journalists and academics alike. 
Therefore, regarding the perception component, I chose to focus on relevant Mainland 
pro-government academic publications, to which I apply a rhetorical textual analysis. 
Secondly, in the case of the propensity component, I analyse popular culture as ‘political 
texts’ for the reason that, in recent years, the PRC has acquired a vast entertainment media 
14 
 
empire that produces popular culture as part of its soft power push. In my analyses, I focus 
on the most prominent section: films that have been produced either solely by the PRC or 
in cooperation with Western studios. Third, to quantify the Western news media image 
of China, I employ an automated dictionary method to measure the sentiment of China 
coverage in Reuters news between 1996-1997 and 2007-2008 (N=1,400,000). Due to the 
large-N approach, manual methods would have been costly and time-consuming. Before 
the empirical analyses, however, I review briefly historical factors that may have influ-
enced the development of China’s international social identity, as well as recent develop-
ments in China’s public diplomacy. 
 
 Theoretical Perspectives 
Soft power by definition represents the idea that making yourself attractive in the eyes 
of others helps in accomplishing policy agenda (Nye, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 2002, 2004). 
Nonetheless, a number of studies show how the PRC envisions soft power for foreign use 
to brand the nation, and for domestic use to create political legitimacy for the China’s 
Communist Party (CCP). Barr (2012) for instance analyses PRC soft power rhetoric 
through nation-branding, and shows how the PRC soft power deployment is as critical to 
the domestic scene as it is to the external one. Edney (2012) views PRC soft power 
through the existing Chinese propaganda bureaucracy and, in this context, highlights the 
interaction between PRC domestic and international policy ambitions. 
Studies focusing on an actor’s status in a particular social group suggest that identity 
concerns are for many states as important as security and welfare goals (Gross-Stein, 
2013:367).  Liu (2012) argues that the calls for soft power by the PRC underline an emerg-
ing ideological crisis: the ever-present Chinese revolutionary ideology and culture are 
increasingly at odds with the recent economic reforms. In the view of Callahan (2015), 
by using soft power the Chinese state is utilising negative-positive dichotomies vis-à-vis 
the West by evoking negative emotions for the use of domestic legitimacy. This shows 
the importance the PRC places not only on soft power but identity politics in general. 
The present understanding of identity politics is mainly informed by the social identity 
theory. Identities are constructed through two alternative perspectives. First of all, actors 
tend to sell themselves accounts, stories or narratives of themselves through which self-
15 
images are built.  These accounts are then tested in interaction and communication with 
others, who might or might not agree (Ringmar, 2015, 6-7). Consequently, if an actor’s 
need for recognition is denied, it leads to perception of disrespect (Honneth, 1992: 202).  
Within the wider field of China studies that concentrate on PRC cultural and identity 
politics, Johnston (1999) advanced an approach that he coined “identity realism”. His 
argument was that the creation of in-group identities leads directly to the devaluation of 
out-groups. In the case of China, Johnston showed that the politics of identity constitutes 
a form of realpolitik where the intensities of the in-group formation affect the “degree of 
outwardly directed realpolitik behaviour […]” (Johnston, 1999: 289). The approach of 
Johnston was commented on by Haacke (2005), who agreed with Johnston’s line of in-
quiry, but criticised it for not giving due attention to recognition-seeking. In his words: 
“Other scholars might agree with the general thrust of his argument but construct an ex-
planation with reference to China’s post-1989 struggle for recognition, as it is this strug-
gle that would appear to lie at the heart of Johnston’s own argument” (Haacke, 2005: 192-
193).  
In this dissertation I build on research into China’s soft power utilising the domestic 
cultural perspective, but also take the advice of Haacke (2005) and consider Chinese soft 
power through the key theoretical concepts of recognition-seeking. Underlining the obvi-
ous conceptual connection between the two constructs, the application of the ‘struggle for 
recognition’ makes the assumption that the minimal requirement of successful ‘soft 
power’ is an actor recognised by others. 
The particular Chinese soft power phenomenon echoes a general tendency among the 
PRC leadership to engage in a victimisation discourse (e.g. Johnston, 1999; Callahan, 
2010). 
 Accordingly, on the one hand, the discourse creates domestic legitimacy for the Com-
munist Party and, on the other, gives both reason and meaning to PRC public diplomacy 
communication. To an extent, this view is supported by existing research that focuses on 
China’s Western media image: most studies conclude that China is portrayed either se-
lectively or negatively. For instance, Zhang and Cameron (2003) observe a negative bias 
existing despite Western media believing that their coverage of China is balanced and 
objective. Willnat and Luo (2011) and Peng (2004) argue for the overall negative framing 
of China in the US media. Xiang (2013) observes that China is more neutrally presented 
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by English-language social media than by traditional media but that “international social 
media uncritically repeats stereotyped Chinese social, political, religious and ethnic im-
ages it captures from the international mainstream media” (Xiang, 2013:252). 
Therefore, it is commonly understood that PRC public diplomacy aims to improve 
China’s reputed negative image in the Western media from negative to positive (Wang, 
2008). Research into the role of media in shaping the public opinion and policy of a for-
eign country has shown many cases in which this approach has been effective (Dearing 
and Rogers, 1996; Powlick and Katz, 1998; Kiousis, 2004). However, prior studies sug-
gest that nation-branding or soft power efforts seldom succeed when foreign media cov-
erage is unfavourable (Golan, 2013). Regarding China, there is some evidence that points 
to a correlation between its foreign media coverage, foreign officials’ perception, and 
policy-making (Liu, 2006). 
This study therefore also draws on literature about communication – especially the 
determinants of international news flow (Kim and Barnett, 1996; Wu, 2000). While these 
have been mainly explained using a systems perspective emphasising power relations 
between “centre and periphery” (Wallerstein, 1974: 1975) and “have and have-nots” 
(Castells, 2009), the international society approach also considers identities and images 
as determinants of information and news flow. Research into country characteristics has 
shown the identity or image of a country to determine the way in which that country is 
presented by the international media (Anhold, 2005). 
The topic under examination can be considered to be of broader interest and im-
portance, as many countries are stepping up their soft power and public diplomacy efforts. 
There is certainly a case to be made that Chinese soft power is media-centric (Sun, 2010; 
Creemers, 2015). In other words, while the PRC is investing in Chinese communication 
capabilities, among the Chinese leadership there is an overwhelming emphasis on im-
proving Western news media coverage of China (Wang, 2008). Overall, while prior stud-
ies have focused on policies and actions China has undertaken to better China’s represen-
tation in Western media coverage (e.g Sun, 2014a, 2014b, 2015), it seems justified to 
further clarify what the forces driving such an approach are, and what the underlying 
assumptions are. The large-N empirical analysis also provides some evidence for the view 
that there may exist a gap between Chinese expectations and how China is actually per-
17 
ceived by Western news media. Making a clear departure from the conventional assump-
tion, however, the analysis indicates that a gap exists between expectations of critical 
portrayal and an overall rather neutral reality. 
 
Methodological Aspects  
As mentioned on page 7, this study employs three different analyses, each of which 
has a particular methodological approach.  A more detailed methodological discussion is 
included in Chapter 2 and Chapters 5-7, which contain the three different empirical anal-
yses. In this chapter I will summarise the applied methodologies.2 
First of all, several studies have applied discourse analysis to the PRC soft power phe-
nomenon (Li, 2008, 2009; Wuthnow, 2008; Hunter, 2009). These mainly focus on the 
strategic implication of the soft power discourse. 1) In this study I will apply a rhetorical 
analysis to flesh out those aspects of the language around the soft power phenomenon 
                                                 
2 Being conceptually vague, the measurement and quantification of soft power is a grand di-
lemma within IR. Assessing power remains, nevertheless, a central task of IR, where the difficul-
ties in measuring hard power alone are manifold. How changes in hard power resources, and the 
ways in which these are utilised, affect outcomes, is a complicated issue. Soft power that is con-
ceptually vaguer is accordingly difficult to measure.  
One option is to qualitatively assess perceptions of a given state among a certain population. 
Wang (2007), for instance, uses a questionnaire to survey the respective images of Japan and 
China among students at Osaka University. The study concludes that the major source of Japa-
nese soft power was its economic re-emergence after the WWII and, to boost Chinese soft power, 
the PRC should continue with the opening up of, economic globalisation of and participation in 
international institutions. 
A second approach is to quantify soft power resources, for instance as done by Yan and Xu (2008) 
in comparing Sino-US soft power. By using a system of indicators, the study makes an attempt to 
find a method to quantify and compare soft power objectively. As the outcome, they estimate 
Chinese soft power to be about one-third of that of the US. Additionally, the study indicates that 
“culture” would be the least effective component of Chinese soft power. A third approach com-
bines the measurement of resources and use of opinion polls. Applying the synthesis, Huang and 
Ding (2006) find that there is an imbalance between Chinese soft power resources (development 
model) and goals (policy objectives). 
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that relate to in-group identity formation and out-group behaviour. To be more specific, 
the analysis focuses on category schemes of the language used (Reicher and Hopkins 
(1996: 353-357). Similarly, Chinese state-sponsored media products have been the focus 
of several academic studies (e.g. Zhang, 2007) where the mutually beneficial relationship 
between the PRC and Hollywood is a well-recognised fact (e.g. Wan and Kraus, 2002). 
2) Applying media analysis, in this study I attempt to show how the messages of in-group 
identity formation and out-group behaviour are included in PRC-sponsored media prod-
ucts, paying particular attention to films. By doing this, I build on Kellner (2010) in at-
tempting to show how social theory and critical reading of films can help understand 
certain aspects of contemporary society and culture - in the case of this study, that of 
China.   
3) The aggregate level quantification of China’s media image has been the topic of 
several academic publications.3 The main body focuses on European and US media cov-
                                                 
3 Large-scale opinion surveys gathered from international public opinion polls have also been 
used to measure national perceptions. The BBC World Service conducts annual opinion polls re-
garding national impressions. The participants, randomly selected people in 25 countries, are 
asked to rate 16 countries and the European Union in terms of whether their influence in the 
world was “mainly positive” or “mainly negative”. The 2006 study found that an average of 45% 
of people polled, excluding Chinese, had a mainly positive view and 27% a mainly negative view 
of China’s influence. More recent polls show that in 2012 50% of participants had a positive view 
of China, and 31% a mainly negative one.  Another annual poll is conducted by the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project measuring national perceptions of given countries. It found, for instance, that 
favourable views among US citizens of China have deteriorated from 43% (2005) to 39% (2008) 
and to 35% (2014). The same trend continues with German nationals having a favourable view of 
46% (2005), 26% (2008) and 28% (2014).  In general the poll shows that the least favourable view 
of China was held by Japanese nationals, and most favourable by Pakistanis including a few Af-
rican nationalities, for instance Tanzania. 
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erage of China. The most popular method to quantify the image of China in the interna-
tional media is manual content analysis. For instance, Zhang and Cameron (2003) analyse 
the content of three major US newspapers, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, 
and the Washington Post, (N=579) while Golan and Lukito (2015) focus on the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal (N=249). The studies most relevant to this study are 
those that have a longitudinal approach. Peng (2004) observes that the coverage of China 
in the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times during  1992 and 2001 (N=189) in-
creased, but the overall tone of reporting was negative. Li (2010) finds that 1) the overall 
proportion of Chinese coverage increased and 2) China drew the most attention in the 
economic and external political sectors in European transnational media (with the focus 
on the Financial Times, the Economist and the International Herald Tribune) between 
1989 and 2005 (N=3004). Wang and Shoemaker (2011) argue, based on content analysis 
of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today between 1979 and 2007 
(N=1412) that “political freedom” in China -- as indicated in the study -- correlates with 
positive US media coverage which again correlates with favourable US public opinion 
on China.  Finally, Yang and Li (2012) observe that the “China threat” coverage in the 
New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, 
and the Chicago Tribune between 1992 and 2006 (N=376) fluctuated from category to 
category (China’s escalating military power, China’s increasing economic influence, and 
the political/ideological differences between China and the US). 
The bulk of prior studies that specifically focus on China’s media image therefore 
consist of small-to-moderate-N methods. In these studies, the range of examined N varies 
between 63 (Zhong and Zhang, 2016) and 4,250 (Xiang, 2013). An obvious reason for 
                                                 
Additionally, individual surveys have been conducted. For instance, the British Council (2014) 
assesses and identifies the “attractiveness” (appeal) of a country. The study surveyed over 1,000 
young educated people via an online questionnaire in Brazil, China, Germany, India and the US. 
Another 1,000 were surveyed online in Great Britain.  It found that the most influential factors in 
the attractiveness of a country are:  1) cultural and historic attractions, 2) countryside and land-
scape, 3) people, and 4) arts and cities. In comparison, the least influential factors are: 1) sporting 
teams, events and achievements, 2) current and past actions of its government, 3) brands, prod-
ucts and services, and 4) science, research and the ability to innovate. The results were somewhat 
striking in that, among educated young people, arts and culture seem to be more important fac-
tors in national attractiveness than politics and education. Also, “economy and business environ-
ment” ranked as sixth least influential among a total of 17 factors. 
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this is that a large data analysis is costly and labour-intensive. This study proposes a novel 
approach to survey large-N text-based data by applying automated sentiment analysis, 
methodology, which has gained attention within Political Science (Monroe and Schrodt, 
2008). Regarding topic detection and categorisation, existing studies have applied more 
sophisticated methods (e.g. Quinn et al., 2010; Lucas et al., 2015). The methodological 
contribution of this study, however, concerns automated analysis of textual sentiment. 
More specifically, the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), cal-
culated from the distributions of document sentiments, is here applied as an appropriate 
measure and its development between corpora is statistically analysed. The model is val-
idated using hand-coding and congruent validation (Weber, 1990).  
The dissertation contributes to literature on China’s Western media image by propos-
ing an alternative method to this relatively well-explored subject. This study agrees with 
the study by Xiang (2013) according to which China-related economic and cultural topics 
are more favourably presented than political ones. However, it should be noted that a 
small-N study using manual analysis can discover a negative tone in some specific forum 
or topic while a statistical large-N study such as this can still be correct in maintaining 
that the overall tone is positive. The results of this study are thus not contradictory to all 
prior studies arguing for negative portrayal but rather only to those that point to an overall 
negative framing of China (He, 2004; Peng, 2004; Willnat and Luo, 2011). 
 
 Structure of the Study 
This dissertation, while in the field of Area Studies, reports research that is multidis-
ciplinary (social psychology/media studies/IR/natural sciences). This poses certain chal-
lenges to the structure of the presentation. After the introduction, the second chapter con-
cerns theory-building. The chapter defends the state-as-person position and argues that 
individual-level identities and emotions are transferable to the collective level. Chapter 
three outlines a theoretical model by conceptualising public diplomacy communication 
into perception and propensity components. The fourth chapter reviews modern Chinese 
history from the perspective of recognition-seeking, while the fifth chapter provides an 
overview of recent developments in PRC public diplomacy and China’s media industries.  
21 
The empirical analysis of the thesis is reported in Chapters 6, 7, and 8, respectively. Chap-
ter 6 documents the rhetorical analysis, aiming to give insight into the perceptions of 
Chinese policy elite regarding soft power and public diplomacy through the analysed 
journal articles. In Chapter 7, the media analysis presents Chinese and Hollywood films 
as political texts, clarifying the propensities of Chinese public diplomacy and giving par-
ticular attention to in-group/out-group identity formations. Chapter 7 documents the au-
tomated sentiment analysis, the objective of which is to quantify China’s Western news 
media image. The dissertation concludes by restating the research problem, recapping the 
analysis, summarising the empirical findings and discussing theoretical and methodolog-

















1.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ‘DIS-
RESPECT’ IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
 
This chapter reviews the formation of identities and their transference into collective 
social identities. The purpose of bridging the various levels of analysis (individual, group, 
international) is to make the point that the struggle for recognition is universal in its hu-
manistic application and thus appropriate for the international level transcending relativ-
istic cultural claims. In terms of identity formation, the idea of an international society, 
as advanced by the ES, by its very definition views states as social actors.   
Therefore, the theoretical position that I wish to defend here is the notion of the ‘state-
as-person’ or, as Wendt (1999: 215-224) points out, that ‘states are people too’. The re-
lated question is: can state behaviour be explained by employing methods used to analyse 
a human individual, without reducing the whole nation to the level of an individual. The 
nature of the problem is well illustrated by Craib (1997: 1): “As if the state would grow 
legs and arms and walk into the consulting room of a clinical psychologist”.  My actual 
aim being somewhat more modest than that, I above all attempt to show how social iden-
tities are formed as both individual beliefs (cognition) and affective states (emotions) and 
transferred into collective identities (in this case national ones), and what implications 
this has for the study of China’s public diplomacy.   
In order to defend the position, I will use a strategy that advances from the particular 
to the general. This is in line with most studies on social psychology, which start with the 
individual and then proceed to group behaviour (see Lebow, 2008). Since I draw from 
both social psychology and international relations in building the framework, it seems 
justified to advance from specific (individual) to broad (groups) assumptions and from 
there to still broader generalisations (mass).  
I shall begin, nonetheless, with general assumptions related to the English School and 
especially to the problem of cultural hegemony, that is, whether international society can 
be seen as a universal or hierarchical culture. I do this in order to highlight those assump-
tions of the English School that are in the first place compatible with a social psycholog-
ical approach. In terms of identity formation, the idea of an international society, as ad-
vanced by the ES, by its very definition views states as social actors.  Thereafter, as stated, 
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the discussion is divided into various levels of analysis, in this case, the individual, the 
group and the international. At the individual level, I discuss basic assumptions regarding 
the study of social psychology, in other words, the concepts of cognition and emotion. At 
the group level, I review the social identity theory and discuss its implications for group 
behaviour. Thereafter, I present some formulations on why and how social identities are 
relevant at the international level. 
In the context of each level, I shall discuss Axel Honneth’s interpretation of the clas-
sical Hegelian theory of recognition as the core theoretical framework for this study. The 
question, therefore, concerns China’s perception of its disrespected status under Western 
cultural hegemony – a state of affairs, which has political implications for public diplo-
macy decision-making, as modelled in the next chapter. 
 
1.1. Broad English School Assumptions 
International Relations (IR) as a disciplinary subject applies several theories classified 
in numerous ways.  The classifications are mainly used as analytical tools to position a 
study within the wider field of IR, and to inform the reader of what claims and assump-
tions are accepted as analytical starting points. Any conceptual positioning regarding 
schools of thought within the IR aims therefore for clarity and overview (Jackson and 
Sörensen, 1999: 34). I will therefore start here with an overview of the assumptions that 
guide the present inquiry. These borrow from the English School (ES) of IR and concern, 
in general, the nature of international relations and foreign policy inclinations of an actor. 
Western theoretical IR schools are typically divided into three different approaches: 
the realist, liberal and international society.4 The first instance to develop a scientific dis-
cipline to study the international political setting was influenced by the First World War 
(1914-1918). The conflict left both scholars and politicians asking why the war took place 
in the first place, why no actual gains were made despite the significant costs involved, 
and why the actors involved persisted with conflict despite lack of progress (Jackson and 
                                                 
4 In many instances International Political Economy is also included in the main traditions (see 
for instance Jackso and Sörensen, 1999). 
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Sörensen, 1999: 36). Not very surprisingly then, the initial theory-building within IR was 
mostly influenced by liberal thinkers both in the US and in the UK who aimed to develop 
a theory of a world system that would advance peace and the forming of alliances, ena-
bling the avoidance of an equal catastrophe.5  
Despite these liberal ideas gaining success in IR literature during the 1920s, the 1930s 
proved that the League of Nations and equivalent formulations were not working. There-
fore, while liberal ideas dominated IR in its earlier phase, realist claims gained a foothold 
before and after the Second World War (Jackson and Sörensen, 1999: 39). 
The realist argument interprets the global arena as a place where states act according 
to a zero-sum game fulfilling only their own needs,6 whereas the liberal one views the 
system through altruism and mutually beneficial cooperation.7 The dividing factor be-
tween the traditions thus concerns the nature of actor behaviour in respect to the assumed 
anarchic world system. The realists maintain that anarchy leads to actor self-help. This 
means that the primary concern of state actors is to maintain their independence through 
whatever means are at their disposal, meaning that the actor relationships form into a 
zero-sum game where the security of one state is another state’s insecurity (Jervis, 1978). 
Within the realist tradition, it is then assumed that states are central actors who possess 
significant power where the strong prevail and the weak perish. Realists also assume 
states as unitary agents and define vital interests as related to the state body.  
While the core of the realist assumption is straightforward, the liberal perspective can 
be considered somewhat more complex. In essence, the idea that cooperation leads to 
mutually beneficial outcomes is to a degree based on the assumption that a process of 
progress takes place within the international system. This is usually referred to as moder-
nity or modernisation (Ruggie, 1993).  The liberal position also includes the notion of 
                                                 
5 One of the main influences behind early utopian liberalism was the US president Woodrow 
Wilson. He promoted democracy and self-determination on the famous grounds that liberal dem-
ocratic governments do not wage war against each other and that world order should be based 
on a firm international organisation that would regulate state relations from an institutional foun-
dation (Brown, 1997: 24). 
6 For realism and neo-realism, see for instance Waltz (1979).  
7 For liberalism and neo-liberalism, see for instance Keohane (1984). 
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modernisation and economic interdependence. In this view, the modernisation of a na-
tion-state requires a supply of goods (material and non-material) from outside the state 
that are not produced in sufficient quantity within the state (Navari, 1989: 345). This 
assumption includes that a sense of progress understood as modernity leads to common 
interests guided by rationality and reason. Modernity is therefore seen as increasing co-
operation in general, economic interdependence in particular, and finally technological 
advancements. 
While social change affects states and state systems, the relationship is arguably also 
reversible (Jackson and Sörensen, 1999: 28). Globalisation and the advancements made 
in transportation and communication have therefore been interpreted as making the world 
“smaller”, reducing the role of the nation-state and traditional power politics. This new 
global environment and subsequent rise of hermeneutics and social construction have led 
to new interpretations and further raised the importance of cultural factors within IR lit-
erature. For instance, Linklater (1992) raised the question of the next stage in IR after the 
Cold War. In fact, alongside the WWII, both the ending of the Cold War and globalisation 
thus created a need and an opening for new opportunities in IR theory that would move 
beyond the traditional classical realism and liberalism (Bellamy, 2005). The ending of the 
WWII and the Cold War in particular resulted in the present US hegemony.  
The International Society Approach, or as it is better known, the English School in IR, 
seeks a middle way in classical IR scholarship. The central idea behind the approach is 
that international relations are regarded as a ‘society’ of states in which principal actors 
are states people who practise statecraft. It is precisely a society rather than a system: 
‘system’ means contact between states and the impact of one state on another; ‘society’ 
means common interests and values, common rules and institutions (Bull, 1977)., The 
focus of analysis is therefore on the foreign policy inclinations of states and states people, 
including their interests, concerns, ambitions, intentions, desires, beliefs, hopes, fears, 
doubts, uncertainties and so forth (Jackson and Sörensen, 1999: 141-142). The English 
School thus considers international politics as a ‘realm of human experience with distinc-
tive characteristics, problems, and language (Wight, 1994: 1). It therefore investigates the 
history of international politics as experienced by the people involved (Jackson and 
Sörensen, 1999: 140).  This includes the perception of change which, according to the 
proponents of the ES, does not take place between unipolar and multipolar systems for 
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instance, but from a society of less inclusion to one that includes more members (Bull, 
1977).  
One of the central themes of the ES is the valuation of moral and norms within the 
practice of international politics. The tradition derives from philosophy, history and law, 
and it is characterised by reliance upon the exercise of judgement (Bull, 1969: 20). Tra-
ditional ES theory emphasises four key aspects: 1) leading operative ideas are seen as 
shaping the thought, policies and activities of states people, 2) in the conduct of foreign 
policy, dialogue between leading ideas, values and beliefs comes into play, 3) the histor-
ical dimension of international relations is relevant, and 4) normative aspect as seen 
through history is considered the most fundamental aspect (Jackson and Sörensen, 1999: 
152). 
Even though the ES is not traditionally focused on applying social-scientific models, 
in this study I construct a theoretical model that is presented in the next chapter. I will 
borrow from the ES a central approach of analysis. That is, my focus is on collective 
ideas, interests, emotions and history regarding the political phenomenon that is referred 
to as ‘soft power’ in China. Moreover, in following the ES I emphasise three key aspects 
in this study: 1) I treat the concept of ‘disrespect’ as the leading idea that has shaped the 
thought, policies and activities of the PRC ‘soft power’ phenomenon, 2) I consider the 
dialogue of ideas between the West and China in the context of soft power, and 3) I place 
the Chinese struggle for recognition in the context of history. 
 
1.1.1. Universal or Diverse Culture? 
 
This subchapter addresses a fundamental tension within the ES, i.e. the tension be-
tween a universal and a particular culture. As Heather Rea (2002: 6) argues, “Cultural 
structures and strategies play crucial roles in the construction of collective state identities 
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[…] It follows, therefore that these structures and strategies also play an important and 
often overlooked role in the constitution of the international system of states”. 8 
First of all, it seems reasonable to ask how culture is defined within the ES? Here three 
variations can be detected: 1) culture may refer to unified modes of thoughts, patterns of 
behaviour, and preferred norms and values of particular society, 2) culture may refer to 
common cultures, cultures that are shared across particular societies or communities with 
a common intellectual culture (language, philosophy, moral, art), and 3) culture may refer 
to diplomatic culture, i.e. the procedural consensus upon which modern international so-
ciety is based by official representatives of states (Bull, 1977; 1980). Bull further argues 
that the cohesion of international society would require the further evolution of a com-
mon, cosmopolitan culture, entailing common ideas and values both Western and non-
Western alike (Bull, 1977: 317). 
Within the ES, a basic question that O’Hagan (2005: 12) presents is to what extent 
norms, rules and institutions that form a common international system emerge from a 
common culture and how order is maintained in an international system that comprises a 
plurality of sovereign political communities? This includes questions about the extent to 
which international norms, values and practices are defined by or project the interests of 
a dominant culture or cultures. In other words, the question O’Hagan (2005) asks presents 
the dilemma of whether international society is horizontal or hegemonic/hierarchical. To 
be more specific, he asks, 1) to what extent there remains implicit or perceived hierarchies 
between cultures within international society based both on history and on continuing 
inequalities (material, institutional, ideational power/influence)? And, 2) to what extent 
cultural difference, expressed as different ideas of political organisation, has been truly 
                                                 
8 Since the 1950s, historians and political scientists have debated the meaning of a collective “po-
litical culture”. The discussions culminated in the 1960s and 1970s in the rise of social history and, 
in the 1990s, in the influences of cultural history (e.g. Almond, 1956; Stevens, 1974; Putnam, 1993; 
Reisinger, 1995). More recently Formisano (2001) discusses the differences between historical con-
ceptualisations (too few definitions) and political science conceptualisations (too many defini-
tions) of “political culture”. Without arriving at any definitive conclusions, Formisano (2001: 394) 
does refer to Pye (1972)  in voicing the deep problematics of the concept: “[T]he mere term ‘polit-
ical culture’ is capable of evoking quick intuitive understanding, so that people often feel that 
without further and explicit definition they can appreciate its meaning and freely use it”. 
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respected within modern international society and to what extent the society continues to 
reproduce cultural hierarchies (O’Hagan, 2005: 217-220). 
Within the ES, a pluralist argument claims that international society stems from an 
idea that accepts a plurality of nations operating within anarchy where each country con-
structs its own approach to good life and justice (Bellamy, 2005: 9-11). The argument 
thus emphasises that there cannot be any agreement on moral and political issues such as 
human rights or justice due to the particularity of different cultures that form international 
society. 
The solidarity argument, in contrast, claims that diverse communities are able to reach 
agreement concerning morals and justice. According to the view, international society 
carries agency to maintain moral standards (Linklater, 1998). In an international society 
that is solidary by nature, international law is developed through displaying solidarity 
(Bull, 1966). The solidarity argument highlights those aspects of contemporary interna-
tional society that are based on shared values and norms including human rights, accepted 
methods of governance and international law (Bull, 1977). According to Buzan (2005), 
these shared norms and values are also visible through economics. 
In this regard, a pluralist ES scholar, Roper Jackson (2000) defines political and cul-
tural diversity as a basic feature of international society. In his view, practices, norms and 
institutions, including international law and diplomacy, are tools through which cultural 
plurality can be managed. Moreover, he argues that moral/legal ideas and a corresponding 
normative vocabulary enable diplomatic practices that are directed by certain assumptions 
and expectations concerning justified and unjustified conduct (Jackson, 2000: 24). Con-
cerning particular civilisations, such as the West, East Asia or the Muslim world, Jackson 
argues that a normative dialogue within international society is possible to the extent that 
it is separated from particular civilisational values (Jackson, 2001: 1). He further argues 
that world culture is foremost an elite culture: while having roots in the political culture 
of Europe, it has developed through globalisation beyond the initial Western-originated 
system (Jackson, 2000: 12). 
These questions are not merely theoretical, but have practical usage. The question con-
cerns socio-cultural, political and economic inclusion and exclusion. This entails binaries 
such as the global South contra the North, Western contra post-colonial Word, and the 
haves and have-nots. For instance, raising income differences that escalate into terrorism 
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have been seen as clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1993, 1996). As discussed above, in 
the context of East Asia, China in particular still insists that the West dictates international 
norms and practices. This not only gives reason for concern regarding the cultural cohe-
sion of international society, but also raises questions of whether and to what extent ar-
guments of cultural hegemony are used to create in-group cohesion and out-group deval-
uation. I will next turn to present those concepts of social psychology that will help in the 
understanding of how social identities and in-group cohesion are conceptualised. I will 
also discuss the implications of ‘national grievances’ for the study of international politics 
in general and China in particular.   
 
1.2. Individual Level 
First of all, within Western philosophical understanding, the distinction between rea-
son and emotion is usually seen as the defining characteristic of humanity (Brader and 
Marcus, 2013, 165). Consequently, based on neuroscientific assumptions the contempo-
rary study of political emotions centres on a few accepted psychological categories: where 
cognition-oriented scholars consider emotions as a form of knowledge and evaluative 
thought (Nussbaum, 2001; Hutto, 2012), a tradition concentrating on affection sees emo-
tions as non-reflective bodily functions (Massumi, 2002; Clore and Huntsinger, 2009).  
Emotions, according to contemporary neuroscience, are neural processes that are faster 
than the aware human consciousness, therefore producing appraisals that take place prior 
to cognition (Rolls, 2005). This implies that, instead of the traditional view of human 
consciousness where thinking is situated “inside” human awareness, affective precon-
scious appraisals in fact arise before the perceived consciousness (Brader and Marcus, 
2013: 171). A neuroscientific synthetisation would in comparison combine not only the 
cognitive and bodily origins of emotions, but also conscious and unconscious perceptions 
(LeDoux, 1995; Jeffery, 2011; Cunningham, Dunfield and Stillman, 2013). Much of this 
discussion moves away from a more traditional “rational-irrational” modelling of inter-
national political behaviour. Borrowing heavily from contemporary neuroscience, the 
“emotional turn” of political science uses emotions as models of explanation, not to jux-




For the purpose of this study, I retain a distinction between cognition (beliefs) and 
affective processes (emotions) in discussing social identities and in-group cohesion. To 
all intents and purposes then, the meaning of both cognition and emotion are obscure.9 
Nonetheless, as stated, I retain the basic division between cognition and emotion, because 
it accords with the social identity theory discussed below in regards to cognitive and mo-
tivational (emotion) in-group biases. 
Individual level emotions, in all shapes and forms, have been studied in a number of 
ways within political science.10 According to the bulk of studies, emotions that contribute 
the most to political action are high-arousal emotions such as fear, enthusiasm and anger 
(Marcus et al. 2000). Of these, fear and anger seem to have the biggest influence on risk 
behaviour (Lerner et al, 2003). Regarding what are referred to as moral emotions, i.e. 
shame, embarrassment and pride, these have been observed to influence adherence to 
group values in particular (Suhay, 2008). On the other hand, negative emotions such as 
anger and guilt have been found to be central in punishing norm violations (Nelissen and 
Zeelenberg, 2009). Regarding individual emotions that are essential in forming group 
behaviour, I will next turn to the Hegelian idea of recognition at the level of an individual. 
                                                 
9 In fact, Brader and Marcus (2013, 173) suggest that this division should be abandoned in favour 
of temporal categorisation that conceptualises emotions as having either “upstream” (precon-
scious) and “downstream” (conscious) dimensions.   
10 Crawford (2000: 116-118) highlights what she calls the “need for passion” in the field of political 
psychology by giving various reasons for the lack of the systemic study of emotion in interna-
tional politics. Firstly, there exists a ubiquitous assumption in IR theory where most state action 
is considered to be rational or at least intelligent. Secondly, where studying emotion would seem 
appropriate, the concentration is on cognition. Thirdly, Crawford labels as ironic the fact that 
those emotions that security scholars take for granted (fear and hate) are conceptualised as self-
evidently important and unproblematised. Finally, she refers to methodological dilemmas: emo-
tions seem ephemeral, internal, subjective and difficult to quantify and distinguish between “gen-
uine” and “instrumental” emotions.  Crawford further warns of the dangers of generalising indi-
vidual behaviour by giving it group attributes, including the states which, one assumes, is the 
reason she concentrates mainly on individual emotions, contributing less to a group level. 
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1.2.1. The Idea of Recognition 
The classical Hegelian model for recognition assumes that every individual has a basic 
need to receive recognition from other human beings. However, unlike other basic needs 
(shelter, food) that can be obtained without changing composition of the individual, the 
process of attaining recognition in itself influences what type of a person the individual 
becomes. Therefore, the creation of the ‘self’ requires the recognition of the ‘other’ 
(Greenhill, 2008, 348; see also Wendt, 2003: 559). Hegel’s idea of the human need for 
recognition proceeds in a certain pattern of social interaction. For instance, a newly borne 
infant needs recognition from the mother, whereby the understanding begins that the 
mother and ‘self’ are separate entities. In later stages of personal life, recognition proceeds 
from familial love to civil rights, leading to a social sense of self-esteem (Greenhill, 2008: 
349).  
In Axel Honneth’s interpretation of the need for recognition, instead of gradual pro-
ceedings, different stages go forward in a series of alternating steps between perceptions 
of conflict and reconciliation. In the first step, the need of the individual for recognition 
challenges existing social systems of order, creating subsequent orders that better suit the 
need for recognition. An alternating step arises when the new order inevitably proves 
unsatisfactory, leading to further conflict and struggle for recognition (Honneth, 1995: 
17). Each step of unfulfilled recognition potentially reveals to the individual novel aspects 
of his/her personality, thus releasing new energy to pursue the next step of struggle (Hon-
neth, 1995: 16). 
The struggle for recognition relates to affective processes, because recognition can 
only be achieved in the form of emotional approval and encouragement. In the view of 
Honneth: “The positive attitude which the individual is capable of assuming toward […] 
this type of emotional recognition is that of self-confidence” (Honneth, 1992: 193).  
Therefore, the underlying emotional layer in the struggle for recognition is a sense of 
individual security when expressing personal needs and feelings that, if successful, lead 
to attitudes of self-respect. Needless to say, when such attempts are unsuccessful they 
accordingly lead to negative emotions related to insecurity and disrespect (Honneth, 
1992: 202). This is especially true for group identities, which in the case of unsuccessful 






The existence of collective emotions without a collective physical body is one of the 
central dilemmas that most contemporary theorisations tackle. Much of the contemporary 
research that focuses on political psychology therefore aims to theorise the processes that 
render individual cognition and emotions collective and thus political.  This is especially 
true for those studies that focus on the role of emotions in international politics (e.g. Mer-
cer, 2014).  
Firstly, in conceptualising the links between the individual and the collective, viral 
models are used to explain the diffusion of emotion from an individual to a larger group. 
In these emotions are considered individual property, where the person is embedded in 
social interaction, then taking up signals from the environment and reacting emotionally 
and diffusing emotion back to the environment (Gross Stein, 2013: 384).  Secondly, and 
relating to the appraisal theory discussed above, it is suggested that emotions spread 
through processes of social appraisal.  Here emotions spread “based on social appraisal 
[that] occurs because someone else’s perceived affect carries information that alters our 
appraisal of the emotional meaning of what is happening” (Parkinson and Simmons, 
2009: 1071). Humiliation, for instance, carries an implication of the understanding of 
social norms: without that shared understanding, it would be impossible to feel humilia-
tion or plan communication that would humiliate (Gross Stein, 2013: 385).  
Hutchinson and Bleiker (2014: 497) make a conceptual distinction between micro and 
macro approaches, in order to understand the processes through which “seemingly indi-
vidual emotions either become or are at once public, social, collective, and political”. One 
of the revelations stemming from the divide between micro and macro is the argument 
that individual emotions, even when felt in individual bodies, are formed and structured 
within particular social and cultural environments (Hutchinson and Bleiker 2014: 497). 
Moreover, emotions are constituted within culturally-specific traditions such as language, 
habits and memories. Following Harré (1986) and Lutz (1988), Hutchinson and Bleiker 
(2014: 504) further argue that specific social and cultural surroundings influence how 
individuals gain an understanding of “what it means to feel”. 
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1.3.1. Social Identity Approach and Group Behaviour 
If various viral models therefore offer solutions to the ‘emotions-without-body’ di-
lemma, the same approach can be generalised into identities. There are thus good grounds 
to make the case for the existence of collective self-identities. Social identity theory (SIT), 
in its basic form, maintains that identities are the product of both personal and social 
perceptions (Cottam, 1992: 7). The theory emphasises the motivation of group members 
“to differentiate their own groups positively from others to achieve a positive social iden-
tity” (Turner et al, 1987, 42). SIT thus highlights collective symbolic concerns, i.e. the 
meaning of the group’s social status for the development of group cohesion (Huddy, 
2013: 741). SIT also emphasises social prestige, self-esteem and inter-group respect as 
explanations of group behaviour (Tajfel and Turner, 1986).  
Factors that influence the development of in-group cohesion include inclusiveness, 
distinctiveness and a need for certainty (Hogg, 2007; Leonardelli, Pickett and Brewer, 
2010). This has political implications in the form of positive group dissociation: group 
identity and in-group bias appear among the members of high-status groups since their 
membership distinguishes group members from non-group members in a positive manner 
(Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton and Hume, 2001; Huddy, 2013). Perceived threat is also a 
central factor in conceptualising group behaviour. It has the potential to create in-group 
cohesion and out-group demonisation (Huddy, Sears, and Levy, 2013: 15).   
In addition to subjective interests, groups typically share common goals, or as such 
perceived, to form cohesion. To these Stephan and Stephan (2000) and Huddy (2013) 
incorporate both material (e.g. income and employment) and symbolic (group esteem and 
respect) threats. The SIT especially focuses on the latter as a defence of group status in 
creating group cohesion, where perceptions of group power, status and culture are con-
sidered symbolic interests. 
A derivative of the SIT, the self-categorisation theory, emphasises cognitive aspects 
of the mechanism that influence social identification (Turner, 1991). Together with SIT, 
the self-categorisation theory forms the social identity approach (Turner, 1991), which 
allows, for instance, for differentiating between cognitive and motivational approaches.  
In the context of in-group biases, a cognitive approach is based on the premise that reality 
as a complex world is too complicated for limited human cognition to grasp, so simplifies 
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it through self-categorisation (Levy, 2013: 308). Thus, due to limited rationality, individ-
uals apply a multitude of cognitive shortcuts to “simplify complexity and manage uncer-
tainty, handle information, make inferences, and generate threat perceptions (Gross-Stein, 
2013: 371). Limited individual mental capacities also make it difficult to process complex 
information and meet rational standards in attempts to maximise interests (Levy, 2013: 
308). The cognitive approach highlights the process of categorisation as important for the 
development of in-group cohesion (Huddy, 2013: 739-740). Individual identity accord-
ingly has the capacity to develop into group identity through adherence to collective 
norms and reinforced self-stereotyping (Terry and Hogg, 1996). Importantly, simplifica-
tions and heuristic shortcuts can be helpful in structuring the world, but are also sources 
of errors and bias, which are known as cognitive or unmotivated biases that occur inde-
pendently of emotions (Levy, 2013: 308).  
In contrast to cognitive approach and bias, motivated biases are driven by individual 
emotional needs. Motivational biases occur when high stakes that influence important 
values are at play, especially people’s need to maintain their self-esteem (Levy, 2013: 
309).  In decision-making both cognitive and motivational biases give rise to the same 





                                                 
11 Theorising on psychology and foreign policy decision-making, however, not only aims to ex-
plain bias and error. To this end, Mercer (2005) proceeds to correct the “misbelief” that psychol-
ogy in the study of international exists only to explain mistakes and misbeliefs. On the contrary, 
Mercer argues that psychological factors can also explain rational choices, strategies and behav-
iour through both emotion and cognition. As an explanatory framework for rational emotional 
behaviour, Mercer (2014) later advances the notions of social emotion and group behaviour as a 
unit of analysis through common identity. Moreover, the importance of recognition, drive for 
self-esteem, and impact of past humiliations in political psychology have been emphasised (Le-
bow, 2010; Lindeman, 2010), supporting Honneth’s analysis of Hegel’s recognition theory 
through collective social value. 
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1.3.2. Social Value of Groups 
 
The idea of respect by Hegel and Axel Honneth’s interpretation of it has significant 
implications for the group level of analysis. As stated above, according to the idea, every 
individual possesses a need to be recognised by social peers. The recognition takes place 
through an emotional affirmation, and when successful leads to positive self-assurance 
and self-esteem.  In the case of denial of recognition, individuals who see themselves as 
victims, resort to different explanations, that is, categories of the different forms of recog-
nition denial. These are divided into three different forms depending on the respective 
degree to which they are capable of upsetting the actor (Honneth, 1992: 188-191). The 
first concerns a person’s physical integrity. This is the most fundamental form of mal-
treatment, and concerns physical injury such as rape or torture. The second degradation 
concerns an individual’s normative understanding of the ‘self’. In this case, an actor is 
denied fully-fledged participation in a community by being denying structural and insti-
tutional rights. The final degradation “entails negative consequences for the social value 
of individuals or groups” (Honneth, 1992: 190). These include the denigration of collec-
tive life-styles, honour, dignity or status, which signify a degree of acceptance towards a 
group’s collective method of self-realisation. Consequently, the group that is the victim 
of the third type of degradation, may suffer from loss of self-esteem and experiences of 
disrespect (Honneth, 1992: 191). Therefore, should the third type of disapproval take 
place, it opens up negative psychological reactions in the form of negative collective 
emotions such as shame, anger, offence and contempt (Honneth, 1992: 197).  
To be more precise then, for Honneth (1993: 269) the struggle for recognition repre-
sents a form of purposive-rational action between groups. In other words, regarding the 
legitimacy of social arrangements, if emotions of disrespect surface, collective struggles 
may follow. Accordingly, when the need for recognition is confirmed, social arrange-
ments tend to remain stable (see also Haacke, 2005: 187). Honneth’s explanation of social 
conflict is therefore symbolic rather than interest-based, where disrespect becomes col-
lective if genuinely shared with group members. In the words of Honneth: “only if sub-
jects are able to articulate them within an intersubjective framework of interpretation that 
they can show to be typical for an entire group” (Honneth, 1996: 163). The relevance of 
Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel to the study of international politics is that nationalism 
and national identities offer ample room for intersubjective interpretations that are per-




1.4. International Level 
In addition to social and political psychologists, IR scholars have also paid increasing 
attention to how cognition and emotions can be conceptualised as collective. This in-
cludes how emotions are shared and to what extent a “mood of the nation” or “national 
psyche” is a viable concept (e.g. Saurette, 2006).  
To give an example, take realism. The realist argument holds that in a world of anarchy 
and self-help, states must rely on accurate representations of the world and react accord-
ingly in a timely manner. This leads to political actors making judgments from a position 
of over-suspicion, where worst-case scenarios are deemed prudent because the penalties 
of being wrong in a zero-sum game are severe. However, according to Goldgeier and 
Tetlock (2001), under certain conditions the logic of the structural realism is not valid 
while the actors are willing to take riskier measures than the model would suggest. The 
conditions are 1) The decision-makers have not made psychological peace with their 
losses; 2) they underestimate the subjective probabilities of failure by treating small prob-
abilities as functionally equivalent to zero; and 3) they overestimate the subjective prob-
abilities of success by treating large probabilities as equivalent to one. The subjective bias 
and possibility for error do not therefore necessarily follow any logical analysis in the 
realist framework (Goldgeier and Tetlock, 2001: 70). To give an example of the states 
that have not psychologically adjusted to losses, Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001: 71) men-
tion Serbia in 1990s, Germany in 1939 and Japan in 1940.  In comparison, when states 
are in a winning position, they would be more likely to accept the status quo rather than 
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pursue resources, for instance, the initial reluctance of NATO to expand to Eastern Eu-
rope post-Cold War. What has not been mentioned is China which, it seems, would not 
psychologically have accepted the loss of Taiwan.12 
It is therefore justified to consider that approaches borrowed from social psychology 
can be appropriate in the study of international politics. As stated at the beginning, my 
purpose in this chapter was to defend the assumption that, to all intents and purposes, the 
functioning of states is analoguous to people. My specific purpose was to discuss, through 
Axel Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s idea of recognition, how the social concept of 
disrespect would be appropriate for the study of China’s soft power. I will do this below 
by starting with an example drawn from social psychology by Carl Gustav Jung. 
 
1.4.1. National Grievances and Disrespect 
As an important element in forming group consciousness, prior studies recognise emo-
tions of power deprivation, that is, ‘grievances’ (Miller and Sarat, 1981). One case where 
grievances as non-material and symbolic interests were used as an explanation for state 
behaviour relates to Nazi Germany, and was done by Carl Gustav Jung in 1946. Jung 
reflected the German collective psyche as an explanation for the emergence and deeds of 
the Nazi regime. The premise of Jung held that, if any symptom is common to a sufficient 
number of individuals, it can be considered a mass phenomenon, and moreover, that the 
                                                 
12 Accordingly, the constructivist model emphasises the juxtaposition of how people perceive 
themselves in a situation (social identities) and their normative assessments of the context of the 
situation (how do my type of people behave?). Here the argument of Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001) 
is that, on a fundamental level, a psychological analysis would agree with the constructivist ap-
proach. Here two starting points are recognised for deepening the constructivist view: 1) The 
consideration of the nature of the information-processing task with which any observer is con-
fronted in trying to draw causal inferences or policy lessons from world politics, and 2) the limi-
tations of the capacity of the human mind. Just as the constructivist point of view would suggest, 
the cognitivist also considers all causal inferences and policy lessons the products of mental con-
structions. However, as Goldgeier and Tetlock (2001: 83) conclude, there would be a fundamental 
difference for the constructivist school: a psychological approach recognises that there exist infi-
nite possibilities of what could, should, might happen or might have happened as a mental con-
struction of alternative worlds. Therefore, a simplification is needed to reduce the numbers of 
possibilities to an amount humanly possible to manage.  
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psychopathology of the masses is rooted in the mentality of the individual (Jung, 1946:1). 
In explaining the key concepts of group mentalities in detail, the biological relationship 
between the unconscious processes and the activity of the conscious mind was described 
by Jung as compensation: in experiencing deficiencies of any sort, the unconscious side 
of the mind compensates. If such a compensatory move is not integrated into the con-
scious side of the mind as a balanced individual would do, it leads to neuroses and even 
psychoses. This would be true for both the individual and thus the collective (Jung 1946: 
1-2). Any person, suffering from disturbances in the subconscious, for instance from 
long-lasting feelings of inferiority, would ultimately suffer from psychic hysteria. The 
hysterical disposition refers to the a-normal distance of opposites between sentiments of 
inferiority and self-assurance (Jung 1946: 62-63). 
Jung argued that the German population had suffered from long-term feelings of infe-
riority leading to overcompensation and psychic hysteria. The deep polar distance be-
tween long-lasting emotions of inferiority and self-assurance and the following psycho-
logical hysteria is the central element in the unraveling of Nazi Germany by Jung. The 
long-lasting feelings of inferiority, beginning with the First World War, as the uncon-
scious national element of Germany were overcompensated for by introducing conscious 
feelings of superiority.13 Jung grounded his argument in the reductionist premise that the 
                                                 
13 For Jung, this was the reason why the German population could not see the tragicomic side of 
the Nazi party with boastful uniforms, extravagant rallies, and small-minded leaders, all of which 
would have been apparent at the time to the majority of the rest of the world. This would also 
explain why otherwise relatively balanced people could perpetrate such a massive inhumane 
crime as the Holocaust. 
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psychopathology of the masses is rooted in individual psychology, and that this sort of 
psychic phenomenon can be investigated through the individual.14 
In his analysis, but using his own concepts, Jung depicts Germany’s struggle for recog-
nition and those repercussions that may take place if the process of recognition results in 
failure. Also in this case, paraphrasing Jung, the need for recognition mattered since it 
represented a process within which an actor came to exist as an actor within international 
society and embrace a certain identity in that society. Jung and Nazi Germany are, in fact, 
not the only instance where national grievances and recognition in an IR or similar context 
have been applied. For instance, Franz Fanon (1967) points out that the developing world 
is struggling for recognition, which is social-psychological in nature. Hedley Bull’s 
(1984) the Revolt Against the West thematically deals with the same issue. More recently, 
Erik Ringmar (1995) applies the approach in studying Sweden’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union. Finally, Philip Nel (2010) uses the struggle for recognition as a framework 
to discuss emerging regional powers. 
The ES approach seems most useful as a general framework to accommodate the more 
specific social psychological concept of struggle for recognition, since the tradition by 
                                                 
14 The actual synthesis between psychology (or psycho-analysis) and sociology (or sociological 
thinking) has been credited to the Frankfurt School advancing critical theory by combining anti-
positivist (or post-positivist) sociology, existential philosophy and psycho-analysis. Among the 
most notable post-Freudian members of the Frankfurt School who contributed psychoanalytically 
to sociology are Herbert Marcuse and his Eros and Civilisation (1956) and Erich Fromm and his 
Escape from Freedom (1941) and The Sane Society (1955). Perhaps the most famous representa-
tive of the Frankfurt School remains Jyrgen Habermas and especially his 1968 book Knowledge 
and Human Interest, investigating the relationship between modernity and self-reflection 
through, among other things, psychoanalysis. 
What sets Fromm and other post-Freudians apart from Jung, is a Freudian interpretation of the 
individual as a social, not biological animal. This led Fromm (1941)  in the Fear of Freedom to 
discuss how modern man, after freeing himself from medieval ties, was not yet in fact actually 
free to build a meaningful life, but looked for security in submission to a leader and the state. In 
The Sane Society (1955), in contrast, Fromm moved away from totalitarian arrangements to argue 
that the 20th century democratic system also presents a type of “escape from freedom” through 
the alienation of the Western man from his fellow citizen, the government, and the world in gen-
eral. Significant to this analysis in both contributions by Fromm is his systematic incorporation 
of psychoanalysis in cultural criticism. 
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definition conceptualises international politics as a society where social actors interact 
according to their personal inclinations. The question of whether international society 
forms a universal or hierarchical culture fits the struggle for recognition particularly well, 
and opens up further possibilities to apply individual-level social psychological concepts 
to the international level. In other words, in a hierarchically perceived culture, it is not 
very far-fetched to imagine that some actors may feel social inclusion or exclusion. If the 
latter takes place, the struggle for recognition and perception of disrespect follows. 
In fact, following Greenhill (2008: 344), here I make a distinction between formal and 
informal demands for recognition. The former refers to those forms of recognition where 
states are officially recognised by the international community, for instance, former sat-
ellites of the Soviet Union that were recognised as independent and sovereign states. In 
addition to the formal recognition politics, as argued, there exists a particular symbolic 
need by states to be recognised. Acknowledging this type of approach can be more fruitful 
in explaining state behaviour than material explanations, an argument that accords with 
Honneth’s symbolic explanation of social conflicts outlined above. 
In the case of perceived disrespect, using Honneth’s approach we can also ask what 
further forms of disrespect take place. The question carries certain relevance in the sphere 
of public diplomacy communication, which more often than not entails country-specific 
strategies, tactics and aims that may or may not stem from national grievances and even 
traumas, using Jung’s formulation.   
According to the advocates of the ‘struggle for recognition’ within IR, the history of  
present international society is in fact the history of the struggle for recognition (Ringmar, 
2015: 11). Already in 1984, Hedley Bull wrote about the various forms that the, what he 
called, Revolt Against the West took. According to Bull (1984: 219-220) Western domi-
nance peaked at the turn of the century in 1900, not in technological or cultural terms, but 
in psychological supremacy. The consequent struggles represented equal sovereignty, 
post-colonial liberation, racial equality, economic justice and cultural liberation.15 Philip 
                                                 
15 Of these five, the first four comprised struggles for values, which were Western-originated and 
thus did not, in fact, represent revolts against the West. The last one, in contrast, referred to the 
struggle of the non-Western world to have recognition of their own right: “the struggle of non-
Western peoples to throw off the intellectual or cultural ascendency of the Western word so as to 
assert their own identity and autonomy in matters of the spirit” (Bull, 1984, 222). 
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Nel (2010) also applied the concept of recognition to the study of Global South. In his 
view, the regional leaders of the South struggle to be recognised as full and equal partners 
in the society of states who have specific development needs that the Global North is too 
often indifferent to. Erik Ringmar (2002) applies the struggle for recognition to an East-
West structure in explaining the behaviour of Soviet Russia towards the West, through an 
identity-based model that he coins the ‘recognition game’. Ringmar (2002: 120) writes: 
“The struggle concerns not the distribution of utilities, but instead of who should have the 
right to impose what description on whom. This is how the master is separated from the 
slave, the superior being from the inferior”. The gist of Ringmar’s game setting is that 
recognition or the denial of it takes place between mutual intercourse where identities are 
not fixed but develop over time. Using the same analogy, Ringmar argues that in the long 
run the recognition received from a slave will not satisfy the master, since this is not 
recognition from a peer. The slave, in his current position, will prove himself through 
education, and as a result of self-transformation will one day become equal to the master, 
now representing a person of whose recognition the master has sought. This way mutual 
recognition is achieved.    
Chinese soft power and public diplomacy seem to lie rather fittingly within this frame-
work. Consider, for instance, the following.  The leadership of the PRC seems to be con-
cerned about the perception of China in European and US media. Consequently, Chinese 
state media and PRC government spokespersons frequently claim that Western media is 
biased against China. Only recently, Chinese state media accused Western news outlets 
of bias against the BRIC countries (Xinhua, 2015), China’s engagement in the South-
China Sea (Global Times, 2016), and even China’s growth figures (China Daily, 2016).  
The question then of what forms this type of struggle represents is an interesting one. 
Does it concern colonial, racial, economic or cultural liberation? In the case of China, one 
could image that the struggle for economic liberation, at least, is no longer very relevant.  
In any case, the PRC leadership has come to the conclusion that the strength of Chinese 






1.5. Putting Theory into Practice 
This chapter took up the issue of connecting the theoretical discussion and empirical 
approaches presented in this study. In this context, nonetheless, I would like to raise a 
few points concerning the empirical and methodological application of the theory.  
First of all, as a general framework for the study the ontology of the English School 
guides the methodological choices. As discussed, there are two basic characteristics 
within the English School. Firstly, there is the assumption that the conduct of international 
politics forms a type of international society, where the tradition highlights states people 
and their inclinations as a central focus of analysis. This means the interests, concerns, 
limitations, ambitions, miscalculations, desires, hopes, fears and, in a word, emotions of 
presidents, ministers, diplomats, generals and other actors who act on behalf of the state 
(Bellamy, 2005: 12). The English School typically studies the activities of states people, 
such as making war/peace, negotiations, giving assurances, sabre-rattling, appeasing, etc. 
(Jackson and Sörensen, 1999: 140-142). Secondly, through Wight’s (1991) initial discus-
sion of the three approaches within the English School (realism, rationalism and revolu-
tionism), methodological pluralism has been raised as the second central characteristic of 
the tradition. Here Linklater (1990) connects the three traditions to methodological plu-
ralism: realism with positivism, rationalism with hermeneutics, and revolutionism with 
critical theory (see also Little, 2009: 88-94). 
The preferred choice among the ES, methodological pluralism, nonetheless, does not 
imply ontological or epistemological pluralism, nor that, as far as methods are concerned, 
‘anything goes’. Naveri (2009: 5-12), for instance,  points out some ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ in 
regards to the methodological pluralism of the ES: 1) instead of an actor, the ES mainly 
treats the state as a setting or structure, 2) instead of a realist power calculus, the ES is 
mainly interested in the perception of power, 3) the ES is interested in actors in more or 
less rationally understood situations, that is, as homo sociologus, and 4) as a derivative of 
the previous point, the ES is interested in understanding social context where social action 
takes place.  
With this in mind, I will employ a set of methods that leans towards the methodological 
pluralism of the ES: the rhetorical analysis studies perception (image of the ‘other’), the 
media analysis propensity (actor choice), and the automated content analysis of China’s 
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overall news media image that relates to both perception (status) and propensity (assess-
ment of situation) components.  In addition, the rhetorical analysis aims to examine the 
development of Chinese out-group/in-group intensity. It accords with the understanding 
of Johnston (1999) that strong in-group identities have the potential to lead to the deval-
uation of out-groups. Accordingly, following the logic, the stronger the in-group identity, 
the stronger the perceptions of competitive out-group relations. It follows therefore that 
the level of intensity of in-group identification has relevance. In the case of China, the 
level of intensity of national identification should correlate with the hostility towards an 
out-group, in this case the US or the West in general.  
I understand therefore that the methods I have chosen comply with Naveri’s (2009) 
“dos and don’ts” of ES, particularly in the points 2, 3, and 4. In this study I am not inter-
ested in soft power calculus, but the perception of it (Chapter 7), I try to place China in a 
rationally defined situation (Chapter 3), and I make a point in attempting to understand 
the particular social context where the phenomenon under investigation takes place 
(Chapter 4). Within the context of this dissertation, I do, however, consider the Chinese 
state a fairly homogeneous actor. 
 
 
1.6.  Summary 
This chapter reviewed the formation of identities, their transference to collective social 
identities, and the consequent implications for the study of international society. The pur-
pose of bridging the various levels of analysis (individual, group, international) was to 
make the point that the struggle for recognition is universal in its humanistic application 
and thus appropriate for the international level transcending relativistic cultural claims. 
In terms of identity formation, the idea of an international society, as advanced by the ES, 
by its very definition views states as social actors.   
By implication, experiences of disrespect not only matter in the study of international 
politics, but also beg the question of what forms the struggle for recognition may take. In 
the context of China’s soft power, I attempt to provide a detailed answer to this question 
in the next chapter by modelling Chinese public diplomacy communication into compo-
nents of perception (image of the ‘other/cultural and political status) and propensity (di-





2. THEORETICAL MODEL: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DECISION-MAK-
ING 
 
In Chapter 1, I argued on behalf of the ‘state-as-person’ position, which maintained 
that individual-level cognition and emotions are generalisable to group- and therefore to 
international level. This chapter in contrast draws from communication studies. The guid-
ing idea is that information, including group-level emotions (in this case grievances), 
which concern social identities, norms and prototypical behaviour (acquiring, validating, 
changing) is mediated through communication (Noels, Giles, and Le Poire, 2003). This 
is especially true of common category memberships that are found to reinforce inter-sub-
jectivity and provide a framework for collective meaning-making (Hogg and Reid, 2006: 
13). Against this background, my purpose in this chapter is to sketch a model of commu-
nication that links social identity (image/perception) and behaviour (actor choice), and to 
briefly place it in the context of the PRC public diplomacy decision-making. 
This chapter thus connects social psychology to media studies in general and PRC 
public diplomacy communication in particular. I will first discuss different conceptuali-
sations of soft power and public diplomacy. Particular attention is paid to the theoretical 
links between media and, on the one hand public opinion, and on the other, decision-
makers. Thereafter, I present a theoretical model of factors that influence US public opin-
ion of China by Wang and Shoemaker (2011: 2). Based on this, I proceed to construct a 
theoretical model of public diplomacy decision-making by reviewing those theoretical 
factors drawn from social psychology that are relevant for intergroup communication and 
thus influence actor perception and propensity components. I support the model with a 
preliminary review of Chinese public diplomacy based on secondary sources. The pur-
pose of this discussion is to validate and calibrate, so to speak, the model. The secondary 
sources are chosen to give justification to the model, so contradictory literature is disre-






2.1. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy 
As a policy and practice, public diplomacy16 became a substantial part of state agenda 
during the Cold War when the superpowers undertook campaigns to foster support for 
their respective ideology and the nuclear balance. A second phase in the development of 
public diplomacy practices was partly coincidental and partly a consequence of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks (Gilboa, 2008). On the one hand, more developed information technology 
allowed widespread and cost-effective communication possibilities (Castells, 2009) and, 
on the other, the attacks themselves caused re-polarisation on a global scale where fa-
vourable perceptions and alluring narratives again played an increasing role (Gilboa, 
1998; 2000; 2001; 2002; 2005; 2008). In the aftermath of 9/11, widespread confusion still 
influenced public diplomacy practices and research. Holbrooke (2001: B07), for instance, 
noted “Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or – if you 
really want to be blunt – propaganda.”   
Various approaches are still visible in present-day conceptualisations where the unit-
ing factor concerns the influencing of foreign audiences for political gain. To be more 
specific, public diplomacy was earlier defined as “direct communication with foreign 
peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their govern-
ments” (Malone, 1985: 199), and more recently as communication with the general public 
of foreign nations aiming to influence people abroad to accomplish policy agenda (Waller 
2007: 23). Public diplomacy is also noted as a marketing problem centring on the premise 
that providing audiences with more information leads to anticipated policy outcomes (Li, 
2013: 1724). Moreover, the practice is seen as understanding the needs of other countries, 
                                                 
16 Among academics, it is usually agreed that public diplomacy and soft power have a conceptual 
connection. However, as to the nature of the connection, two trends can be observed. While some 
define soft power projection as the “major component of a country’s public diplomacy strategy” 
(for instance d’Hooghe, 2011: 24), others see public diplomacy as an “official policy translating 
soft power resources into action” (for instance Gilboa, 2008: 61). The views differ in that primacy 
is given either to public diplomacy or soft power, and that either ‘soft power’ is something that 
‘public diplomacy’, among other things, conveys, or that ‘public diplomacy’, among other things, 
is one tool in a grand soft power strategy.  The position I take in this study follows the latter, i.e. 
the view where public diplomacy is considered a vehicle for soft power projection. This not only 
seems to be the most logical approach in that public diplomacy is considered a concrete policy 
and soft power a fuzzy concept and an overall framework, but it also accords with the Chinese 
understanding of the two concepts. 
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cultures and people, communicating one’s own views and correcting misperceptions 
(Leonard 2002: 8). Three interdependent realms are also mentioned in the context of pub-
lic diplomacy: news management, strategic communication and relationship-building. 
News management aims to shape foreign and domestic media on a day-to-day basis, stra-
tegic communication is considered an intermediate activity communicating strategic mes-
sages of nation promotion and, finally, the purpose of relationship-building is to develop 
long-term contacts fostering goodwill (Sun 2010: 9-10. See also Leonard 2002; Nye 
2010). Distinctions have also been made between “public diplomacy” where state and 
non-state actors communicate to influence public opinion in foreign societies, and “media 
diplomacy” where state actors use the media to promote mutual interests, negotiations, 
and conflict resolution, and “media broker diplomacy” where journalists are considered 
to temporarily assume the role of diplomats by serving as mediators in international ne-
gotiations (Gilboa, 2008: 58).  
Moreover, d’Hooghe (2011: 20) following Sharp (2005: 106) has advanced a defini-
tion of public diplomacy where it is understood as “the process by which direct relations 
with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of 
those being represented”. This more precise definition is referred to as “new public di-
plomacy”, and is part of a world view where “postmodern transnational relations, the 
roles and responsibilities of actors in international relations are no longer clearly deline-
ated and most actors are nearly as much in control as they would like to be” (d’Hooghe, 
2011: 20). Finally, Gilboa (2000; 2001; see also 2008: 57-58) differentiates between three 
models of public diplomacy. These are: 
1) The Basic Cold War model referring to the information and persuasion 
campaigns used by the two superpowers in an antagonistic relationship to 
achieve long-term results in foreign societies.  
2) The Non-State Transnational model referring not only to the emergence of 
new non-state transnational actors in international affairs such as NGOs, 
but also to the increased and considerable interdependence of all actors, 
requiring a revision to the Cold War model. 
3) Domestic PR model referring to state actors hiring PR firms and lobbyists 
in the target country to achieve policy aims. 
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The basic Cold War model is usually used in the context of authoritarian regimes, 
while the other two have been applied to democratic and liberal countries. PRC public 
diplomacy seems to be a curious mix of the first and third models. PRC bureaucracy 
seems to consider communication as a zero-sum-game between China and the West, the 
US in particular, where the PRC has used international PR firms and lobbyists. Conse-
quently, the PRC itself mainly seems to interpret all Western activity – state and non-state 
alike – through the basic Cold War model.  Within this framework, in this study I will 
mainly consider China’s mid- to long-term strategic communication mediated either 
through traditional news media or entertainment media. 
How, then, does this type of public diplomacy work? In other words, through what 
mechanisms do state actors shape the policy environment of a foreign country? Prior re-
search recognises the connection between mass media and, on the one hand, public opin-
ion, and on the other, decision-makers in a foreign country. Both connections are mainly 
attributed to the fact that most people, whether decision-makers or not, lack direct expe-
riences, and hence are relying on the media to form opinions of foreign countries. The 
factual knowledge of public or individuals regarding foreign countries can indeed be lim-
ited, as evidenced by the documented ignorance of the US public regarding foreign affairs 
(Carpini and Keeter, 1997).  
Regarding the public, a seminal study by Perry (1985) found that, in contrast to their 
personal knowledge, respondents relied on news to make inferences about foreign coun-
tries. More recent studies have also shown how mass media shapes the public opinion of 
other nations (Wanta, Golan, and Lee, 2004; Entman, 2004). Moreover, regarding agenda 
setting, prior research finds a correlation between the salience of foreign affairs in media 
and the salience for foreign affairs of the general public (Wanta and Hu, 1993; Soroka, 
2003). Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) also show in detail how the US media shapes public 
opinion on foreign countries: when the US media covers foreign countries in a negative 
tone, the public tends to have a negative opinion of those countries. In contrast, a positive 
or neutral tone does not show any effect on public opinion. In general, public diplomacy 
and public relation campaigns by foreign nations have been shown to potentially influ-
ence the public opinion and foreign policy of a foreign country by targeting its main-
stream media coverage (Manheim and Albritton, 1984). Furthermore, in the US a foreign 
policy issue will only receive public attention once it has received mainstream news cov-
erage (Powlick and Katz, 1998). 
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Drawing from prior research, it is therefore possible to conceptually link media cov-
erage and public opinion. Consequently, a number of studies also show how the media 
influences policy decision-makers. For instance, it has been argued that the media not 
only sets the agenda for the public but also for policy-makers by making an issue salient 
(Liu, 2006). It would also seem that a major source of instability in US politics is the 
shifting attention of the media (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Furthermore, media fram-
ing has the potential to influence how the public and policy-makers perceive an issue 
(Dearing and Rogers, 1996; Kiousis, 2004). Arguably, there exists a connection between 
the salience of foreign affairs in US media and an increase in US defence spending (So-
roka, 2003). It has also been demonstrated that there exists a link between media coverage 
and foreign aid: the salience of a recipient country in the domestic press influences the 
amount of aid the said county receives (Van Belle, Rioux, and Potter, 2004).  
Studies that have interviewed policy-makers make the point that the news media is a 
major source of information for them (O’Heffernan, 1991). In a seminal study, Cohen 
(1963) argues that policy-makers and diplomats rely on mass media to map the world 
(Cohen, 1963: 12-13). Diplomats are also prone to relying on mass media in their report-
ing, which according to Cohen (1963) is shaped by the press (Cohen, 1963: 209-212). 
Moreover, considering the major developments in communication technologies including 
the internet, studies show that both traditional and new media continue to shape the envi-
ronment where foreign policy is made (Potter, 2002). Finally, nation-branding efforts do 
not seem to succeed if the media coverage and public perception of a country is negative 
(Golan, 2013). Political leaders also seem to pay attention to public attitudes when devel-
oping policies, thus public opinion has the potential to influence foreign policy, especially 
in democratic countries (Sobel, 2001; Holsti, 2004). Thus, China for instance may have 
an impact on the foreign policy of a Western democracy by trying to influence local pub-
lic opinion and attitudes.   
 
2.2. Predispositions Influencing Public Diplomacy 
In their model of public diplomacy, Wang and Shoemaker (2011) depict the causal factors 
that influence US public opinion of China. In constructing the model, they draw from a 
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number of studies.17 The basic gist of their theoretical argument is that the characteristics 
of a country and public relations efforts of that country influence both its media image 
and public opinion in a foreign country. Moreover, as also argued above, media image 
influences public opinion. In constructing their model, nonetheless, Wang and Shoemaker 
(2011) review only briefly China’s public relations efforts from an empirical point of 
view, nor do they elaborate on the various components that may influence public diplo-
macy decision-making. I will take up this task below. 
                                                 
17 According to their discussion, first of all the effect of various characteristics such as country’s 
geographic, economic, social and political and cultural attributes have been shown to influence 
news coverage (Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger, 1987; Chang, 1998). In more specific terms, 
‘extra media factors’ (trade, population, geographic distance) have been observed to influence the 
volume of country-specific news coverage (Rosengren, 1977). Moreover, trade and population 
affected the volume of media coverage African countries gained in the New York Times (Shore 
and Todd, 1979). Also, the level of both GDP and population was found to predict the quantity 
of coverage in Japanese news (Ishii, 1996). Countries with higher socio-economic and cultural 
status were also more likely to receive more coverage than other countries (Chang, 1998). Addi-
tionally, the volume of trade was found to relate positively to the volume a country receives in 
foreign media (Wu, 2000). Finally, it was suggested that international news coverage is positively 
associated with national economic development, political freedom and the level of population 
(Kim and Barnett, 1996). Regarding the connection between country characteristics and opinion 
of foreign countries, prior research suggested that the more similar two countries are in terms of 
culture and politics, the more favourable opinions their populations have of each other (Nincic 
and Russet, 1979). More specifically, Wanta and colleagues (2004) argued that when US media 
portrays foreign countries in a negative light, US public opinion tends to have a negative percep-
tion of those countries. Positive or neutral news did not have any effect. Moreover, Wilnat and 
collegues (2000) showed that the coverage of the US media can influence the criteria based on 




Figure 1 The theoretical model of the influences on public opinion of China in the 
US. Source: Wang and Shoemaker (2011: 2).  
 
The broad outline of the various components that I propose here is based on the social 
identity theory discussed in Chapter 2. The theory holds that social identity as a concept 
of self is usually derived from an individual’s group and from a perceived status of that 
group membership (as category arguments). In this regard, images are conceptualised as 
mental pictures, composed of cumulated experience-based “knowledge” of the surround-
ing world (Elgström, 2000: 68). National self-images that are collective “knowledge” are 
built on national identities that determine an actor’s sense of who they are based on their 
group membership, in this case, nationality (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). National images 
serve as “road maps” and “focal points”, telling policy-makers how to define a certain 
situation and giving them clues as to how to relate to environment (Goldstein and Keo-
hane, 1993: 3-30). National identities are therefore cognitive organising devices that help 
policy-makers interpret and understand the complex “reality” (Cottam and Shih, 1992). 
In this study, I primarily address two types of actor-oriented components of national 
identity: 1) Images of ‘Others’ intentions (positive or negative) and 2) cultural and polit-
ical status (inferior or superior) (Chaban et al., 2016; see also Elgström, 2000). Relevant 
to the model, image components can introduce two types of predispositions into actor 
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decision-making: 1) a diagnostic propensity, which influences the diagnostic of the situ-
ation and 2) a choice propensity, which leads an actor to favour certain types of actions 
(Chaban et al., 2016; see also Shimko, 1991; Cottam and Shih, 1992). Figure 2 illustrates 
the relationship between the perception component (‘self’ and ‘other’) and the following 
propensity component (diagnostic/actor choice) in the context of public diplomacy. In the 
next subchapters, I review the theoretical factors that influence each component. 
 
Figure 2 Theoretical model of the predispositions that influence an actor’s decision 










2.3. Perception Component 
 
In this study I consider strong identities and symbolic threats/grievances as catalysts 
for group-based social identities, that is, perceptions of status in intergroup relations.   
 
2.3.1. Cultural/Political Status: ‘Image of Self’ 
First of all, ‘Status dilemmas’ are considered as an example of grievances within in-
ternational political conduct. Closely related to ‘security dilemmas’, status dilemma oc-
curs when “two states would be satisfied with their status if they had perfect information 
about each other’s beliefs” (Gross-Stein, 2013, 367). Without the information, the leaders 
of one country may perceive its status as being challenged when in fact it is not. When 
that country then takes action, the other perceives that as threating, beginning a spiral 
movement. The status dilemma therefore sees states valuing status equally to security 
(Wohlforth, 2009; Lebow, 2010). Considering China, several observers who address 
China’s cultural and political history point to the direction where both PRC decision mak-
ers and public opinion consider China politically and culturally inferior, suffering from 
victimisation and national humiliation. It is a common understanding in China that the 
period 1840-1940 is commonly considered as the ‘century of national humiliation’ (for 
instance Callahan, 2004: 2010).  
Strong identities are found to be important in explaining the political influence of iden-
tities founded on both partisanship and ideology (Huddy (2013). Strong partisans are 
therefore more likely than others to make biased diagnostics of economic and social facts 
(Bartels, 2002). There is also evidence to support the view that such tendencies are linked 
more to identities and less to beliefs (Malka and Lelkes, 2010). Importantly, strong iden-
tities are found to provoke defensiveness when facing criticism targeted at the group 
(Huddy, 2013: 745). Among strong identifiers, ‘group prototype’ or ‘leader’ is a central 
concept that can be used to explain political group cohesion. They establish group bound-
aries and limit exchange with out-groups. Group prototypes, in this case, political leaders 
or national figures (factual or fictional) influence group members through their personal 
beliefs, actions and so forth (Huddy, 2013: 749). In China, it is claimed, the PRC leader-
ship has come to the conclusion that the strength of Chinese culture and its international 
influence are not compatible with China’s contemporary international status (Hu, 2012). 
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To support the view, there is some evidence that Chinese culture tends to be admired by 
foreign people, whereas its politics and governance are not (Wang, 2011: 6). For instance, 
it would seem that in several Asian countries the perception of China along the cultural 
dimension is more favourable than along the political one (Xie and Page, 2013: 854-855). 
Moreover, Chinese public diplomacy products tend to be viewed as propaganda in the 
West because they originate from a Communistic regime (Chu, 2014). One study ad-
dressed the contradiction between the peace-loving harmonious image the PRC wants to 
project and the image the US public holds of China of an authoritarian state (Wang, 2003: 
52-53). 
 
2.3.2. Intention of the ‘Other’: Intergroup Hostilities 
In the development of cohesion within political groups, intergroup hostilities play a 
significant role. In international politics, the concept of ‘gestalt’ approximates stereotyp-
ical ideas and is known as a form of general knowledge of other countries. Studies that 
apply the gestalt approach make the assumption that the individual actor perception of a 
given country is homogenous to the degree that it makes no practical sense to describe it 
partially (Herman, 2013: 338-341). As the intensity of the negative perception of inten-
tions of another country increases, with it increases the intent to construct a cognitive 
image regarding the other country, including negative aspects (Reeder, Pryor, Wohl, and 
Griswell, 2005).  
As a form of gestalt, perceived negative intentions of the ‘Other’ may result in a per-
ception of threat and eventually to the emergence of an enemy image. One reaction to the 
perception of threat is demonising a country (Herman, 2013: 342-353). Those threats in 
particular that are perceived as existential to the in-group have been found to reinforce 
group cohesion and identity (Huddy, 2013: 762).  Moreover, a perception of threat may 
be exaggerated due to emotions, incomplete information, institutional factors and cultural 
practices. Threat therefore can “become culturally routine, embedded in political institu-
tions, and acquires an almost taken-for-granted quality” (Gross-Stein, 2013: 368). An en-
emy image produces imagery on behalf of which is easy to act on desired goals. There-
fore, Herman (2013: 352) argues, enemy images may appear in many cases only as mere 
propaganda by the political elite in order to manipulate public opinion, but in this context 
they can be seen as “psychological defences that the elite come to believe in as they act 
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on their strategic desires”. When the concept of an enemy image is placed in the context 
of China, prior research highlights mutual mistrust and controversial relationship between 
the PRC public diplomacy bureaucracy and international media. For some Chinese schol-
ars, the Western media is negatively biased to the extent that it represents a conscious 
effort to demonise China (e.g. Li, 1996). The PRC has also been blamed for the mistreat-
ment of foreign journalists, in labelling them as a “force to contend with” (Tang, 2013: 
66) and, quite literarily, as “demons and unruly beasts, to be avoided at all costs” (Chen, 
2011: 101).  
One central concept that relates to perceived out-group hostilities is ‘prejudice’. In this 
context, prejudice refers to “beliefs about another group’s inferiority and feelings of ani-
mosity directed at the group” (Kinder, 2013: 814). In this instance, the beliefs that actors 
possess about other social groups are typically known as ‘stereotypes’ (Brown, 1986: 
188). Stereotypes are typical cognitive solutions to simplify reality into a form managea-
ble for humans. They also have the tendency to sharpen the boundaries between the in-
group and the out-group (Kinder, 2013: 822). Stereotypes also typically focus on the neg-
ative aspects of an out-group such as defects and deficiencies (Bobo and Massagli, 2001). 
To illustrate the empirical relevance of these concepts, I refer here to Zhang and Cameron 
(2003: 17-18) who report on questionnaires conducted at bilateral communication con-
ferences. In these instances, American journalists and policy-makers viewed US coverage 
of China as balanced and objective, while their Chinese colleagues strongly disagreed. 
To give further anecdotal evidence of prejudice and stereotypes of Western media that 
are typically used in China, Chu (2014: 163) quotes one Chinese blogger: “Whenever 
there is a conflict, western reporters will prefer to choose some selected views – you 
guessed it right – the views that are opposed to China […] They would rather prefer the 
Asians remain poor and under-developed, so that superiority of Western civilisation can 
be maintained in the region”. 
In Chapter 6, I will analyse Chinese journal articles published in Mainland China con-
nected to soft power and public diplomacy. As discussed in Chapter 1, I will apply a 
rhetorical analysis in order to flesh out the category arguments of the texts to further clar-
ify the underlining assumptions of the PRC soft power approach. These centre on the 
above-discussed concepts of gestalt, stereotype and an enemy image as catalysts for na-
tional identity and perception of China’s international status.  
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2.4. Propensity Component  
 
The final subchapter discusses the theory of action and the poliheuristic theory that ad-
dress the actor choice component in the model.18 
 
2.4.1. Assessment of Situation: Emotional Appraisal 
First of all, in the conduct of international politics it is typical that decision-makers 
exaggerate their own capabilities and the hostilities of adversaries (Levy, 2013: 312). This 
includes not only power relations but also symbolic issues such as reputation, complicat-
ing any decision-making process and is prone to lead to cognitive and motivational biases, 
as discussed above.  This could help to explain why Chinese police-makers not only insist 
that Western media governs the international setting, but that it also deliberately aims to 
demonise China (Ma and Hong, 2011). The globalisation of state-run Chinese media cor-
porations are also seen in China as facing barriers from a global communications system 
that serves Western-based transnational monopolies. China is thus not seen to be “fully” 
or neutrally represented by global media due to a Western-dominated structure of infor-
mation flow (Hu and Ji 2012: 32). Chinese scholars and police-makers also estimate that 
80% of the world news is produced by four Western news agencies; AP, UPI, AF and 
Reuters (Wen, 2010). These estimates would seem to represent a typical exaggeration of 
enemy hostilities that in this case concern symbolic issues. 
The theory of appraisal is aptly positioned to further clarify Chinese position. The the-
ory is drawn from social psychology, and in essence focuses on the relationship between 
appraisals and emotions. Within the approach, appraisals are understood as “cognitive 
interpretations of the significance of a situation for one’s goals that trigger emotions” 
(Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). While the claims of structural bias within the international 
media might have some claim to them, Chinese assessments of the situation seem to some 
extent to be based on emotional appraisals. The Chinese elite indeed seem to believe that 
                                                 
18 As Levy (2013, 316) shows, however, it should be noted that all key variables in international 




global media stereotypes China as an “oriental” nation-state, offering a biased and nega-
tive perspective. The distorted and demonised Western media bias is seen to stem from 
differences in news practice, ideology and national interest (Xiang, 2013: 255). More 
specifically, the historical, cultural and political “complexity” of China has been seen as 
posing challenges, especially to US journalists, at whose mercy the national image of 
China is perceived to be (Peng, 2004: 54-64).   
In those studies, conducted and published in Mainland China, the appraisal of Western 
media slant is even more persistent. For instance, Zhong and Zhang (2016) argue that, 
due to inherent tensions in Chinese rhetoric, the top-down approach of Chinese propa-
ganda, and anti-communist ideology of the Western media, China is stereotyped in inter-
national media. In contrast to those studies conducted and published in international jour-
nals, however, Chinese Mainland studies have also approached the issue through the pe-
riodisation of history. For instance, Li Xiguang (1996) divides the reporting of interna-
tional media after 1971 into the “Romanticised Period” (1970s), the “Angelised Period” 
(1980s), the “Demonised Period” (1990s), and the “Demonised Period” (21st century). 
Following Li (1996), He Ying (2004) also recognises historical periods: the “Horrible 
Stage” (1950-1972), the “Respect Stage” (1972-1979), the “Glorifying Stage” (1979-
1989), and finally the “Demonising Stage” (1989-2000) when China was depicted as dic-
tatorial, brutal, and authoritarian. Lu (2009) in turn, divides the history into three periods: 
the “Antagonistic Period” (1950s and 1960s), the “Cooling-off Period” (1970s and 
1980s), and the “Negative Period” (since the 1990s). Following the theory of appraisal, 
these Chinese assessments seem to exaggerate the significance of China and the intentions 
of Western journalist, thus evoking an emotional appraisal from these Chinese analysts.  
 
2.4.2. Choice of Action  
In addition to the emotional appraisal of a situation, there is evidence that emotional 
issues may further influence the decision-making process. For instance, the theory of ac-
tion holds that a decision-making process can be divided into two modes: whereas pre-
decision phase actors tend to be thoughtful and deliberative in weighing up possible sce-
narios and options, in the post-decision phase actors move on from making decisions to 
implementing them. Importantly, prior studies show that during the latter phase actors are 
most vulnerable to various biases, including selective attention, tunnel vision, cognitive 
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dissonance, and self-serving illusions (Levy, 2013: 313). Emotions, essentially, are found 
to influence which of these takes place in decision-making. In other words, emotional 
appraisals shape judgment in the sense that they may trigger one or the other type of 
decision-making mode (Brader and Marcus, 2013: 184).19  
As evidenced by the above-discussed Chinese appraisals, it could be argued that the 
PRC’s soft power push seems to be intrinsically linked to a post-decision-making mode 
whereby, after an emotional appraisal, the decision-making mode has moved on to im-
plementation. As Susan Shirk (2007: 6-9) shows, the decision-making of the PRC lead-
ership is connected to China’s domestic insecurity. In her view, the domestic fragility of 
Chinese society has made the PRC leadership be above all concerned with its own posi-
tion. While lacking a democratic system, the ruling Communist party is at the mercy of 
social instability, where popular movements could not only overthrow the party elite, but 
also threaten their lives and the lives of their families.  
This existential threat underlines the importance of the domestic scene where the Com-
munist party attempts to convince the Chinese population that the party represents legiti-
mate rulers. At the core of its soft power, the PRC thus seems to utilise traditional culture 
as a symbolic source for national spirit, knowledge and strength, reinforcing a perception 
of China as the representative of the oldest and most valued cultural civilisation. Through 
this rehabilitation of its traditional culture, “cultural soft power” has become popular in 
China’s official articulations of itself, characterising its public diplomacy communication 
(Wang, 2011). The PRC has also become a formidable cultural gatekeeper and producer 
that manages a vast publishing and broadcasting empire, also influencing artists in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan (Curtis, 2012: 6). In essence, the PRC leadership tends to believe that 
through boosting China’s international cultural influence it can achieve a “competitive” 
advantage, and overcome its still largely negative image – both at home and abroad (Chu, 
                                                 
19 Brader and Marcus (2013, 185) also show how emotions impact political decision-making in 
particular ways through learning: “[…] one triggered by anger, focusing on defense of extant 
convictions and hence disinterested in disconfirming evidence or new information triggered, and 
a second, more deliberative and mode that is triggered by anxiety”. In other words, for instance, 
anxious voters have been found to be responsive to available information and less tied to predis-
positions, whereas either those who are angry or enthusiastic have been found to be the opposite 
(Brader 2006; Parker and Isbell, 2010). 
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2014: 164).20 In this instance, they seem to rely on ‘symbolic patriotism’ using positive 
emotions and pride in national symbols that represent the nation (Huddy, 2013: 747-748). 
More importantly, the perception and possibility of a symbolic loss create for the PRC 
opposition to the out-group (the West) and support for policies that aim to counter the 
perceived threat (Huddy, 2013: 752). 
As argued above, a perceived external threat has the ability to reinforce in-group co-
hesion. This was especially true in the case of the threat being perceived as existential.  
In this situation, normative restraints on behaviour are relaxed, creating a context that 
allows engaging in morally questionable behaviour such as lying, torture and killing (Her-
man, 2013). This would also seem to be correct in the case of the PRC: as part of the 
recent media ‘going out’ campaign, the PRC intentionally blurs media demarcations be-
tween “Western” and “Chinese” media and journalists. The intention is to give the do-
mestic audience a false impression of non-Chinese media that praises China and the PRC 
(Sun, 2014). 
In Chapter 7, I will show how out-group hostilities and in-group cohesion building are 
implemented in Chinese public diplomacy through ‘political reading’, i.e. the interpreta-
tion of several films that have been produced either entirely by the PRC public diplomacy 
bureaucracy or in co-operation with Hollywood studios. The analysis also further clarifies 
the question of how the PRC blurs media demarcations in order to assure the Chinese 
domestic audience of its international respect. While there is a general argument to be 
made that popular culture and international politics are in fact on a continuum instead of 
separate entities (Grayson, Davies, and Philpott, 2009), in the case of the PRC films are 
a pivotal part of its media-centric public diplomacy and hence relevant empirical data that 
cannot be overlooked. In effect, the narratives of the films show how identity formations 
                                                 
20 Studies that concentrate on decision-making in international politics have developed several 
models to approach the difference between “genuine” processes of learning and motivational 
biases. Take for instance the poliheuristic theory. Similar to the theory of action, it holds that the 
decision-making process has two stages. During the first, people eliminate those strategies that 
are perceived to lead to unacceptable outcomes, and during the second stage people choose the 
strategy that they perceive has the most potential for success. Importantly, in the context of inter-
national politics, it has been shown that in many cases it is the domestic position that is considered 
primary while the international is considered secondary and can thus be jeopardised if these two 
positions are in conflict (Levy, 2013: 317). 
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This chapter constructed a theoretical model to depict dispositions that may influence 
actor decision-making. In doing that, I drew from social psychology in dividing the deci-
sion-making process into perception and propensity components, linking social identity 
with actor behaviour.   
The various components of the model were also briefly placed in the context of China’s 
soft power and public diplomacy. According to the discussion, the complexities of 
China’s social identity seemed to link to perceptions of what China is and what it should 
be. These were associated with an enemy image of Western media and the concept of 
Western media bias. The subsequent public diplomacy communication centres on pro-
moting China’s culture. One may argue that it is likely that the basic concept of claimed 
out-group hostilities is generally accepted among the PRC policy community and general 
public to the extent that gives justification for costly and dramatic public diplomacy com-
munication strategies. The basic concept of media slant in China consists largely of a 
stereotypical enemy image where “Western” media is seen as a hostile actor that does not 
recognise China’s national image as legitimate. 
The next chapters report the empirical analysis of the thesis. These follow the model 
outlined in this chapter (see Figure 3). Chapter 7 thus addresses the perception compo-
nent, Chapter 8 the propensity component and Chapter 9 the aggregate general of China’s 
Western media image.  While Chapters 7 and 8 provide verification, further clarification 
and more nuanced empirical evidence to the arguments presented in this chapter, Chapter 
9 challenges the concept of Western media slant against China. Before these, however, 
Chapter 4 reviews those historical factors that have influenced the formation of China’s 
international social identity, and Chapter 5 discusses latest developments in China’s pub-










Figure 3 The components of the model marked in bold that are empirically ana-
lysed in this dissertation. Chapter 5 addresses the Perception, Chapter 6 the Pro-























3. THE PARTY-LINE HISTORIOGRAPHY: BACKGROUND TO CON-
TEMPORARY PRC SOFT POWER ENTHUSIASM 
 
This chapter highlights certain perspectives regarding how Chinese national social iden-
tity has developed through a changing relationship with the West and Westphalian soci-
ety, as perceived by the Communist Party. I aim to show that the struggle of the PRC for 
recognition through soft power has a historical dimension ever present in the understand-
ing of history by the Communist Party echoing in its public diplomacy policies. Drawing 
mostly from Chinese secondary sources, in my reasoning I follow in broad terms the of-
ficial Communist Party-line historiography, proceeding in the following manner. In the 
first part of the chapter, I underline how the replacement of the tributary system with 
Westphalian society has been perceived in such a manner that it has in essence triggered 
the struggle for recognition. I then show how numerous historical events have been inter-
preted to rejuvenate China’s international social identity, all failing. The recent economic 
reforms and the adoption of the soft power concept seem then logical continuums of this 
Party narrative, whereby the economic reforms would restore China to a central position 
within the international society in an economic and political sense and soft power in a 
cultural one. The second part of the chapter provides an overview on how the soft power 
concept was localised and how it developed through internal discussions.  
It should be pointed out that the party-line historiography regarding social identity reju-
venation is related to the concept “Century of Humiliation” (1839-1949), which often acts 
as a starting point for Chinese leadership for their perceptions on how China should in-
teract within other nations within international society (see for instance Callahan, 2006; 
Kaufman, 2010). Neither is the narrative presented here by any means a comprehensive 
discussion, as it is limited to issues relevant to later soft power policies. For a detailed 
discussion on how the Confucian idea of the state was replaced by an imported national-
ism, see Whitney (1969). On the other hand, for an elaborate investigation of the linkages 
between Chinese nationalism and the perceived international aggression, see Zhao 
(2000).  






3.1. A Bitter History: Social Identity Lost 
I wish to start the historical background review by pointing out what is meant by “in-
ternal” and “external” causes in Chinese history writing. The issue has received wide 
attention in China, and has particular relevance in discussing the perceived struggle for 
recognition. Wang Xi (1997) most notably raised the issue of the two competing perspec-
tives in interpreting macro-level changes in Chinese society. While the latter implies that 
Chinese society remained stagnant before the Western interaction that brought about a 
positive influence on the modernisation of China, the former suggests that domestic fac-
tors of China were mostly responsible for the drastic change and progress that took place 
during at the turn of the 20th century. In making the point, Wang clarified the differences 
between Japan and China in responding to Western colonial ambitions. His view was that, 
while Japan was more eager to assimilate foreign culture, methods and influences, China 
mainly maintained a resilient negative disposition towards outside influence and all things 
foreign. Moreover, Wang argued that the foreign-oriented national mental state of Japan 
was not a singular isolated case, but has been repeated multiple times in history, in con-
trast to China. In making the argument, Wang (1997) echoed earlier commentators. Chih-
yu Shih (1992), for instance, had pointed out that Japan’s transition from colonial humil-
iation to Western-style modernisation was easier than China’s, in part because Japanese, 
unlike Chinese, did not harbour any “pretensions of innate superiority” (Shih, 1992: 186-
187). This made it easier for the Japanese to welcome and accept both officially and in 
popular terms Western values after the WWII. 
The question of inner and outer influences reflects the broader issue of Western East-
ward expansion that is perceived to begin the abolishment of China’s centrality, a position 
different to that of several thousand years of imperial past. During this time, the world 
around China in East Asia consisted of the so-called tributary system where China is 
interpreted to have enjoyed a central status.  The tributary system in essence welcomed 
neighbouring states to pay tributary visits to China’s imperial court, where strict protocol 
based on Chinese ritual practice was followed. The centrality of China in this arrangement 
influenced Chinese conception of world order to the extent what Esheric (2010: 19) calls 
“strategic centrality and cultural superiority”. This particular conception of world order 
was supported by numerous philosophical constructs. Of those Tian Xia (literally under 
heaven), for instance, meant that the Chinese emperor was a Son of Heaven, ruling all 
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people under heaven. The idea of Tian Xia carries weight in contemporary PRC propa-
ganda to the extent that it has been reformed by some Chinese IR theorists as one possible 
solution for durable world peace (e.g. Zhao, 2006, 2009, 2011). These formulations, on 
the other hand, have been criticised by Western scholars as reinventions and nostalgia 
towards a Chinese-led hierarchical world order, having use mainly in Chinese domestic 
propaganda (Callahan, 2008).  
The issue seems to have, nonetheless, relevance in how the PRC perceives China’s 
self-image developed between 1840 and 1949. It appears that during this time it can be 
interpreted that China’s collective mentality underwent a period of uncertainty influenced 
by the transition from the tributary system to Westphalian international society. There-
fore, where some Chinese historians have depicted the era using such a concept as “cen-
tury of great transformation” (Luo, 1997), others borrow from social psychology in refer-
ring to it as China’s “struggle for identity reconstructing” Qin (2010, 263). Moreover, the 
period has been referred to in China as “self-examination” (Luo, 1997), “self-conscious-
ness” (Chen, 1995) and “self-reflection” (Qin, 2009).  
 A pattern can thus be observed to emerge in this interpretation whereby during this 
time China is seen to come into contact not only with the technologically superior West-
ern powers, but also with itself. What unites these depictions by Chinese historians is a 
sense that during 1840-1949 China struggled with external relations, mainly due to inter-
nal backwardness leading to re-evaluations of China’s international status. To illustrate 
the point further, Qin (2009: 37-38; 2010: 253-258) divides the period into three separate 
phases of self-reflection and social identity reconstruction: after the Opium War defeats, 
the struggle dealt merely with technological issues. Between 1898 and 1911, a political 
dimension was added in accordance with the turbulence of the political revolution, and, 
finally, the struggle also spread to the cultural sphere with the New Culture Movement in 
1919.  
These periods of self-reflection do not seem to represent for Chinese historians at-
tempts to construct a Chinese social identity, but rather to restore it. As stated above, 
before the status dilemma became a concrete issue for the Chinese, the Tributary system 
placed China at the centre of that particular international society. The first period of self-
awareness then deals with the direct aftermath of the Opium Wars. In 1860s, therefore, 
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what is either known as the Westernisation Movement or the Self-Strengthening Move-
ment reflected on China’s multiple defeats in the Opium Wars and attempted to rejuvenate 
China to a great power by developing its military to Western standards. According to 
Elliott (2002), it was an elite-led top-down movement, which had minimal popular back-
ing since the Chinese population at the time consisted mainly of agrarian workers for 
whom national pride was of no primary concern. The progressives of the movement put 
forward the idea of maintaining the best of Chinese culture while adopting the best of 
Western technological and military knowhow. This approach was depicted with the slo-
gan “Chinese learning for essential principles, western learning for practical applications” 
(zhong ti xi yong).21  
The Chinese elite, it has been argued, were left without any other practical options on 
how to psychologically cope with the national humiliation of the Opium Wars. Fairbank 
(1942), for instance, shows that this realisation broke the continued genealogy of Chinese 
intellectual atmosphere. In other words, to an extent it opened up the Chinese elite to the 
possibility that China’s status might not remain the same going forward, in other words, 
the idea of the centrality of Chinese society and culture might not be sustainable in the 
future. The technological superiority of the Western powers was profound to the extent 
that, in the end, the Western-oriented reformism in the Chinese military adapted Western 
technology by especially developing the Chinese Navy. In 1868, the first steamboat was 
finished, in 1888 the Beiyang fleet was completed, and Nanyang and Fujian fleets set sail 
soon after (Qin, 2010: 254). 
However, by the late ninetieth century this particular road to rejuvenating Chinese in-
ternational status is seen to face serious obstacles, which eventually turned into a failure. 
First of all, instead of China, the Japanese became the first East Asian country to develop 
                                                 
21 In Mandarin体consists of two elements, from a feudal, totalitarian political system and that part 
of Confucian philosophy that serves such a system. 用 on the other hand, here refers to Western 
science and technology. 体 was the goal and 用 the method to serve 体. At the time, amid Western 
influence, this slogan served a compromise purpose. The advocates of traditional China could 
live with it because it maintained 体, and those for modernisation could accept it because it 
acknowledged Western techniques (Wang 1997: 13). 
65 
a modern military.22 In the subsequent First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) China was 
defeated, ending for the time being the Westernisation Movement. According to Shih 
(1992) for those cultural conservatives who opposed Westernisation to begin with, the 
defeat to the Japanese proved ultimately that an Oriental, in this case Japanese, solution 
was better than Western learning. The advocates of Westernisation, in contrast, were left 
in despair and purged from the military. The rest of the elite while in shock, but found 
new energy to rejuvenate China’s status (Qin, 2010: 255). The pinnacle of this Oriental 
conservatism that accompanied the First Sino-Japanese War occurred with the Boxer re-
bellion of 1899-1901. Supported by the Qing court, the rebels, convinced of Eastern learn-
ing, figuratively tried to use Chinese “traditional boxing” to defeat Western military tech-
nology. The result was a devastating defeat by the Western coalition. According to Shih 
(1992, 187) the inevitable catastrophe led to the further diminishing of national pride. 
Following the logic set by Chinese historians, the second attempt to restore China’s 
social status would have taken place during the reform period of 1898 and the subsequent 
revolution of 1911. As stated above, the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War seems to 
have been devastating to the extent that it shocked the contemporary Chinese elite. It 
would have been shocking precisely for the reason that none other than Japan, which was 
considered a national little brother, beat the Chinese to modernisation and then delivered 
them a military and technological blow. In part for this reason, the following Reform 
Movement of 1898 sought to bring reforms to Chinese political institutions and govern-
ance by replacing the divine imperial system with constitutional monarchy (Qin, 2010, 
255). This ultimately failed due to strong opposition from the conservative Qing court 
members.  
Along with the 1911 revolution, another social movement of the time in China was 
granted  status as an effort to restore China’s social identity. This was the New Culture 
Movement in 1919, crystallising in the May Fourth Movement. As argued above, at the 
                                                 
22 As suggested by the US popular historian James Bradley (2009) the Japanese considered them-
selves the representatives of Western progress and development in Asia, a mental state partly 




beginning of the 20th century cultural conservatives in China made the case for more tra-
ditional pan-Asianism inspired by Japan.23 At the same time Western-oriented progres-
sives felt that the restoring of China’s social identity would demand Western-style mod-
ernisation. This desire then crystallized essentially in the May Fourth Movement 
(Schwarcz, 1986). Mostly educated in the West, the advocates of the movement took the 
idea of reforming China to the extent of denouncing the country’s traditional civilisational 
core in rejecting Confucianism all together. They not only wanted China to adopt Western 
governance, but also envisioned for China a Western-style historical trajectory when 
moving from traditional to modern. Hu Shi (1891-1962), for instance, who was a leading 
figure in the movement and educated at the Cornel and Columbia Universities, identified 
a teleological development in the West from enlightenment to industrialisation and from 
democracy to socialism, where the renaissance symbolised the beginning of modernity. 
For Chinese modernity, Hu envisioned an analogous trajectory for China from Tang-dyn-
asty poetry and Song-dynasty neo-Confucian philosophy through the dramas of the 13th 
century to 300 years of classical scholarship. According to Hu’s argument, this trajectory 
ended with the May Fourth Movement as the “Chinese renaissance” (Dolezeva-
Velingerova and Wang, 2001).24  
From the perspective of restoring national identity, all these attempts to restore China’s 
status have been more or less perceived to fail. This is also the case with the revolution 
of 1911. Although it was successful in overthrowing the Qing, the movement did not 
succeed in rejuvenating China’s national identity, and China’s struggle for international 
recognition fell short when the country fell into a period of internal turmoil.  The Party 
                                                 
23 After the First Sino-Japanese War, support from Japan sought, among others, monarchists (e.g. 
Liang Qichao), warlords (e.g. Zhang Zuolin) and revolutionaries (e.g. Sun Yat-sen)  
24 Outside China, Schwarcz (1986), for instance, describes the period of the May Fourth Movement 
as Chinese “enlightenment”. Where in the West critical thinking was advanced against Christi-
anity, the Chinese, Schwarcz argues, sought emancipation from the ethic of self-submission and 
the familiar authority of Confucian values. Even though Western religious dogma and Chinese 
feudal ethics share a social self-inflicted immaturity, Schwarcz points out that in the West the 
quest for social truth was more abstract. The battle for “Chinese enlightenment” was not against 
a transcendent god but obedience to compatriot patriarchal authority and social tradition. 
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argument here is that the fall of the tributary system led China not only to lose its territo-
rial integrity but also deprived it of any possibility to join the Western-originated new 
world society as a full-fledged member.  
This new self-image did not correspond well with the image China harboured collec-
tively through its imperial past. As was the case with the May Fourth Reformers, all sub-
sequent failed attempts to rejuvenate China’s international status seemed to have caused 
an enormous emotional toll on elite Chinese that still echoes in contemporary depictions. 
Take for instance Qin (2010, 258) who depicts the anxieties of the May Fourth reformers 
as rather unique in world history: “Seldom in human history has a nation begun to doubt 
its roots. The pain and torture must have been tremendous”.25 It seems, therefore, obvious 
that the separate efforts to restore China’s social identity between 1840 and 1949 consti-
tuted a project that faced unprecedented difficulties. The Second Sino-Japanese War and 
the Civil War did not help the cause. The victory of the early Communists and the subse-
quent adoption of Communism in China can be said to represent another attempt at social 
identity restoration that echoed the past in that it also failed to restore China’s status in 
international society. 
Chinese historians are less enthusiastic about depicting the era of Communism or the 
adoption of a market economy as another self-reflection. As one of the few, Qin (2010: 
258-259) does make the argument. According to him the “thirty years of peace” – his 
choice of words – between 1949 and 1979, should have been enough for China to rebuild 
a coherent social identity and a relevant international status. However, due to separate 
internal and external reasons, China had to play in between the superpowers and was 
therefore unable to reconstruct an appropriate identity in the world society. At the same 
time domestically, as Qin (2010: 258-259) calls it, consecutive political movements led 
                                                 
25 According to (Tang, 1996), the brutality of WW1 and the disappointing Versailles resolution 
made Chinese intelligentsia disillusioned with Western learning. For instance, Liang Qichao 
(1873-1929), an unofficial member of the Chinese delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, 
reported the war atrocities back to China: In the following climate, faith was restored in the Chi-
nese traditional culture. The following Sinicisation movement then aimed to highlight Chinese-
ness in history, culture and politics, to which also the Communists contributed. Mao celebrated 
the “soul of China” in culture and arts, which were to have a “Chinese flavour”. Fung (2009, 806) 
shows how during this time the early Communists also came to localise Marxism, giving the ideas 
of Marx a dose of Chineseness. 
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to domestic turbulence causing, in addition to natural, also so-called “man-made catas-
trophes”.   
 
In summary, while the notion of national social identity in general, and the losing and 
rejuvenation of it in particular, can be seen as contemporary projections of modern no-
tions to the pre-modern era, the narrative presented above has its relevance in explaining 
background factors influencing PRC soft power efforts today. The recent success in eco-
nomic reforms and the resultant gain in political status in international society are seen 
within the Communist Party as signifying a return to global prominence and an ending to 
the “Century of Humiliation” that began with the defeats in the Opium Wars. As it stands, 




3.2. Localized Soft Power to Help in the Struggle   
When China was struggling with loss of its central position and subsequently social 
identity, from the transatlantic perspective the world was also changing. The ending of 
the Cold War cemented US position as the sole super power. Then global economic de-
velopment and the spreading of market economy marked a transition to a more multipolar 
world and relative decline of US hegemony. The balance of power therefore seemed to 
move from Europe to “West” and then further from “West” to “East”. This led to the fear 
and admiration of the Japanese economy in the 1980s (e.g. Chan, 2013) and then to vari-
ous discussions on “Asian values” in the 1990s (e.g. Thompson, 2001).  
Reacting to these global developments, the initiator of the soft power idea, Joseph Nye 
(1990a, 1990b, 1991, 2002, 2004) developed the approach as a tactic for the US to regain 
position by utilizing its immaterial attractive resources through the possibilities offered 
by the advanced communication technology. To be more precise, the original intent of 
Nye, that he outlined with his 1990 book “Bound to Lead”, was to remind the American 
policy makers that the US was still a leading country, partly due to its cultural recourses, 
and dispute any assumptions of the relative decline. The theoretical contribution of Nye 
was to combine prior research using Carr’s (1940) argument of “power over opinion”, 
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Lukes’ (1974) “three faces of power”, 26 and Etzioni’s (1975) segregation of “coercive, 
remunerative, and normative power”. 27 In a subsequent book, Nye (2004) reacted to the 
drop of global US attractiveness caused by the unpopular Bush administration and the 
unsanctioned war on Iraq in 2003. By condemning the failure of the administration to 
incorporate soft power into hard power, Nye further extended his analysis to include the 
Hollywood entertainment industry, and ideals of freedom and democracy as part of Amer-
ican cultural attraction.28 
As the power and economic weight was perceived to shift more towards the East along 
with economically reforming China, attention in the international discourse was given to 
the “rise of China” (e.g. Cumings, 2011) and subsequent “China threat” metaphors (e.g. 
                                                 
26 The idea of Nye was indeed not a very novel one. The main argument of Lukes (1974) was that 
power manifests in three ways: decision-making power, non-decision-making power, and ideo-
logical power. While focusing on the connection between, on the one hand, how to think of power 
theoretically, and on the other, how to study it empirically, Lukes (1974) advanced the notion that 
power is most effective when least observable or noticeable. 
27 Likewise, already in 1975 Etzioni argued: 
“Power differs according to the means employed to make the subjects comply. These means may 
be physical, material, or symbolic. 
Coercive power rests on the application, or the threat of application, of physical sanctions such as 
infliction of pain, deformity, or death; generation of frustration through restriction of movement; 
or controlling through force the satisfaction of needs such as those for food, sex comfort and the 
like. 
Remunerative power is based on control over material resources and rewards through allocation 
of salaries and wages, commissions and contributions, ‘fringe benefits’, services and commodi-
ties. 
Normative power rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations 
through employment of leaders, manipulation of mass media, allocation of esteem and prestige 
symbols, administration of ritual, and influence over the distribution of ‘acceptance’ and ‘positive 
response’.” (Etzioni, 1975: 5ff). 
28 In a more recent take, Nye (2011) acknowledged the importance of “stories” and “images” also 
in contemporary conflicts that otherwise remain geopolitical in nature. Therefore, while mainly 
focusing on the outward image projection in his formulations of soft power, Nye (2004) argues 
that an actor (the US) should also pay attention to how it develops its soft power on the domestic 
front, and moreover, that successfully implementing it domestically is even more important than 
abroad because other states pay attention to how it acts there. 
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Broomfield, 2010). The participants in the discourse advocate that an increasingly influ-
ential China forms a concrete threat both regionally and globally. The nature of the threat 
was perceived as comprehensive with a wide variety of issues ranging from military to 
economic and social security. The subsequent academic discussions around the China 
threat ranged from neoliberal (Roy, 1996) to post-structuralist (Song, 2015) explanations 
and policy recommendations. 
To counter the Western “China threat theory”, China under Hu Jintao devised the of-
ficial policy doctrine of “Peaceful Rise” (Zhongguo heping jueqi) in 2003. This was con-
tinued in 2005 when the concept of “Harmonious Society” (hexie shehui) was introduced 
as a proposal for a post-Western world order that would better accommodate different 
civilizations, including the non-liberal China, echoing similar formulations of the Tian 
Xia. Subsequently, the idea of soft power was introduced in China during the early 1990s 
where the first academic efforts concentrated on translating the works of Joseph Nye. A 
related macro policy development took place in 2004 when Chinese policy elites started 
developing the concept “soft power” as a policy tool to advance the understanding of 
China’s story.  Soft power was raised to the fore of China’s foreign policy in 2007, ex-
plicitly announced by Hu Jintao at the 17th CCP National Congress. 
However, the adoption of soft power like attitudes in communist China has its roots in 
the early reform era. In 1979 the then Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping made a trip 
to the US as the first Chinese leader to visit the country since 1949. This turned out to be 
a success. According to the official CCP biography of Deng, the visit marked a turning 
point in Chinese foreign policy: “From then on, China said "good-bye" to isolation and 
stepped onto the path of "opening to the world" and "opening to the future."29 Then hardly 
by coincidence, when a few years later in 1984 Deng encouraged Chinese academia to 
analyze the future national security environment, Chinese scholars became to speculate 
on the softer side of China’s power repertoire. As a result the concept “comprehensive 
national power” (zonghe guoli) was coined, referring to the combined overall conditions 
and strengths of the nation (Zhang, 2010: 386-387). 
This in fact meant that culture as a security issue was already part of the discourse in 
China before Nye coined the actual soft power idea in the US a few years later. This way 
both practice and theoretical discussion can be said to have laid the foundation for the 
                                                 
29 FIXME 
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later localization process. Incidentally, when the soft power concept caught Chinese in-
terest, it coincided with the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Due to the closeness of 
the subsequent international controversy and the Western origin of the soft power con-
cept, the possibilities to discuss the issue and thus official interest in soft power remained 
marginal within Chinese policy circles. Only in 2003 after the emergence of the “peaceful 
rise” doctrine, which aimed to counter the suspicions of a growing Chinese influence, did 
an actual construction of the PRC soft power understanding begin.30 
After soft power gained more top-down policy attention, alongside it re-emerged the 
concept of “cultural security” (wenhua anquan) in Chinese academic literature. Having 
roots in the 1980s, the contemporary concept of cultural security stems from two seminal 
articles by Lin Hongyu (1999) and Rong Zhuchuan (1999). Following that, in a 2004 
volume entitled National Security Studies, Liu Yuejin devoted a chapter to cultural secu-
rity. Combining soft power and cultural security, the contemporary concept of “cultural 
soft power” (wenhua ruanshili) has been singled out as one of the central theoretical ap-
proaches of the PRC to national security. 
The growing emphasis on cultural aspect in the official soft power rhetoric can be 
traced by looking at the Party Secretary General’s Reports at the First Plenum of the 16th 
(2002), 17th (2007) and 18th (2012) CCP National Congresses. Initially, during the 16th 
Congress, Jiang Zemin did not refer to soft power, but recognized the importance of cul-
ture in global competition: 
“[…] culture is interactive with economic and political activities, and its 
status and functions are becoming more and more outstanding in the com-
petition in overall national strength. […] create an even more splendid ad-




With Hu Jintao in power, the rhetoric changed. The 17th Congress report brings together 
the idea of soft power and cultural creativity as a national issue: 
 
“We must […] stimulate the cultural creativity of the whole nation, and 
enhance culture as part of the soft power of our country […]”32 
                                                 
30 See Zhao, Li and Cai (2011) for a full discussion on the early history of soft power research in 
China. 
31 Source: http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm#6 (Accessed 19.11.2015) 





The following 18th Congress formulation left no doubt about whether soft power mixed 
with culture was central to national development, now called cultural soft power. It also 
places economic responsibility for the cultural industry: 
 
“The country's cultural soft power should be improved significantly. […] 
More cultural works should be created; a system of public cultural services 
should be basically in place, and the cultural sector should become a pillar 
of the economy.”33 
 
 
Finally, the 18th Congress report continues with more details regarding the contents of 
cultural soft power. It recognizes traditional culture as the basis of cultural soft power: 
 
“We should develop a system for carrying forward fine traditional culture 
and promote outstanding traditional Chinese culture. […] The strength and 
international competitiveness of Chinese culture are an important indicator 
of China's power and prosperity and the renewal of the Chinese nation.” 34 
 
 
If the party discourse between 2002 and 2007was still sending relatively weak signals 
of the official recognition of cultural soft power, at the same time the academic rhetoric 
became detailed, echoing official themes. In it, the promoting of domestic cultural soft 
power was seen as inseparable from mass media and the development of mass media 
pivotal to the construction of cultural soft power. The promotion of culture, identity, and 
social progress were interpreted as needing channels for realization and expression. For 
instance, Guo (2005: 218) saw the basic task of mass communication as the “guiding of 
public opinion”, including “social cognition, values, attitudes and action”. The values of 
traditional China, on the other hand, were not interpreted as transforming automatically 
to cultural soft power. Liu and Zheng (2008: 22) envisioned cultural resources needing a 
“modern conversion” of mass communication before transforming into soft power re-
sources. According to Yang, Xu and Leng (2011: 260), the first step was “agenda setting”, 
forming a guide for public opinion and a link to cultural soft power, which needed a 
                                                 
33 Source: http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/con-
tent_27137540_3.htm  (Accessed 19.11.2015) 
34 http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_6.htm 
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“mature system” consisting of “equipment updates, technology promotion, government 
support for media, and personnel training”. As the contemporary PRC mainstream view, 




The point that I wished to make in this chapter was that China’s relation with the in-
ternational society has always in the modern era been the focal point that has influenced 
China’s domestic development, Communist Party understanding of history, and the PRC 
perception of China’s social identity within the international society. 
The next chapter continues the same theme but focuses on reform era public diplomacy 
in general and the development of China’s film industry in particular. There is a good 
argument to be made that the latter takes place to defend Chinese culture from Western 
values, and that China has every right to do so. However, the point I try to articulate is 
that a struggle for recognition appears to justify – not morally questionable – but, lacking 
a better word, ‘clumsy’ communication tactics. While the next Chapter sets the table for 





                                                 
35 Comparing the two soft power approaches (US – PRC), they are superficially similar. However, 
concerning the role of domestic and international politics, some differences emerge. Nye would 
seem to think that soft power stems from both the domestic political values and foreign policies. 
In contrast, according to the Chinese, there is a difference in mire propaganda and actually ful-
filling of ideals. The Chinese view of tianxia sees the world as a whole, rather than splitting it in 
to single actor states. This unified world again has three levels: tianxia, state and family. The 
measures to realize harmony in all of these would accordingly be the same, implying consistency 
between domestic and international politics.  Despite some similarities, Li, Li and Jiang (2011) 
conclude, the two approaches differ in one central issue – the perspective. They claim that the 
articulation of Nye does not have any higher ideals then the American security strategy, although 
in many analyses it is taken for granted that it can be applied to everyplace everywhere. In con-
trast the all-under-heaven world view would be more applicable in the era of globalization since 
it is – at least in the rhetoric – all encompassing. 
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4. STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: REFORM ERA PUBLIC DI-
PLOMACY  
 
The previous chapter provided a review of factors that contributed to the development of 
Chinese national identity after it came into contact with the expanding European interna-
tional society that ultimately replaced the regional tributary system and decentred China. 
In this chapter, I consider more recent historical attempts to rejuvenate China’s lost na-
tional identity. Since the reform era beginning in 1979, the struggle for recognition has 
taken many forms. These range from communist anti-imperialism to recent neo-liberal 
corporative strategies, and are discussed below.  
 
 
4.1.   China’s Public Diplomacy 1979-2014 
In line with the general role of China during the early years of the PRC, Chinese public 
diplomacy among the socialist bloc was mainly focused on countering “American impe-
rialism” by seeking friends from the developing nations.36 Since the opening up in 1979, 
Chinese public diplomacy has, in relative terms, matured to build an international image 
of China as a cooperative, friendly and responsible country, signifying its status as a major 
                                                 
36 Being led by the Communist party, the past of the PRC-endorsing culture is, however, anything 
but unambiguous. While Mao Zedong agreed with Marx that the basic contradictions in a social-
ist society were between forces of production and the productive forces (and between the super-
structure and the economic basis), his vision of a three-in-one (sanweiyiti) model combined new 
political, economic and cultural forces. Thus, under Mao Chinese artists were supported by the 
state, whereas during the materialism of Deng Xiaoping, differentiation between spiritual 
(jingshen wenming) and material civilisation (wuzhi wenming) was again relevant, and cultural 
institutions and artists were given fewer subsidies and had to support themselves (Zhang 2010: 
393-394). After the pragmatism of Deng, culture re-emerged on the party agenda, first in 2002 
during Jiang Zemin with the three-in-one development of “socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics” (economic, political and cultural), and then in 2005, under Hu Jintao, with the adoption of 
four-in-one (siweiyiti) development, adding a social dimension. Both ideas (first soft power and 
then four-in-one) led to growing interest in arts and culture among the PRC elite, and thus in-
creased funding. For instance, during the 10th Five-Year Plan from 2001 to 2005, national invest-
ment in non-commercial public cultural institutions reached approximately 50 billion yuan 
(Zhang 2010: 397). 
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stakeholder in international society. Consequently, to an extent PRC public diplomacy 
bureaucracy has been able to depend on the formal “good” international conduct of China. 
Since its 1972 UN membership, the government has demonstrated increasing willingness 
to participate in international organisations and multilateral arrangements: the Chinese 
initiatives of the Shanghai Five Grouping and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
established in 1996 and 2001 respectively,37 WTO access that took place in 2001, a 
China-ASEAN free trade agreement was signed in 2002, and in 2003 China joined the 
regional non-aggression pact Southeast Asia Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Since 
2005, China has also been an active participant in peacekeeping operations. During the 
years leading up to 2006, China sent more peacekeeping troops under the UN flag than 
any other permanent member of the Security Council, and more than any NATO member 
(Gill and Huang, 2006: 22). Between 2006 and 2015, China ranked no lower than the 
sixteenth largest contributor of peacekeeping personnel (police, military advisor and 
troops) to the UN.38 
Established in 1991, the government body currently responsible for the coordination 
of public diplomacy bureaucracy is the State Council Information Office (SCIO). The 
main mission of the SCIO is articulated as follows: 1) to tell the story of China and the 
government to the world and promote Chinese culture, 2) to counter what is perceived as 
hostile foreign propaganda; 3) to counter Taiwan independence ambitions and promote a 
one-China policy; and 4) to propagate PRC foreign policy (e.g. Shambaugh, 2007). The 
establishment of the SCIO placed the responsibility of public diplomacy within the prop-
aganda system, directly in charge of all forms of publishing, radio, film, television, culture 
and education (Creemers, 2015: 3). This has meant that the Foreign Ministry with its 
diplomatic missions abroad is separated and has less influence in public diplomacy than 
the propaganda bureaucracy. In the Chinese discourse, “external communication” (duiwai 
xuanchuan) is often used instead of “public diplomacy” (gonggong waijiao), when refer-
ring to the international soft power projection of China. 
                                                 
37 Both regional arrangements have also been seen as “anti-Western”, “anti-democratic” and ad-
vancing authoritarian values (e.g. Ambrosio, 2008).    




The importance of public diplomacy in PRC security strategy was officially announced 
in 2003 by President Hu Jintao who declared at a national external propaganda conference 
that “creating a favourable international public opinion environment” and “establishing a 
good image of China” internationally were of “importance for China’s national security 
(See Ohlberg 2013: 9). The declaration can be seen as a legacy of the “making news 
media big and strong” policy (ba xinwen chuanmei zuo qiang zuo da) of 2002 that pro-
moted the creation of powerful Chinese media conglomerates under party control for the 
use of international competition. The idea behind it was that, without strong state-led 
commercial media, China would be unable to influence global public opinion.39 For in-
stance Wang (2008: 269) summarises a detailed PRC public diplomacy strategy: 
The target: An image of a self-confident, trustworthy, peace-loving China. 
China’s public diplomacy should gradually change China’s image in inter-
national society from negative to neutral to positive. 
 
The means: Chinese government organs overseas should initiate image-
promotion activities through cultural exchange and broadcasting, making 
use of local media to broadcast Chinese news and other programmes with 
the help of local overseas Chinese, students studying abroad, and transna-
tional companies with investments in China. 
 
The Focal point: Since China’s international image is demonised by the 
American media, Chinese public diplomacy should focus on the media in 
                                                 
39 See China Media Project 07 April 2007. http://cmp.hku.hk/2007/04/10/225/ 
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the United States and Europe, who mainly shape the public opinion of the 
world, to erase the bad effect of the “hate media”.40 
 
International broadcasting is therefore a central feature in PRC public diplomacy, and 
since the 1990s the central government has increased its competitive capabilities in the 
field. The public diplomacy bureaucracy has hired foreign lobbyists, brand consultants 
and policy strategists to advance their ideas and interests internationally, especially lead-
ing to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. State-owned media (Xinhua News Agency, China Ra-
dio International, China Central Television, and the newspaper China Daily) made sig-
nificant investments to improve their status and capabilities (Ding 2014: 9; see also Zhang 
2010).  
Traditional culture also remains a central element in international broadcasting. This 
is seen as enhancing Chinese cultural identity and helping the world understand the Chi-
nese “story”, which is done by disseminating mass media and international communica-
tion, for instance, news reports, cultural performances, cultural exhibitions, multimedia, 
                                                 
40 At the centre of this national cultural soft power effort lies what Yang, Xu and Leng (2011) call 
the “construction of mass communication”. Accordingly, they argue that China should not only 
depend on economic and military power, but that national cultural soft power should provide 
more fundamental, profound and longer-lasting competitive strength. Traditional culture in par-
ticular should possess charm to attract tourists, enhance Chinese cultural identity in the world, 
and help the world to understand Chinese culture and heritage. This should be done through 
dissemination of mass media and international communication, for instance through news re-
ports, cultural performances, cultural exhibitions, multimedia and literary works, overseas com-
munication of Chinese material and non-material cultural products displayed in the international 
arena. In the context of globalisation, this international communication and construction of na-
tional cultural soft power should aim for the world to know more about positive, healthy, open 
and democratic China. Chinese cultural industry should use international mass media especially 
in the fields of 1) overseas Chinese literature, 2) Chinese movies and television series and, 3) 
modern information networks.  
In a similar vein, Ma and Hong (2011) view Chinese cultural soft power from the perspective of 
mass media development. While recognising the central role of mass media in soft power com-
petition, they argue that Western media still governs the international setting. To overcome this 
bottleneck of mass media, Ma and Hong propose 1) to increase financial support, 2) to develop 
Chinese mass media industry and, 3) to strengthen the influence of Chinese media industry. 
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films, literary works, overseas communication of Chinese material and non-material cul-
tural products (Yang, Xu and Leng, 2011). To give an overview of the development of 
the industry, according to PRC data, the business volume of Chinese telecommunication 
services, under government control, grew from 1.2 billion to 22.2 billion yuan between 
1996 and 2008.41  
Yet another, but central, example of the practical measures the party-state has taken 
during the early phase of its push to rejuvenate its status as a major cultural civilisation, 
is the Confucian Institute Project (CIP). Initially the CIP started as part of a five-year plan 
in 2004 for Chinese language education abroad, known as the Chinese Bridge Project 
(Hanyu qiao gongcheng). The launching and controlling organisation of the CIP is the 
Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), which was first set up as a 
language education agency under the Ministry of Education, but was later expanded to 
include representatives from 12 different state organisations42 responsible for education, 
culture, foreign affairs and strategic planning for long-term national development (Pan 
2013: 26). In the very basic form, the institutes are Chinese government establishments 
that operate in collaboration with foreign universities and educational institutions in order 
to promote Chinese language and culture. The first CI was opened in 2004 in Seoul, Korea 
and by 2011 353 CIs and Confucius classrooms had been established in 104 countries and 
regions, mainly in Asia, Europe and North America.43 The origins of the concept are in 
Germany’s Goethe Institutes, Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, the British Council and the Al-
liance Francaise. While the main functions of all the national institutes are language 
teaching, cultural promotion and facilitation of business activities, none has received 
nearly as much criticism and scepticism from the receiving countries as the CIP. Concerns 
have been raised about whether the CIP represents ideologically-laden cultural invasion 
                                                 
41 Source: National Bureau of Statistics China. http://www.stats.gov.cn/ 
42 These are General Office of the State Council, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, Over-
seas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Development 
and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Culture, State Administration of 
Radio, Film and Television, State Press and Publications Administration, State Council Infor-
mation Office and State Language Committee (See Zhe 2012: 3).  
43 Between 2004 and 2008, 292 new institutes were opened in 78 countries (See Zhe 2012: 2-10). 
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and a Chinese “Trojan horse”. Recently scepticism has intensified in the US amid con-
cerns that the CIP might threaten academic freedom, conduct surveillance of Chinese 
students abroad, and promote the political agenda of the Chinese party-state. In 2013, the 
Canadian Association of University Teachers urged all Canadian universities hosting 
Confucius Institutes to cease doing so, and in 2014 the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors made a similar plea to US universities.44  
The discussion around CIP has also gained scholarly attention regarding its purpose, 
nature, features, structure, operation, controversies and challenges. This has mainly been 
done in the framework of soft power or cultural diplomacy (for instance Guo, 2008; Har-
tig, 2012; Lo and Pan, 2014). Where the general consensus agrees that to a large extent 
the CIP, being part of the soft power strategy, aims to create a favourable international 
environment for the modernisation of China, more moderate voices are also heard. Zhe 
(2012) for instance argues that the CIP is a mere language education tool. Paradise (2009) 
argues that the best way to think of the project is to see it as a type of impression man-
agement and an effort by China to construct a positive image of itself.45  
Pan (2013) understands the CIP as a state-sponsored and university-piloted form of 
cultural diplomacy that involves soft power techniques, but not full soft power capability, 
and that is intended to facilitate economic connection, cultural dialogue and political trust 
between China and the rest of the world. Pan (2013: 29) also segregates the cultural di-
plomacy activities into three: 1) the CIP lays the foundation for the PRC to promote 
China’s cultural traditions, way of life and foreign policies through intensive cultural 
events, 2) the CIP targets elite classes, including politicians, university presidents and 
foreign CIP partners, and 3) the CIP is used to showcase China’s diplomacy, foreign pol-
icy and harmonious image. Thus, while the CIP is on the surface all about language learn-
ing and cultural promotion, it is at the same time part of the grand Chinese strategy and 
greater soft power projection, where the PRC attempts to dis-alarm the world regarding 
its political agenda.  
                                                 
44 See BBC 22 December 2014: Confucius institute: The hard side of China's soft power 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30567743 
45 See Paradise 2009, 662. 
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Other Hanban language and cultural promotion projects include the US-focused Chi-
nese Language and Culture Initiative with the College Board. With several components, 
the programme aims to teach Chinese language and culture to elementary-level students 
in the US.46 The educational exchange has not only been limited to institutions. Gill and 
Huang (2006) show that of those international students who studied in China during the 
decade prior to 2006, at the time of the study some 30 held minister-level positions in 
their home countries, more than 10 have served as ambassadors, and over 30 as attachés 
posted in China. Gill and Huang (2006) speculate that these professionals are likely to 
have a better understanding of Chinese interests, and therefore increase Chinese soft 
power. While this might be a correct assessment, it is just as likely that individual-level 
exchanges lead to negative evaluations, as has happened with the CIP.    
It can be concluded that the PRC soft power agenda includes the changing of the West-
ern perception of China from strong, threatening and negative to strong, peaceful and 
positive. While in general the soft power push of the PRC has been received with scepti-
cism, and foreign media coverage of China and the Confucius Institutes Project has gen-
erated mutual mistrust in particular, the challenges of Chinese public diplomacy are as-
sessed as more versatile.  There is certainly irony in the PRC enthusiasm for soft power: 
on the one hand China promotes diversity, peace and harmony and, on the other, it con-
trols freedom of speech and access to social networks (Barr, 2012). Internationally Chi-
nese media projects an image whose values, ethics and sensibilities are compatible with, 
if not superior to, international morals. However, Chinese media faces a crisis of credi-
bility; the wielding of political and economic power might take attention away from soft 
power (Sun, 2010). Also, the technocratic nature of the public diplomacy programmes by 
the propaganda bureaucracy have been seen as homogenised commodities that are pro-
duced based on efficiency rather than, for instance, attractive narratives or identifiable 
characters (Creemers, 2015). The specific problems of Chinese media communication are 
finally argued to be threefold: 1) Political and institutional constraints (lack of openness); 
2) Differences in media and cultural traditions (desire to present the best but not truthful 
image); and 3) Deficiencies in knowledge and skills (lack of Western-style communica-
tion experts) (Lu, 2012). 
 
                                                 
46 See Paradise 2009: 654-655.  
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4.2.  Foreign Journalists and China 
 
Quite interestingly, all the above reflects on the relationship between Chinese officials 
and foreign journalists working in China.  First of all, it is not far-fetched to argue that 
Chinese officials seem to believe that global media narratives stereotype China as orien-
tal, displaying a biased and negative perspective overlooking positive accomplishments 
and aspects of Chinese society (e.g. Hu and Ji, 2012: 32). Also, as discussed in Chapter 
3, while recognising the central role of mass media in international soft power competi-
tion, Chinese mainstream academia insist that the Western media governs the interna-
tional setting (e.g. Ma and Hong, 2011). 
Thus, not surprisingly, it has been argued that the most instrumental party determining 
the effectiveness of China’s public diplomacy remains not only the domestic but also the 
foreign media. While the former remains under the control of the Communist Party 
(CCP), the foreign media covering China has also witnessed more transparent and open 
Chinese government public disclosure. In the past, this has been all but self-evident. Dur-
ing the Mao era, foreign correspondents were not allowed to enter China unattended, but 
were invited for propaganda purposes under strict control. Reporting on China was there-
fore done by “China watchers” usually based in Hong Kong. During the economic re-
forms in the 1980s, foreign correspondents were seen as a necessary evil, who had to be 
allowed to enter China, “inviting the wolf into house” being the typical pattern of thinking 
(Sun, 2014).  
Consequently, PRC external propaganda bureaucracy seems to harbour negative sen-
timents towards the foreign press corps in China. In the earlier days, and in those rare 
cases when Chinese officials have accepted requests for interviews from foreign journal-
ists (Kristof, 1990), the usual procedures have gone along the lines of “inviting them to 
have a chat, issuing with a warning, and cancelling their visas and sending them home if 
they break the rules” (Zhang, 1998: 190).  
Indeed, depictions in Chinese domestic studies of foreign journalists working in China 
remain damning. For instance, the coverage of foreign journalists is assessed as “inaccu-
rate”, “selective”, “biased”, “partial” and “one-dimensional” (Hu and Ji, 2012: 32). For-
eign journalists are also accused of “distortion”, “demonisation”, and “malicious attack” 
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(Li et al, 1996). The relationship is also depicted as “continuous conflict” between “co-
operative antagonists” where mutual distrust is omnipresent (Zhang, 2008). 
Thus, after 2003 when President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao declared the new 
foreign policy doctrine of ‘peaceful rise’ by stressing soft power and peaceful means such 
as the spreading of culture instead of military force (e.g. Zhang, 2008: 310) as part of the 
shift in foreign policy conduct, China’s public diplomacy changed, and with it the foreign 
press corps has witnessed more transparent and open Chinese government public disclo-
sure (Zhang, 2012: 687). As late as 2006, the PRC government lifted its old restrictions 
on foreign correspondents working in China, including the suspension of the earlier strict 
travel restriction placed upon foreign journalists, allowing them to report on China’s so-
cial, political and economic issues. The concession was made permanent after the Beijing 
2008 Olympics on October 17, 2008 (Zhang, 2012: 687). This policy eliminated some 
rules. For instance, foreign journalists were no longer required to be accompanied by 
Chinese organisations or individuals when conducting journalism, and were allowed to 
hire Chinese assistants through their agencies (Sun, 2014: 3). Before and after the Beijing 
Olympics, the rhetoric of the Chinese officials also changed towards the foreign press 
core using such language as “similar mutual benefits”, cooperation” and “joint effort” 
(Zhang, 2008). 
Among the policy relaxations by the PRC on foreign correspondents working in China, 
perhaps the most central is the new government spokesperson system. The idea has been 
on the PRC agenda since 1989, but only after the SARS epidemic in 2003 did the gov-
ernment start to fully implement it (Zhang, 2008: 311). Starting in 2003, the system has 
been developed across the country in the State Council, government ministries and pro-
vincial governments. The purpose of the system is to create good relations with other 
countries through “presentation”, “explanation” and “dissemination” instead of “publi-
cising” or “propaganda”. The communication should also be based on the “research of 
foreigners’ interested issues and reading habits”, as was declared by the official govern-
ment media voice (People’s Daily, 28th March 2005).  
 
4.3. Marketisation as Neoliberal Policy 
 
In the overall picture, the main goal of PRC state public diplomacy bureaucracy seems 
to include the achieving of full Chinese representation within global news media in order 
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to correct the assumed false media narratives and thus achieve a more balanced structure 
of international information flows. What makes this effort especially modern is the way 
in which the PRC has transformed its propaganda system from the old socialist style to 
one following contemporary market economy principles, letting the consumer markets in 
the end decide which cultural products are accepted as Chinese soft power. To this end, 
the already existing propaganda system has offered a practical platform (Edney, 2012). 
Following the period 2008-2009, the PRC launched a new media “going out” cam-
paign.47 The main strategies can roughly be divided into three: 
1) The government and government affiliated actors are targeting Chinese ethnic dias-
pora. Utilising diasporic connections and communities, media outlets are set up to spread 
the PRC public diplomacy message. 
2) The main players of PRC state media (CCTV, Xinhua, CRI) set up offices and sign 
formal content contracts with non-Western, non-liberal democratic states, for instance in 
sub-Sahara, South-East Asia and Latin America. Common to these target countries is a 
strong state media presence, usually under authoritarian, sometimes former communist 
regimes that still adhere to anti-American and anti-imperialistic rhetoric, and which are 
considered China’s “friends” (Sun, 2014: 1900).  Xinhua in particular has in recent years 
increased its activity in Africa including setting up regional bureaus, developing news 
content targeting African audiences, providing news content for local media, and provid-
ing journalistic training and technical support to media organisations. Additionally, 
Xinhua has signed formal content deals with Cuba, Mongolia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Tur-
key, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. CCTV and CRI have also started to produce content in Eng-
lish targeting non-Western countries. 
3) The main players enter into third-party partnerships in those Western countries that 
do not permit Chinese state media to operate within their borders directly. The third-party 
broker can be an overseas entrepreneur, and have close connections to the PRC govern-
ment utilising an individual Chinese actor, media tycoon or simply a private Western 
media corporation. For instance, in 2011 CCTV and Sky News Australia, a cable news 
corporation, entered into a ten-year agreement on content swap. As a consequence, for 
                                                 
47 For a detailed discussion of the details in the campaign, see for instance Kurlantzick, 2011; Ding, 
2011; Curtin, 2012; Hu and Ji, 2012; Chu, 2014; French, 2014; Sun, 2014, Sun 2015. 
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the first time, Australian news events will be seen live in China and major Chinese news 
events seen live on Australia’s news channel. According to reports, the agreement will 
allow CCTV to “provide its viewers with live pictures of events happening in Australia, 
including state visits by Chinese leaders and other material with a China angle”. Im-
portantly, of course, the agreement will not affect “Chinese state control of news broad-
casts”.48 
As another example, in 2012 the Chinese media giant Wanda bought the then second 
biggest American movie theatre franchise, AMC, for $2.6 billion, creating the largest 
cinema chain in the world.49 The Chairman and main owner of Wanda, Wang Jianlin, is 
considered a Beijing insider and one of the richest men in China. In 2014, it was reported 
that Wanda was looking to expand to Hollywood by purchasing a majority stake in a local 
major production company, either in the Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation (which 
produced the Twilight Saga and Hunger Games films, among others) or in MGM (which 
produced for the Hobbit trilogy and James Bond films). According to other reports, Wang 
expressed ambitions to control 20% of the world cinema market by 2020.50 In March 
2015, it was rumoured that the US movie studio Lionsgate had agreed to a Chinese com-
pany co-financing its films in hopes of gaining better access to the Asian market. Appar-
ently, a subsidiary of Hunan TV and Broadcast Intermediary Company (HTBI) would 
help fund "qualified" films for the next three years. PRC state news agency Xinhua re-
ported that the agreement was worth USD 1.5 billion, and described it as "the biggest 
overseas deal in China's film-making history".51 According to Xinhua, Long Qiuyun, the 
HTBI chairman stated that "The deal will bring Hollywood's production model to China 
and start an era full of imagination."52  
                                                 
48 See Hollywood Reporter August 2011: www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/sky-news-aus-
tralia-chinas-cctv-224884 
49 See Bloomberg May 2012: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-21/china-s-
wanda-group-to-buy-amc-cinema-chain-for-2-6-billion 
50 See China Business Review December 2014: http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/dalian-
wanda-eyes-lionsgate-purchase/ 
51  See South China Morning Post: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1742302/chi-
nese-firm-hunan-tv-us15-billion-deal-lionsgate-films 
52 See Xinhua March 2015: http://www.china.org.cn/arts/2015-03/18/content_35095392.htm 
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4.4. China’s Film Industry Develops 
 
As is the case all over the world, cinema in China has always had political, ideological 
and cultural connotations. For instance, foreign film productions and imports have been 
seen as the product of “the political, economic, military and cultural invasion of the West” 
carrying with them a “deep colonial branding” (Wang, 2003: 61).  This is also the reason 
why the Chinese film industry has been on the radar of the party-state with a view to 
nationalising it to serve as a propaganda tool. This is especially true regarding the early 
years of Communist rule from the 1950s to the 1970s, when the film industries mainly 
responded to the official agenda (Wang, 2003).  The relevance has re-emerged with the 
contemporary enthusiasm for soft power. 
Following Mao’s initial artistic enthusiasm and Deng’s pragmatic funding cuts from 
the creative industries, the contemporary status of the film sector in Mainland China has 
been described as “vague” and “doubtful” (Su, 2010: 317-318). Beginning with the re-
form era, the artistic function of films is maintained by the so-called Fifth Generation 
directors (e.g. Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige). As the industry began to face economic pres-
sure, state cinema policies also moved from a planned economy to a more market-oriented 
one and, consequently, entrepreneurs began to invest new resources in this sector which 
had become profitable. Nonetheless, the film industry’s high profit margins and the re-
maining ideological importance meant that the sector was subject both to commercial 
investment and state control. State control also intensified after the Tiananmen events: 
the function of the mainland film industry returned once again to convey official ideology 
(Wan and Kraus, 2002).  
Only after the official embracing of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” did the 
film industry undergo the reforms required to operate under the banners of the market 
economy (Su, 2010: 318). The change in policy was defined at the 15th CCP National 
Congress in 1997 that declared the need for advancing marketisation as “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics”. At a subsequent national film conference, the then Propaganda 
Minister, Ding Guan’gen declared: “The film sector must win the market in order to pros-
per. Under the condition of the socialist market economy, film as a cultural product cannot 
be independent of the market economy” (quoted in Zhao, 2000: 13; See also Su, 2010). 
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One year after China joined the WTO in 2001, the PRC began in earnest to reform its 
film industry. Firstly, the state ended the monopoly of the state-owned China Film Group, 
which was transformed into the China Film Group Corporation. Secondly, the govern-
ment allowed private film production and distribution companies to operate, also in co-
operation with foreign actors, as joint ventures and partnerships in China, but not inde-
pendently, as partnerships were only permitted with state-owned film production compa-
nies. Moreover, foreign partners were only allowed a 49% ownership of a joint film pro-
duction venture, and furthermore the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
(SARFT) granted distribution licences to only six private companies, breaking the state 
monopoly of the China Film Group in film distribution (Wan and Kraus, 2002; Su, 2010; 
2011). 
Keane (2005: 130) argues that the reforms of the culture, media and creative industries, 
including the film sector, have become a central issue in the soft power enthusiasm of the 
Chinese state. The central reason for this is, as d’Hooge (2010: 4) points out, that the PRC 
is highly sensitive to international perception of China in general and the state and its 
policies in particular. Zhang et all (2007: 37) detail how the state is increasingly allowing 
private investors to enter the Mainland film industries and thus compete with Hollywood 
productions, leading to a “euphoric age of blockbusters (dapian shidai).53 Despite the 
nature of coproduction between the state and private investors, efforts have been made to 
keep the content of films political. In a later take, Keane (2010: 7) shows how the main 
trend in Mainland cinema production is the politicisation of content, censorship and the 
necessity to modify scripts according to official liturgy. 
In recent decades the PRC state has therefore both loosened control over the financing 
of film production, and tightened control over the content in the direction of the official 
party-state line. As Gerth (2010) argues, this has led to a situation where the market, rather 
than the state, plays a major role in deciding the taste of consumers regarding cultural 
products. However, while the markets decide what cultural products consumers consume, 
the state maintains control over the industry as a whole, promoting those images that are 
favourable for its legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic audience. 
                                                 
53 For a detailed discussion on various coproduction strategies see Keane (2005, 6).  
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Figure 4 Annual Cinema Box Office Revenues (China/US). 
 
Source: China Film Industry Report, Motion Picture Association of America54 
 
To this end, that is, the soft power push, the Chinese domestic film industry has wit-
nessed an unprecedented growth in both revenues and number of cinema screens. Figure 
11 depicts the development of annual Chinese box office revenue, converted into US dol-
lars. Between 2006 and 2014, the amount of revenue the cinemas received increased more 
than tenfold (2006: 0,4 Bn US$/2014: 4,4 Bn US$). In comparison, Figure 11 also depicts 
the box office revenues of US domestic cinemas. While maintaining higher revenues, the 
overall volume was stable between 2006 and 2014, as is also depicted in Figure 11. 
During the same time, the number of movie screens in China grew from 3,034 (2006) 
to 22,000 (2014), as depicted in Figure 12. In comparison, US figures remained virtually 
stable, although continued to be higher than in China. The developments depict the po-
tential of growth in China, making it the most lucrative market for the future, especially 




















Figure 5 Annual Number of Cinema Screens (China/US) 
 
Source: China Film Industry Report (2006-2014), National Association of Theater Own-
ers55 
 
Regarding future prospects, according to US Department of Commerce data, the film 
sector in China is expected to grow by 13% by 2018 to reach $7 billion, almost doubling 
from $3.8 billion in 2013. 56 This is mainly due to the PRC continuing policies to stimulate 
the sector, building up its domestic movie production, expanding the role of co-produc-
tions, addressing the quota system and increasing revenue-sharing imports. In 2015, for-
eign films had a 45.5% market share, mainly due to the success of the US film Trans-
formers: Age of Extinction. In 2014, 67 foreign films were released in China. Thirty-three 
of those were released on a flat-fee basis and 34 on a revenue-sharing basis, meeting the 
full quota of films, as defined by PRC public diplomacy bureaucracy.57 
An important hallmark in movie imports to Chinese markets is the US-China film deal 
of 2012. This contract allows 14 additional movie imports on a revenue-sharing basis. 
                                                 
55 http://english.entgroup.cn/index.aspx 
http://natoonline.org/data/us-movie-screens/ 
56 See US department of commerce data: http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Media_and_Enter-
tainment_China.pdf 
















China’s overall import quota on a revenue-sharing basis now stands at 34 films annually 
for all countries. Co-production is gaining in popularity, and several major Hollywood 
studios as well as independent filmmakers are engaging in these deals with China.58 
Although the US at the present is home to the largest movie market in the world, this 
is not predicted to be the case in the future. Box office sales in China totalled 29.6 billion 
yuan from 618 films on the screen in 2014, up 36% from previous year. In February 2015, 
Chinese box office income reached 4 billion yuan, overtaking the US market for a short 
time.59 This also explains the interest of Hollywood production companies in entering 
into cooperation with Chinese state media: it grants them access to the rapidly growing 
and lucrative Chinese market. At the same time, nonetheless, it gives the PRC public 
diplomacy bureaucracy a channel of communication and, to a large degree, credibility for 
its message. This is a win-win situation for both the Hollywood studios and the PRC, 
connecting corporate and policy goals. 
 
 
4.5. Summariezed Findings 
 
In this chapter, I gave an overview of PRC public diplomacy during the reform era. In 
seeking recognition and restoration of status, more recent strategies have been rather so-
phisticated, where joint ventures, corporate acquisition and co-productions of media and 
cultural products play a significant role. The argument can therefore be made that PRC 
public diplomacy is media-centric. This has relevance for the next chapters that move on 
to the actual empirical analysis, focusing on Chinese films and China’s Western news 
media image in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively. Before this, however, Chapter 6 attempts 









                                                 
58 See Financial Times February 19, 2012.  




5. ANALYSIS: PERCEPTION COMPONENT 
 
This chapter addresses the perception component of the model outlined in Chapter 2. The 
focus is on both China’s perception of its ‘cultural status’ and on its perception of the 
‘intention of the Other’. In doing that, I employ a rhetorical analysis to highlight how soft 
power language is used to mobilise identity categories in the Chinese government-sanc-
tioned soft power language. From the discussion presented in above chapters, I draw two 
main and one additional research question for the empirical analysis. These are: 
 
RQ#1: What specific type of disrespect does the Chinese soft power phenomenon ad-
dress? 
 
RQ#1.2: Which ‘category arguments’ and classifications define PRC soft power rhetoric? 
 
RQ#1.3: To what extent, if at all, can the intensity of this type of disrespect be evaluated? 
 
 
5.1.  Rhetorical Analysis: Methodology 
Existing studies have concentrated on the strategic elements in the PRC soft power 
discourse, highlighting the need to transmit traditional culture, the desired leadership role 
of the third world, and willingness to assure the world of China’s peaceful rise (e.g. Wuth-
now, 2008; Li, 2008, 2009). In contrast to these earlier studies, my focus here is on na-
tional identity formation. I therefore employ an approach that enables a focus on identities 
that emerge in qualitative research data (Törrönen, 2013: 80).60  
 
                                                 
60 Reicher and Hopkins (1996, 353-357) discuss a method that combines self-categorisation theory 
with rhetorical and discursive psychology. According to their argument, language is one, but not 
the sole, domain where categories are constructed and contested. Moreover, in their discussion 
of cause and effect, Reicher and Hopkins (1996, 356) further argue that, without establishing the 
present of category arguments in language, investigations as to their effect are irrelevant. 
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First of all, political rhetoric as a concept refers to those strategies used to construct 
persuasive arguments either in day-to-day discussions or formal talks and debates (Billig, 
2013: 263). Consequently, the study of political rhetoric entails a multitude of ap-
proaches, where the demarcations are obscure, for instance, political narrative (Hammack 
and Pilecki, 2012), framing (Chong, 2013) and discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 
2012).61 In contrast to many forms of discourse analysis, nonetheless, empirical studies 
on political rhetoric tend to focus on micro-features such as clichés, idioms and other 
figures of speech as strategic argumentative tools (e.g. Ferrari, 2007; Orwenjo 2009; 
Kephart and Rafferty, 2009).62 Argument here refers to a variety of phenomena of which 
the most relevant to this study are disputes between groups and coherent sets of statements 
used to rationalise unitary premises (Billig, 2013: 267). 
The empirical analysis of political rhetoric I wish to conduct in this study draws from 
the social identity approach discussed in Chapters 2 and 4. This especially concerns the 
self-categorisation theory, which suggests that, when individuals act in the context of so-
cial identity, they tend to stereotype the ‘self’ based on in-group definitions and the ‘other’ 
based on out-group definitions. Classifications are thus considered an important vehicle 
                                                 
61 In contrast to rhetoric, “discourse” as defined by Foucault (1972), is considered a body of 
knowledge composed of particular ways of talking and seeing, forms of subjectivity, and power 
relations. A “discourse analysis” also refers to a multitude of methods. For instance, ethno-meth-
odologists and structuralists approach language as constituting social reality, where the study of 
discourse is a way of studying society (see Hammersley, 1997: 237). 
62 The interpretation of texts is arguably the most common method of studying political behav-
iour. Monroe and Schrodt (2009) for instance date clearly political texts as far back as 2500 BC in 
the case of Mesopotamia and 1300 BC in the case of China. Later contributors usually include 
Lorenzo Valla’s philological analysis of the Donation of Constantine revealing the volume as a 
medieval forgery post-dating Emperor Constantine. The method of automated sentiment analy-
sis is derived from the field of Information Science. Despite representing a novel approach within 
the field of Political Science, the method has long traditions: the Catholic Church has been at-
tributed as systematically categorising text documents as early as in the 17th century and similar 
techniques were still used by social scientists in the 1940s analysing, for instance, the “effect of 
reading to people” (Waples et al., 1940) and “collaboration in propaganda” (Berelson and de Gra-
zia, 1947). The first modern and theoretically driven textual analysis is usually considered Harold 
Lasswell’s Wartime Communications Project performed just before the Second World War (see 




in constructing ‘self’ and ‘others’ as membership categorisations (Sacks, 1974) and “spe-
cific argumentative devices, tropes, or commonplaces” (Billig, 2013: 267). Moreover, in 
addition to classifications, the boundary lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ can also be con-
sidered as subject positions (Törrönen, 2001). These can be produced as “open or implicit 
categorisations, and they can be based on slim differences of degree or sharp, almost an-
tithetical distinctions” (Törrönen, 2013: 85). 
Social self-categorisation in communication is quite commonplace. Regarding politi-
cal leaders in general, they typically frame an in-group agenda as representative of the 
entire nation. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) consider political leaders, in a rhetorical sense, 
as entrepreneurs of identity. Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins (2004) also show how such 
categories as “West” and “Islam” have been used in political rhetoric to legitimise group 
interests, social contexts and particular choices of action. 
Regarding China’s soft power, the discourse is not a closed system. On the contrary, 
political rhetoric within the Chinese government is influenced by numerous external fac-
tors, varying from Western conceptualisations to Chinese state ideology, and from devel-
opments in Chinese foreign policy to day-to-day world events (Wuthnow, 2008). Alt-
hough soft power rhetoric discussed here has various sources involving a fairly large 
number of practitioners, I consider it homogeneous enough to be treated as an entity. The 
data for the rhetorical analysis consists of practical political writings and scientific schol-
arship. While the former withholds CCP declarations, policy papers and newspaper arti-
cles, the latter consists of academic publications. The latter data (n=30) comprises Chi-
nese journal articles published on the mainland either in Chinese or in English, drawn 
mainly from the CNKI database. The selected journal articles are published between 1993 
and 2015, and are connected either implicitly63 or explicitly to PRC soft power or public 
diplomacy.  
                                                 
63 A number of journal articles address such themes as moral decline in China, Chinese public 
diplomacy and political philosophy.  
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The selected data set is a representative sample of the very homogeneous Chinese ac-
ademic rhetoric.64 Namely, in China the category of scientific scholarship is, to an extent, 
controversial. For instance, Wu (2013) shows that lack of academic autonomy makes the 
study of domestic politics in China an underdeveloped and sensitive field. He (2013) also 
criticises Chinese academics for a pro-government approach where official endorsement 
is preferred over peer review in judging the quality of research. Accordingly, Zhu and 
Pearson (2013) argue that the state in Chinese academic literature is rarely critically con-
sidered. While thus often lacking academic rigor, domestic political research conducted 
in Chinese and published in Mainland China nevertheless has the potential to provide 
insight into the general attitudes of the party-state and official party line. More im-
portantly, it reflects the official views, concepts and accepted approaches.65  
A disclaimer I wish to point out concerns the language used itself. As Link (2013) 
argues, political rhetoric in China diverges from the regular one. She coins the term “of-
ficiousness” to depict the official language of China, and argues that this has a long ped-
igree dating back to imperial times as guanhua (literally “official talk”) (Link, 2013: 234-
235). As attributes of the official language, Link includes “colorless” and “boring”, in a 
sense that it is mostly ritual. Another central characteristic of the official language is what 
Link calls “fruit language” (shuiguo yuyan). This entails an amount of vagueness: “When 
we hear the word ‘banana’ or ‘apple’ […] we can picture an image in our minds. When 
                                                 
64 The writer of the analysed texts represent among others the Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 
Research Center of the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the National 
Defense University, Tsinghua University, Beijing Normal University, and Beijing International 
Studies University. 
65 The study distinguishes between those studies published in international fora in English for an 
international audience, and those studies published in Mainland China in Chinese. Naturally 
both groups include Chinese nationals or ethnic Chinese with other nationalities. Prior studies 
drawn from the mainland for Chinese audiences are regarded categorically as empirical material. 
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we hear ‘fruit’ we don’t know what to picture” (Link, 2013: 246).66 The fruit language 
enables Chinese politicians to preserve options and thus even, if needed, save their career. 
While this might be something that most politicians practise universally regardless of the 
country or nature of the political model, in authoritarian systems the level of abstract 
language grows. 
 
Finally, the term ‘soft power’ has been translated in various ways in Chinese.67 The term 
‘ruan shili’ is usually used to describe “soft power”, whereas ‘ruan quanli’ translates into 
‘soft authority’, ‘ruan liliang’ into ‘soft strength’, and ‘ruan guoli’ into ‘national soft 
power’. These different translations are variedly used in Chinese literature. However, 
‘ruan shili’ is more used in the context of cultural construction or strategy and has a more 
domestic angle. ‘Ruan quanli’, on the other hand, would seem to be used in an interna-
tional power perspective, more in the spirit of the original theory of Nye. Different from 
this, and relevant here, are the extended concepts ‘wenhua ruanshili’ which translates into 
“cultural soft power” and ‘guojia wenhua ruan shili’ translated into “national cultural soft 
                                                 
66 In the Chinese official language, Link also observes characteristic metaphors, where some are 
“dead metaphors”, that is, metaphors that are so well established that people no longer recognise 
them as such. Again “military” metaphors arise from communist tradition, including references 
to guerrilla warfare. These also include those parts of official Chinese language that Link de-
scribes as “violent”, where the politicians establish an “atmosphere of fear” bringing “psycholog-
ical pressure” to people eventually becoming accepted as part of the official language (Link, 2013: 
251-254). 
67 As is evident through the linguistic complexities, it is challenging to find analytical consensus 
in the rhetoric; the use of language is scattered and multiple variations of ‘soft power’ are used. 
Soft power has been extended to areas of “regional society” (Wang and Qin, 2011), “business 
management” (Sui, Guo and Sun, 2011),  “urban planning” (Li and Zheng, 2011),  “education” 
(Jiang and Song, 2011),  “human resources” (Tian, 2011),  and many other things. The scope of 
research has moved from translating the ideas of Nye towards analysing, theorising and con-
structing a Chinese soft power vision. This vision nonetheless has the potential to showcase in-
group and out-group dynamics involved in the PRC soft power enthusiasm. 
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power”.68 In conducting the CNKI database search, I employed the key words ‘ruan shili’, 
‘ruan guoli’, ‘wenhua ruanshili’, and ‘guojia wenhua ruan shili’. 
 
 
5.2.  Intention of the ‘Other’: An Enemy Image 
First of all, typical of the Chinese soft power rhetoric, Guo (2012) deviates from Nye 
in making a difference between national and international soft power in her article “From 
national to international soft power” (Cong guojia ruan shili dao guoji ruan quanli). For 
Guo (2012) soft power has a dual purpose, where “ruan shili” indicates the domestic and 
“ruan quanli” the international dimension. Zhao, Li and Cai (2011)69 also underline the 
necessity in differentiating the soft power theory originating from the “American dis-
course”, and in enhancing the soft power of China by developing a theory with local 
traditions. They refer to Liu (2006):70  
 
There might be a serious ambiguity and misunderstanding, if we con-
tinue to use Nye’s soft power definition and connotation as a value base 
on analysis of China’s power construction. Presently the theoretical 
point of China’s soft power construction is neither the traditional view 
of comprehensive national power, nor the western-style soft power the-
ory but the soft power theory with Chinese characteristics (Quoted in 
Zhao, Li and Cai 2011, 41. See also Liu 2006.) 
 
 
In the pro-government discourse therefore, two broad but interconnected dimensions 
can be observed: firstly, a need to move towards Chinese formulations from the original 
idea of Nye and secondly, indications of ambitions to juxtapose the soft power of the US 
and China. Regarding the latter, the views of Chinese scholars differ significantly. Liu 
(2001),71 for instance, claims that soft power provides a new angle in researching the 
                                                 
68 Additionally, in Chinese literature there are also such extensions as “political soft power” 
(zhengzhi ruan shili), “military soft power” (junshi ruan shili), “soft power of thinking” (siwei ruan 
shili) and “meal soft power” (zhongcan ye shi ruan shili). 
69 Zhao Xiufang, Lecturer at School of Political and Public Administration, University of Jinan.  
70 Liu Xienshang, Research Scientist at the Institute for Science, Technology, and Public Policy, 
Texas US. 




nature of American hegemony. According to the argument, the rapid expansion of US 
soft power after the Cold War promotes “Americanisation” within the processes of glob-
alisation, changes the dynamics of power competition, and raises historical challenges not 
only for developing countries, but also for major Western nations. Wang (2007),72 on the 
other hand, argues that the major source of US soft power is its hard power, which is the 
strongest in the world. By combining these two, Wang claims, the US can fully exploit 
its resources to have the maximum effect on other countries. According to the discussion 
by Wang, American popular culture has had an enormous impact on the development of 
other cultures since the 20th century, and would thus be a major source of US soft power. 
 
Continuing the argument, another scholar, Wang (2013)73 calls for more protective and 
proliferating measures regarding the national Chinese film and television industries, as 
they are “under attack by foreign cultures” (Zhongguo chuantong wenhua zai wailai 
wenhua chongji xia). Using the notion of “cultural imperialism” (wenhua diguozhuyi), he 
fears that through Hollywood, the Chinese may start to turn towards “American values” 
(Meiguo de jiazhi guannian). Wang notes that the Chinese television and film industry 
has a long way to go to protect national Chinese culture.  Likewise, Li (2013)74 recognises 
US popular culture as dominant, which would enable it to “control the global cultural 
discourse” (kongzhizhe quanqiu de wenhua huayu).  
 
This kind of identity classification between ‘them’ as abnormal, dominant and intru-
sive and ‘us’ as normal and vulnerable is a recurring argumentative tool in Chinese soft 
power rhetoric. This is evident through references to cultural imperialism and attacking 
foreign cultures. Another recurring way to construct the same position is by reference not 
only to the US but the West in general. Wu (2011),75 for instance, interprets “cultural 
homogenisation” (wenhua shang de tongzhihua) followed by globalisation causing “blur-
ring of national cultural identity” (minzu de wenhua shenfen ye bian de mohu). This would 
lead to “anxiety and crises” (jiaolu yu weiji) for non-Western cultures, especially China. 
He sees globalisation as proliferating “foreign cultural hegemony” (wailai wenhua 
                                                 
72 Wang Xiaode, Professor at the Fujian Normal University.  
73 Wang, SuYa, Zhengzhou University School of Journalism and Communication. 
74 Editorial Department of Journal of Shangluo University. 
75 Wu Xueli, Provincial Party School. Shandong.  
97 
baquan), “cultural colonialism” (wenhua zhimin) and “general public westernisation” 
(shehui dazhong xifang hua). 
 
By taking distance to China’s main rival the US, users of the rhetoric therefore express 
demarcations between the West and non-West, that is, China. Globalisation, proliferation 
of market economy and modernisation are subsequently classified as belonging to the 
former and not to the latter. Moreover, these subject positions are further constructed by 
implying that in the West “modern” is considered as “good” and “traditional” that refers 
to the non-West, is regarded as “bad”.  
 
Considering various types of categorisations as social identity construction represented 
in the rhetoric, it is rather easy to notice that these are placed in the context of global 
cultural competition where China is seen as the underdog. Take for instance Li (2013), 
who makes a normative argument to the effect that modern globalisation consists of West-
ern institutions and ideas. Leading to a lack of Chinese cultural confidence, these institu-
tions and ideas take shape in “global expansion” (quanqiu de kuozhang) and have thus 
grown to “represent the advanced culture” (daibiao xianjin wenhua). It is ironic that in 
the Chinese soft power rhetoric the subject position of “lack of cultural confidence” in 
China is connected to globalisation, of which the PRC is in economic terms among the 
most prominent beneficiaries.  
 
Producing this position further, Su (2013) argues that China is threatened by “Western 
cultural hegemony” (xifang wenhua baquan), “export of Western democracies” (xifang 
minzhu shuchu) and “religious penetration” (zongjiao shentou). Wang (2014)76 also ar-
gues that Western impact is the reason why Chinese academia is interested in cultural 
confidence, hinting at why it is studied from both “historical and realist perspectives” 
(lishi he xianshi de weidu). This “realist” perspective seems to position China in cultural 
competition with the West as a realpolitik fact. A distinctive feature of the soft power 
rhetoric is therefore the mapping of contemporary menaces to Chinese cultural, political 
and social existence. As shown above, Chinese scholars find them in the categorisation 
schemes of globalisation and decadent Western culture. 
                                                 




To this problem, interesting solutions are offered. To illustrate, Liu (2014)77 connects 
ideology to Chinese cultural soft power, arguing that the enhancing of national soft power 
is a “cultural path to ideological security” (yishi xingtai anquan de wenhua lujing). For 
this reason, Liu suggests establishing a national cultural security strategy to build a “great 
cultural security wall” (wenhua anquan changcheng) against “Western cultural invasion” 
(xifang wenhua de qinxi).  In expressing, if it is so doing, symbolic withdrawal from the 
world, the choice of words is extraordinary.  At best, this could be interpreted as nostalgia 
towards traditional society amid the economic reforms and, at worst, it comes across as 
misguided alarmism in the face of imminent lack of legitimacy of the establishment. 
Zhao, Li and Cai (2011) continue the criticism of US soft power and American cultural 
hegemony by proposing measures to respond in defence of “Chinese cultural security” 
(wenhua anquan). Therefore, to encounter American values, the discourse recognises a 
strategic need to strengthen the soft power of China. This reflects the overall classification 
system between ‘self’ and ‘other’ as a membership argument.  
 
 
5.3. Image of the ‘Self’: Cultural Status 
The context for the undertaking to build an enemy image of the West in general and 
the US in particular seems to be connected to the Chinese image of the ‘self’. This is 
evident through those rhetorical moves that reflect on wider processes within Chinese 
society. In this, not only the perceived threat of globalisation but also the recent ideolog-
ical turnaround in economic thinking are perceived as developing social anomie or, as 
Wu (2011)78 coins it, a “national sense of apathy” (minzu yishi danmo). Producing hier-
archical positioning, Lee (2011) also questions the mental state of the Chinese population. 
According to the argument, the transitions in Chinese society are resulting in the mentality 
                                                 
77 Liu Cuiyu, School of Humanities and Law, Henan Agricultural University. 
78 Shandong Provincial Party School.  
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of some people79 “getting gradually out of balance” (jian shiheng), “the moral sense get-
ting confused” (daode yishi chuxian-mimang) and their “values being distorted” (jiazhi 
quxiang fasheng niuqu).  
 
Relating to this sense of “national apathy”, a further tendency can be observed in the 
rhetoric to apply in-group definitions and self-categorisation stereotypes.  Xiao (2013),80 
for instance, depicts the post-Marxist or, in other words, the reform era as “drastic 
change” (sudong jubian) and adds that “people’s thoughts were shocked” (ren de sixiang 
chansheng dongyao) and “feelings for the future confused” (dui weilai de fazhan gandao 
mimang). Xiao seems convinced that an understanding of Marxism has practical signifi-
cance and that the “strengthening of faith in communism is of crucial importance” 
(jianding gongchan zhuyi de xinnian youzhe zhi guan zhongyao de yiyi). The references 
to popularised Marxism in the discourse can be seen as the historical legacy of the social-
ist era. At the same time, they may represent a counter-discourse to the perceived Western 
originated neoliberalism and, again, the perceived lessening of national morality by con-
sumerism. The subject position resonates with the PRC notion of the so-called “socialist 
core values”, attempting to mix nationalist sentiments with Marxism in a contemporary 
context. According to the People’s Daily, these values “have taken roots in the public’s 
mind and are translated into actions”.81 
 
In this framework of traditional culture and popularised Marxism mixed with general 
alarmism, Pan (2005)82 discusses the broad relationship between present-day national se-
curity and culture in China. According to the view, cultural security mainly refers to “po-
litical cultural security” (zhengzhi wenhua anquan) including “political values” (zhengzhi 
                                                 
79 To refer to “some people” is a typical rhetorical choice for the PRC policy elites when discussing 
political opposition. See Chapter 7. 
80 Xiao Weiwei, College of Marxism, Central China Normal University.  
81 According to the People’s Daily: “Core socialist values, which summarize the nation, society 
and individuals, comprise a set of moral principles defined by central authorities as prosperity, 
democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, patriotism, dedication, 
integrity and friendship.” See People’s Daily March 2016. “24-word core socialist values en-
graved on people’s mind”: http://en.people.cn/n3/2016/0302/c98649-9023926.html. 
82Pan Yihe, Department of International Cultural Studies, Zhejiang University.  
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jiazhi) and “social management system” (shehui guanli zhi). The argument of Pan is that 
culture is not only a subdomain (ziyu) of security, but an essential part of it. A threat may 
come in the form of an “open challenge to government legitimacy” (zhengfu hefa xing 
quanwei de gongkai tiaozhan), other “social conflict” (shehui chongtu) or “civil war” 
(neizhan). 
 
Regarding a more specific perspective, Shen, Liu and Ni (2011)83 link cultural security 
with soft power. In this view, culture produces security through national cohesion while 
maintaining an intact ideology: the prosperity and decline of a nation would be dependent 
upon the rise and fall of the respective culture.84 National culture, the argument goes, is 
the historic accumulation of national ethos as a specific “survival guide” of the nation. 
Should national culture be weak, a country loses soft power in competition with other 
countries. In this sense, they argue, cultural safety is factually tantamount to national sov-
ereignty. Following this logic, the scholars argue that China must carry forward the “out-
standing achievements of national culture”, and construct a “shared spiritual home” for 
the Chinese. Accordingly, of highest importance for China would be to develop the struc-
ture of its cultural industry and form cultural industry groups (Shen, Liu and Ni 2011: 32-
36). Echoing the argument, Li and Shi (2011)85 bring to the discussion an application of 
soft power. The method, as a rhetorical move, looks at domestic social management, call-
ing it soft power of the ruling class – “ruling soft power”. This means that after gaining a 
ruling position, a class exposes members of society by mandatory means to dominant 
ideology, public opinion or cultural education to maintain the ruling status and the stable 
development of society.86  
                                                 
83 Shen Haigang and Ni Yong, Department of Sociology, Shandong University of Technology/Liu 
Qingshun, School of Business Administration, Jiangsu University.  
84 As an analogy, they mention the Jewish ideology of returning home to Israel after times of 
hardship and exile. The Zionist power would stem from the Jewish national spirit and culture, 
the Bible functioning as a cultural carrier (Shen, Liu and Ni 2011: 35). 
85 Li Liaoning and Shi Jun, Marxism College, Hainan University. 
86 Li and Shi give three principles of the “ruling soft power”: 




This need for a “ruling soft power system” stems from the need to create legitimacy 
for the CCP. In addition to the academic publications, the rhetoric has also been applied 
to state-run media, albeit in a somewhat more moderate form. Among other things, the 
argument for a need for a “ruling class soft power” is noticeably absent in the rhetoric of 
daily newspapers. To illustrate, in a People’s Daily article,87 Director Chen Shaofeng,88 
formulates for China a need to construct a “new understanding and enthusiasm of culture” 
(wenhua de xin renshi he xin reqing).  The impact of culture should bring hope as a “pos-
itive socialist image construction” (shehui zhuyi jianshe lai de jiji ying). He states that 
culture, economy, entertainment and lifestyle are separate and should be managed with 
“ideological policy” (yishi xingtai de zhengce). Again, it would be important to under-
stand the role of culture in national development. Chen notes that culture should be “ele-
vated to a strategic level” (tisheng dao yige zhanlüe gaodu) where cultural self-confidence 
can be achieved through structural reform and “major cultural development” (wenhua de 
da fazhan). He thus makes clear that cultural industries are closely related to “national 
cultural safety” (guojia de wenhua anquan) by making cultural existence a “security is-
sue” (anquan wenti). 
 
Consequently, in a take on Guangming Daily,89  Professor Zhang Yiwu90 sees Chinese 
culture at a new starting point, but stresses the importance of the continuation of Chinese 
civilisation. For Zhang, the founding of the PRC itself and its support for the Third World 
created “precious spiritual wealth” (zui baogui de jingshen caifu), and 30 years of reforms 
                                                 
2) Ruling soft power is a humane social management repertoire, which is realised through such 
flexible methods as dominant ideology, cultural education or public opinion, while maintaining 
people orientation, in other words, people dependency. 
3) The goal of ruling soft power is to advance the position of the ruling body by attracting mem-
bers of society and obtaining widespread support (Li and Shi 2011, 201). 
87 September 2, 2010, People's Daily - the theoretical channel. See http://theory.peo-
ple.com.cn/GB/166866/12627026.html 
88 Deputy Director of the Department of the National Cultural Industry Innovation and Devel-
opment, Ministry of Culture. 
89 November 27, 2009, Guangming Daily. See http://theory.peo-
ple.com.cn/GB/166866/10464588.html 
90 Professor at Beijing University. 
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and rapid development a “large platform for soft power tactics” (dapingtai shi Zhongguo 
fahui ruan shili de jichu). According to Zhang, China wants to achieve “cultural aware-
ness” (wenhua zijue), “utilize the power of culture” (fahui wenhua de liliang), and charm 
domestically to create a “harmonious China” (hexie de Zhongguo). In the same article,91 
Professor Wu Jiamin92, raises the issue of the long social tradition. Wu asks why the feu-
dal society of China has survived the longest in the world. His argument seems to be that 
the “mainstream culture” (zhuliu wenhua) of China has been consistent even throughout 
multiple regime changes, even surpassing the feudal nature of the imperial China. Ac-
cording to Wu there are two important dimensions of this cultural continuation; domestic 
“long-term stability´” (changzhijiu'an) and external “contribution to the world” (dui shijie 
de gongxian). In this, he also echoes both in-group cohesion and out-group competition.  
 
Soft power rhetoric thus positions China’s cultural civilisation as domestically durable 
and externally potential. In addition to stereotyping traditional culture and Marxism, the 
rhetorical argument is to connect soft power to domestic ethnic harmony in searching for 
stability and security. Wu (2014),93 for instance, attempts to show that shared cultural 
communication is inevitably connected to cultural confidence. Here classification be-
tween ‘us’ and ‘them’ is produced by proposing dialogue and cultural communication 
between different ethnic groups of China to “achieve psychological and cultural appeal 
under political equality” (shixian zhengzhi pingdeng xia de xinli he wenhua suqiu). Ac-
cording to this logic, as I read it, the diversity of 55 domestic ethnic minorities should 
unite towards a common identity of Han culture under the PRC. Producing this demarca-
tion, Sun and Wang (2014) place at the centre of the soft power construction a cultural 
security concept that is “pragmatic, self-confident, open and pluralistic” (wushi, zixin, 
kaifang, duoyuan). According to this subject position, ‘pragmatic’, ‘pluralistic’ and 




                                                 
91 November 27, 2009 Guangming Daily. See http://theory.peo-
ple.com.cn/GB/166866/10464541.html. 
92 Professor at Foreign Affairs University. 
93 Wu Xianjun, School of Marxism, Fujian Normal University. 
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5.4.  Intensity 
Based on the above rhetorical analysis, it would seem that the level of intensity of 
identity formation and underlining recognition-seeking seems rather tense. Earlier studies 
do not, however, provide any method or indicator to assess its level. This is recognised 
by Johnston (1999: 292), who highlights the difficulties in evaluating the intensity of the 
in-group formation: “the literature is remarkably free of any effort to think about indica-
tors of the scope and intensity of in-group identification”. To the best of my knowledge, 
no studies after the initial remark of Johnston (1999) have addressed the issue, which is 
no doubt challenging to operationalise. However, regarding the scope, and perhaps inten-
sity, of the in-group formation that concerns Chinese soft power rhetoric, I consider here 
a statistical indicator. 
 
As I have attempted to show using the rhetorical analysis, the soft power-related lan-
guage of the PRC is rather homogeneous. In it, the practitioners apply fairly similar ar-
gumentative devices and subject positions in forming identity categories. It would seem 
to me, then, that the scope and, with certain reservations, the intensity of the in-group 
formation could be assessed by looking at the amount of publications on an annual basis.  
Figure 13 shows the number of soft power-related academic journal articles published in 
China between 2001 and 2013. The search was conducted using the Journal and News-
paper Database of Renmin University of China and the Wanfang Database. A few obser-
vations can be made. First, the results indicate an increase in numbers of soft power-
related journal articles and conference proceedings published in China since 2001, with 
a dramatic rise first in 2004 and then from 2006 to 2008. The first observed change in 
volume coincides with the launch of the ‘Peaceful Rise’ doctrine in 2003. The second 
development in 2006 occurs in tandem with the launch of the national soft power strategy 
by Hu Jintao in 2007. With this coincidental rising trajectory of academic interest, it can 
be assumed that contemporary soft power enthusiasm mainly represents top-down move-
ment within Chinese policy circles.94   
                                                 
94 This is evident in those journal articles included in the discourse analysis. For instance, Su 
(2013), Liu and Zhou (2013), and Liu (2014) begin their articles with the declarations of third Ple-
nary Session and Li (2013) with the eight Plenary Session of 18th CCP Central Committee, 




I would therefore argue that the volume of publications would reflect not only policy 
guidelines given top-down, but also the general attitudes of the practitioners of the rhet-
oric. It could thus be considered an indication, if not evidence, of the scope of this partic-
ular form of in-group formation. It is not clear, however, whether this can be considered 
an indication of the intensity of the phenomenon. As I understand it, this problem could 
be approached by quantifying the sentiment or tone of the language used and by observing 
its development over time. This could be achieved with multiple automated methods. One 
in particular, for English language sources, is proposed in this dissertation in Chapter 8. 
Multilingual and non-English approaches have been developed by Lucas et al (2015), 
among others.      
 
Figure 6 Soft Power-Related Journal Publications and conference proceedings in 
Mainland China 
Source: the Journal and Newspaper Database of Renmin University of China, Full-text 
Database of Academic Conferences in China   
Note: Searches were conducted using the key word ruan shili. 
 
 
                                                 
Indeed, as He, 2013 shows: “Today, it is common for top universities like Qinghua, Beijing and 
Fudan to offer the most prestigious awards to those short executive summary papers or docu-
ments that have drawn the attention of Chinese central leaders who then read, comment on, or 
endorse the scholar’s policy-oriented work. As a result, the leaders’ preferences determine the 
















5.5. Summarised Findings 
At the beginning of the chapter I outlined two main questions and one additional research 
one. Below I will consider each. 
 
 
RQ#1: What specific type of disrespect does the Chinese soft power phenomenon ad-
dress? 
 
In observing how the subject positions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ are constructed through soft 
power rhetoric, it can be found that these are produced by contrasting China and the West, 
assumptions of advanced and backward cultures, Chinese culture and American culture, 
developing countries and Western countries. This, in my view, can be seen as recognition-
seeking that is post-colonial and self-orientalist. 
 
Accordingly, to strengthen Chinese position, the rhetorical move is to envision China 
as ethnically harmonious and socio-economically stable. Therefore, future China is seen 
by the participants as self-confidently open (in an introverted sense) and ethnically di-
verse. As the rhetoric literally suggests, the Chinese soft power idea can be seen as a 
cultural wall constructed to defend the uniqueness of Chinese civilisation, which is pro-
tected from the forces of globalisation by a confident Chinese culture. 
 
 
RQ#1.2: Which ‘category arguments’ and classifications define PRC soft power rhetoric? 
 
The analysed rhetoric focuses on those developments of Chinese society that are fa-
vourable to subject-positioning and that stereotype the ‘self’ as weak and under attack, 
discussing the mental state of the Chinese people and national apathy, curable by common 
culture, ethnic unity and political stability. 
 
The observed soft power rhetoric thus aims to close the socio-economic and ethnic 
ranks as a counter-strategy to the perceived threats of globalisation and Westernisation. 
Therefore, the category argument offered in the rhetoric speaks for a social order and 
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patriarchal authority devoid of inner conflicts and capable of defending the civilisation 
against foreign threats with a mental wall of vitality, uniqueness, and higher status.  
 
In the PRC soft power language, there can thus be observed a trend where culture is po-
liticised and nationalised. This creates a framework for social discussion that takes place 
outside “politics” and within “culture”. This is convenient for the one-party-state in main-
taining its ruling status. 
RQ#1.3: To what extent, if at all, can the intensity of this type of disrespect be evaluated? 
 
The intensity of this type of in-group formation remains a difficult task to evaluate. 
There is a statistical argument to be made, but it is question of interpretation whether this 





























6. ANALYSIS: PROPENSITY COMPONENT 
 
This chapter focuses on the propensity component of the model outlined in Chapter 3. 
The analysis draws on media studies in studying Chinese public diplomacy products, pay-
ing special attention to entertainment media and popular culture. As specific research 
questions I will ask:   
 
RQ#2: What type of propensities does the PRC perception of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
introduce into China’s soft power communication?  
 





6.1. Media Analysis: Methodology 
 
 
Prior cultural studies show how entertainment industries can be used to form political 
agenda. The political relevance and importance of interpreting films has a long tradition. 
Siegfried Kracauer’s analysis of pre-WWII German cinema, published in a volume enti-
tled “From Caligari to Hitler – A Psychological History of The German Film” (1947), 
can be considered seminal. In the study Kracauer was less interested in the films for their 
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own sake, and more because they could reveal national psychological dispositions pre-
dominant in Germany before the Second World War.95 
A more recent take on the issue comes from Crane (2014) who studies global cultur-
alisation through international film markets. While the main argument of Crane is that 
global culturalisation has led to changes in film content towards more deculturalised 
transnational films, her argument shows that governments spend vast sums of money on 
maintaining a presence in the film industry. This would indicate that media in general and 
films are perceived as having considerable symbolic and cultural value (Crane, 2014: 
365-366), and that the production and consumption of films performs an important role 
in negotiating or constructing cultural identities and social consciousness (Gao, 2009: 
432). “Cultural policies that support national film industries in the form of tariffs, quotas 
subsidies and tax credits may therefore be interpreted as a form of cultural resistance to 
the homogenised effects of globalisation” (Gao, 2009: 432; quoted in Crane, 2014: 366). 
                                                 
95 Kracauer (1947: 5-7) gives two specific reasons why national films have the potential to reflect 
collective mentalities in a more direct way than other artistic media. The first argument addresses 
precisely the collective nature of the medium: films are never the product of an individual so the 
teamwork nature of any production would tend to suppress individual peculiarities favouring 
common traits. The second rationale of Kracauer is based on the appeal of the audience, or the 
“anonymous multitude”: “Popular films –or, to be more precise, popular screen motifs – can 
therefore be supposed to satisfy existing mass desires” (Kracauer, 1947: 5). What Kacauer states 
would seem to imply that both the production team of a film and the subsequent audience are 
together bound in a collective mentality that may or may not be confined within national borders. 
In Kracauer’s time, the late 1940s, this dependency was no doubt clearer than it is today. How-
ever, what makes the contemporary situation more interesting and thus having relevance for this 
study is the hegemony of the Hollywood film productions that the international audience is ac-
customed to. It is this hegemony that any public diplomacy effort must take into account, if the 
goal is to speak to a large international audience. On the contrary, the ambition of Kracauer was 
no less than to discuss the rise of the Third Reich: “Thus, behind the overt history of economic 
shifts, social exigencies and political machinations runs a secret history involving the inner dis-
positions of the German people. The disclosure of these dispositions through the medium of the 
German screen may help in the understanding of Hitler’s ascent and ascendency” (Kracauer, 
1947: 11). 
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Prior studies show that contemporary governments seem not only to be aware of the 
value of entertainment media, but also actively use it as a policy tool to promote national 
values and a good national image (De Zoysa and Newman, 2002; Crane, 2014). To this 
end, Scott (2004) and Keane, (2005) discuss how the “pen is mightier than the sword, and 
how the picture is worth a thousand words”.  
A popular approach is to focus especially on Hollywood and the US film industry in 
general. In this area, most studies show how popular culture is used and have been used 
to promote US politics, the American way of life and thus US soft power and foreign 
policy in the world. For instance, Kellner (2010) analyses allegorical representations in 
Hollywood films that commented on, interpreted or indirectly portrayed aspects of the 
Bush era. According to Kellner (2010: 14-15), films, properly interpreted and contextu-
alised, can provide key insights into the specifics of political history.96 
In addition to Kellner (2010), Thompson (1985) and Jarvie (1992) consider the early 
phases of US film exports. Stokes and Maltpy (2004) also analyse Hollywood contempo-
rary exports. Finally, the focus of Crane (2014) is on cultural globalisation and the dom-
inance of the US film industry.97 
                                                 
96 Moreover, “cinematic mappings” for Kellner represent historical events, individuals, character 
types, cultural norms and other defining features of specific societies, and the fact that films are 
a crucial part of contemporary cultures embedded in fundamental economic, political and social 
elements of the present age (Kellner, 2010: 14-17). 
97 It is especially the early years of the Hollywood film industry that have been seen as inward-
looking, promoting American middle-class values and discounting, devaluing and stereotyping 
the outside world: “[…] the mythical golden years of Hollywood spanning 1938-60 projected a 
uniformed vision: faith in the democratic order, the classless society, heroic individualism and 
the golden opportunities offered by the capitalist work ethic and enterprise” (De Zoysa and New-
man, 2002: 188). These views have also been contested as unrepresentative and one-sided, but it 
has equally been argued that even those films that appear as counter-cultural and liberal such as 
Taxi Driver (directed by Martin Scorsese, starring Robert De Niro) and Blue Velvet (directed Da-
vid Lynch) have in fact been representative of a right-wing agenda and cinematic tradition, ap-
plying heroic individualism, myth-making, and incapable of structural reform (see for instance 
Cousins, 2001, Kellner, 2010, De Zoysa and Newman, 2002).  
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Using a similar approach, De Zoysa and Newman (2002) show how the American film 
became an essential part of the socialisation process from early childhood in many parts 
of the world. They argue that this way American values, basic assumptions, idioms and 
subtexts became part of what they call global consciousness. According to their argument, 
film and television became an integral part of US soft power, promoting the virtues of a 
particular American life: “American self-definition as the first ‘universal nation’ made up 
of immigrants familiar with cultural exchange meant it could negotiate other traditions 
with ease” (De Zoysa and Newman, 2002: 189). 
Within the field of IR, popular culture and world politics have mostly been understood 
as interconnected but separate entities (Grayson, Davies, and Philpott, 2009: 155). How-
ever, popular media is also increasingly recognised as important for world politics (We-
ber, 2006; Dodds, 2008; Ruback, 2010; Drezner, 2011). Popular media is relevant for 
security issues in identifying threats and characterising enemies (Dixit, 2012; Valeriano 
and Habel, 2016). The premise here assumes that there exists an ‘intertext’ between what 
are known as the ‘first order’ and the ‘second order’, that is, between the real world and 
the fictional world (Fey, Poppe, and Rauch, 2016: 349; see also Weldes, 2003; Kiersey 
and Neumann, 2013).    
From the viewpoint of methodology, Grayson, Davies and Philpott (2009: 158-160) 
outline a popular culture-world politics research agenda, which places popular culture 
and world politics on a continuum instead of cause and effect. Of their agenda, I utilise 
here three points. First, according to the outline, the interconnectedness of these two 
spheres enables the study of popular culture as political ‘texts’ and sites where politics 
takes place. Secondly, cultural studies have the potential to give insight into relations 
between popular culture as an identity producer and the nation-state as an IR actor (see 
also Greyson, 2008). Finally, as argued above, also according to Grayson, Davies and 
Philpott (2009), the focus of popular culture studies within the IR has been on the Anglo-
                                                 
Coming to the Bush era, as both Kellner (2010) and De Zoysa and Newman (2002) show, Holly-
wood reinforced and reflected on “American values”, and more specifically, it seems that the 
Bush administration not only encouraged but in fact enlisted Hollywood studios for a propa-
ganda project to sell the Iraq war to the outside world. 
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American world. Thus, taking popular culture ‘seriously’ would require expanding in-
quiry to the rest of the world.  
The reading of popular culture as texts and interpreting them presents some methodo-
logical difficulties. Within the domain of security, interpretations of popular culture texts 
tend to either be critical or affirmative, that is, texts are seen to either support or challenge 
an assumption of a threat. Moving beyond positive-negative interpretations, reading texts 
in multiple different ways may better capture the political significance of entertainment 
media. This is known as ‘polysemy’ (Schulzke, 2017).  Polysemy should enable a focus 
on how identities are produced and deemed commonsensical (Dixit, 2012, 289). To be 
more specific, instead of causal links between popular culture and world politics, the for-
mer potentially explains how images, narratives and ideas are made commonsensical 
(Nexon, 2010).  In this fashion, popular culture creates and sustains the conditions of 
world politics (Weldes, 2003, 6). This approach is reflexive. Instead of audience recep-
tion, therefore, the focus is on the meaning of the actual text and the author’s motives 
behind it (Fey, Poppe, and Rauch, 2016: 349). 
Of the popular culture and film genres, the most attention among IR scholars seems to 
have been paid to science fiction and fantasy. Here particular themes and products have 
focused on zombies (Drezner, 2011), Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Davies, 2010), Harry 
Potter (Nexon and Neuman, 2006), many aspects of the Battlestar Galactica (Carpenter, 
Civijanovic, and Mason, 2006; Jackson, 2011; Fey, Poppe, and Rauch, 2016), and Doctor 
Who (Dixit, 2012). Based on a rather short review, a genre that may be overlooked is 
action, and in the case of China, the Kung Fu movies that play a significant role in PRC 
public diplomacy communication. Su (2010) argues how, through Kung Fu movies, Chi-
nese films have a long history of penetrating Western film markets, mainly with Hong 
Kong actors such as Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan, Chow Yun Fat and Jet Li. The central strat-
egy of Chinese Kung Fu films, according to Su (2010), is to draw from traditional Chinese 
culture and combine this with Hollywood production techniques. The films highlight tra-
ditional Chinese cultural values such as brotherhood, family ties, personal perseverance 
and loyalty. They also employ skillful shooting techniques, sensational kung fu arts, gor-
geous costumes, magnificent settings, and colourful, impressionist-painting-like scenes. 
Moreover, according to Su (2010), Kung Fu movies have obtained official public diplo-
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macy bureaucracy blessing, because the domestic filmmakers in China believe that an-
cient themes are politically safe, financially less risky and commercially successful (Su, 
2010: 319-321). 
As a case in point, He (2013) shows how Singaporean audiences react positively to 
Chinese martial arts films. The argument is that, in making traditional Chinese culture 
attractive, the potential of Chinese action films in enhancing China's soft power is seen 
as significant. Moreover, He (2013) shows that Chinese martial arts films are a valuable 
cultural resource, and a promising way through which China can project soft power. 
The primary data for the empirical analysis consists of action films that have been fully 
or partly financed by the PRC public diplomacy bureaucracy or Chinese media companies 
that are closely tied to the Communist Party. 
 
 
6.2. Situational Assessment 
 
To give an overview of tensions that underline the PRC public diplomacy strategies, 
the first text concerns the so-called Document no. 9 entitled “Communiqué on the Current 
State of the Ideological Sphere”. The communiqué was leaked and translated into English 
in September 2013 by a US-based Chinese news outlet Mirror Media Group. The memo 
attracted wide attention both in and outside China.98 The reasons for the attention are 
obvious, as the memo was issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party responsible for drafting and circulating CCP memos and directives. The 
document urged party members to stay alert and guard against ideological threats ema-
nating from the outside world, including the promotion of “western constitutional democ-
racy”, “universal values”, “civil society”, “neoliberalism”, “Western idea of journalism” 
and “historical nihilism”. 
                                                 
98 See for instance  
The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leader-
ship-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html?_r=1 
The Economist: http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/06/political-rebalancing 
China File: http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation 
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There remained a few doubts as to the authenticity of the document among Western 
analytics, especially since a wide and harsh government crackdown on Chinese dissidents 
was later reported. Among others, in April 2015 the 71-year-old journalist Gao Yu was 
sentenced to seven years in prison for "leaking state secrets."99 
In general, the document was considered offensive, against all liberal political ideas 
and values and a way for Xi Jinping to silence dissent and consolidate power. The mes-
sage of the communiqué was also interpreted as instilling faith in the conservatism of Xi’s 
regime. In contrast, during the early years of his reign it was widely believed in the West 
that not only the economic reforms, but also social and political opening up would con-
tinue, Xi having from the outset outlined somewhat liberal directions. For instance, in 
2012 in a congress speech Xi stressed the importance of the PRC constitution and the 
rights of individual citizens that it guaranteed. He stated: 
 "We should endeavour to let the people experience fairness and justice in 
every judicial case, and should never allow unjust judgment infringing peo-
ple's rights and interests."100  
The contrast between the early statements of Xi and the later “Document 9” can be 
considered especially stark since there was no uncommon pressure to underline the con-
stitutional rights of Chinese citizens in the first place during 2012, and no unusual social 
or political turmoil or civil threats towards the legitimacy of the CCP in 2013. 
Based on Document 9 alone, it could be argued that the PRC leadership would seem 
to feel that its position of power and legitimacy is somehow threatened by Western ideas. 
According to the memorandum, the goal of “some people” is to use “Western constitu-
tional democracy” to undermine the leadership of the PRC. The memo further states that, 
                                                 
99 See for instance  
CBS: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-journalist-gao-yu-prison-sentence-leaking-state-
secrets/ 
The New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/asia/china-journalist-
gao-yu-gets-7-year-sentence.html 
 
100 See http://www.china.org.cn/china/2012-12/05/content_27312541.htm 
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for instance, the separation of power, a multi-party system and general elections are con-
cepts of the “capitalist class” regarding nation, political model and system design. Con-
sidering the turbo-capitalism the PRC itself benefits from, utilises and promotes, the claim 
borders on latent denial. Moreover, the document argues that the West, headed by the US, 
is attempting to weaken the control of the PRC over the Chinese economy, by carrying 
out “their Neoliberal agendas under the guise of globalisation”. This tactic, the document 
claims, would have had “catastrophic consequences for Latin America, the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe”, not forgetting to stress that the financial crisis is still ongoing, only 
apparently everywhere else but in China. 
Perhaps more understandably, the memo also tackles social and cultural issues. Here 
again, “some people” in co-operation with “Western anti-China forces” are seen as pro-
moting the “Western theory” of civil society, claiming that it would be the precondition 
for protecting the rights of the individual, and setting the CCP “against the masses”.  The 
memorandum warns against any declarations that advance “universal values”. This is 
seen as a biased claim that Western values transcend time, space, nation and class, appli-
cable to all humanity. In this context, the document stresses that, due to the long-term 
Western dominance in economics, military and science, the argument of the universality 
of Western values might be “confusing and deceptive”. Equally confusing, at least to a 
Western reader, is the claim that the known “some people”, through promoting “historical 
nihilism”, would be distorting the history of the CCP and characterising it as a “continu-
ing series of mistakes” by rejecting the “accepted conclusions”. 
Considering the pro-PRC government academic arguments presented in the discourse 
analysis, the claims of the Document 9 cannot be considered surprising. They can be 
given the benefit of the doubt, nonetheless, in “social matters”, and one can acknowledge 
that there exists organised social forces on whose agenda rests the advancement of civil 
society, human rights and democracy, not only in China but in the world in general. The 
idea, however, that through neoliberal market-oriented globalisation, the West would aim 
to undermine the legitimacy of the PRC is an extraordinary claim, which would require 
extraordinary evidence. In fact, it seems that viable explanations regarding the content of 





6.3.Actor Choice: In-group/Out-group Narratives 
 
 
6.3.1. Blurring of Media Demarcations 
As argued in Chapter3, recent times have witnessed the Chinese Communist Party 
acting as a global neo-liberal media player, utilising the full imagination of transnational 
capitalistic communication tactics. I therefore wish first to underline a central feature of 
PRC public diplomacy. Even though the PRC does not generally operate in a latent fash-
ion when it comes to third-party corporate acquisition, it does purposefully aim to blur 
media demarcations. This tactic relies on both the international and domestic audiences 
confusing PRC media, independent Chinese media, and international media, making it 
difficult to tell whether the media representatives (such as journalists) and the media prod-
ucts (such as films) are “Chinese” or “foreign”. The above-mentioned third-party corpo-
rate media acquisitions play a central role in this tactic, with the invisible hand of the PRC 
external propaganda bureaucracy guiding the process. 
The first film that I analyse as political ‘text’ is a seemingly separate Hollywood-pro-
duced film Transformers – Age of Extinction that premiered globally in the summer of 
2014.  At the time, the film was the latest entry in a series of Transformers films, which 
feature one group of alien robots fighting on Earth alongside humans (mainly US mili-
tary) against another group of robots. The producer and director of the films, Michael 
Bay, is known for his earlier works that exploit American values, patriotism, and military 
might in high-budget productions (for instance, The Rock, Pearl Harbor, Armageddon). 
Also, the three previous Transformers films made no exception to this formula, clearly 
produced in co-operation with the Pentagon.  
The events of the film taking place in Mainland China and Hong Kong notwithstand-
ing, it was surprising that, in the Age of Extinction, the typical US patriotism of Michael 
Bay productions was changed to a Chinese one. In short, the opponent of the protagonists 
is the CIA, the White House government is represented as incompetent, and the main 
villain, a US agent, uses the government’s secret operations for personal gain. In contrast, 
the Beijing government is portrayed as benevolent, and a body to whom the Chinese pop-
ulation can turn in time of crisis. In the final battle scene, in which Hong Kong is being 
destroyed, two seemingly insignificant small scenes turn out to be revealing. First, when 
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the evil robots destroy the harbour, a Hong Kong official declares that “we must call 
central government for help”. After a short while, the film moves to Beijing where the 
PRC Defence Minister gets a call informing him that Hong Kong is in trouble. His reac-
tion is: “Of course China will help Hong Kong. We’ll send fighter jets.” 
There would not have been anything out of the ordinary with the two scenes, except 
for the fact that the events are completely unrelated to the plot of the film. No central 
government help or fighter jets are seen during the rest of the narrative. Not surprisingly, 
the film turned out to be partly financed by the Chinese state media, in this case CCTV’s 
movie channel, the Jiaflix Enterprises. It does not require a huge leap of analytical faith 
to speculate that, within PRC public diplomacy bureaucracy, this type of co-operation 
requires the consent of the high ranks. Surprisingly China watchers, academics and jour-
nalists took little public notice of the film, especially since it aired both in China and 
internationally during the Hong Kong student pro-democracy demonstrations of 2014. In 
fact, only the Senior Editor of Variety magazine, David Cohen, in an opinion article, 
raised the issue calling it “sickening” to see Bay and Steven Spielberg (the second exec-
utive producer) “show less courage in the face of the CCP than Hong Kong grocers and 
waitresses”.101 
The film was a huge financial success both inside and outside China, generating in 
China alone more revenue than any other film before it. Despite the coincidental timing 
with the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests, which could make the film appear as a ra-
ther blunt reaction of the PRC to the protests, the general principle follows the Hollywood 
pattern of cashing in on patriotism and nationalistic emotion. The utilisation of American 
cultural “imperialism” and the Americana values of popular entertainment: individualism, 
autonomy and the right to be different are not a particularly new tactic. Moreover, it has 
also been found to be an effective one for domestic purposes. In a social psychological 
experiment, US female nationals who were shown a clip from an altered Rocky IV where 
the protagonist (an American boxer played by Sylvester Stallone) lost to his Russian ad-
versary (instead of the original plot where he wins), were found to have lost national self-
esteem (Branscombe and Wann, 1994, see also Gries, 2005: 241). 
                                                 
101 See Variety July 2014: http://variety.com/2014/film/columns/transformers-age-of-extinc-
tion-patriotic-for-china-1201257030/ 
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The second, also relatively little-known, case of PRC public diplomacy blurring the 
media demarcations is what Sun (2014) calls the “curious case of Andrea Yu”. The inci-
dent occurred during the 18th Party Congress in Beijing in November 2012. It is usually 
not normal at official press conferences of the Party Congress for foreign media to be 
allowed to address PRC officials. They prefer Chinese state media to pose easy questions 
(known as ‘soft balls’) with no risks of confrontational editorialising. It was considered 
surprising then that in the press conferences of the 18th congress, a seemingly Caucasian-
looking young female reporter identifying herself as an Australian journalist by the name 
of Andrea Yu was given multiple opportunities to ask questions. Moreover, she asked the 
questions in both excellent Mandarin and English, ‘pitching’ the typical ‘soft balls’ be-
loved by Chinese state media. 
This, of course, aroused the interest of other members of the foreign press corps, and 
soon it was revealed that the company Andrea Yu was representing, Global CAMG Me-
dia, was not only Melbourne-based and Beijing-funded but also a subsidiary of the CRI. 
A final confirmation of the issue was provided by Stephen McDonell, a long-time Aus-
tralian correspondent in Beijing, who in an eight-minute interview with Andrea Yu, got 
her to confess that through her the PRC government was basically “asking questions of 
themselves”.102 Of course, those questions presented in Mandarin by Andrea Yu were 
widely circulated in Chinese domestic news coverage. This particular tactic of blurring 
media demarcations is not only an ongoing, but also a growing phenomenon.103  
The tactic of blurring media demarcations speaks to the apparent Chinese need for 
outer recognition. The fashion in which this is conducted, that is, praising oneself, is re-
lated to the psychological concept of complex. This means that in social psychology, the 
psyche is understood as a complete self-regulatory system. Accordingly, the process of 
self-regulation is capable of bringing about its own self-realisation. This is, in the most 
technical sense, called psychic compensation. According to Aziz (2007: 24-25), the more 
awareness there is of a psychic compensation, the less problematic the process is. Ac-
cordingly, when the process is accompanied by little or no awareness, it becomes psychi-
                                                 
102 The interview can be heard from the Australian Broadcasting Corporations (ABC) website ac-
cessed in August 2015: http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2012/s3632894.htm 
103 Interviews 2 and 3 with foreign journalists working in China. 
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cally autonomous and thus more problematic. An example of an application of the con-
cept in present-day China is given by Gries (2005: 243-250) as the Kissinger complex and 
the Nobel complex. 
According to the first, Chinese nationalists exercised an exaggerated desire for exter-
nal confirmation through the positive evaluations of China by Henry Kissinger. Kissinger 
praising Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai was an overly emphasised theme among Chinese 
nationalists in historical discussions concerning the warming of diplomatic relations dur-
ing the early 1970s.104 
The external positive evaluation validates group identities, as is the case with the Kis-
singer complex, but when the collective desires for positive self-confirmation are not met, 
negative individual and group emotions prevail. The Nobel complex thus deals with the 
flipside of the Kissinger complex. It is based on the anger of the Chinese nationalists at 
having being denied international affirmation in that no Chinese economist has been 
awarded the Nobel Prize, in spite of the Chinese “economic miracle”.105 The insult has 
been exacerbated by first awarding a Nobel to Guo Xingjian in 2000, considered a dissi-
dent writer, and more recently to the human rights activist Liu Xiaobo in 2010. This way 
personal and collective emotion has become intertwined through, on the one hand, aware-
ness and, on the other, autonomous processes.106 
To apply the concept of complex to the study of PRC public diplomacy, certain con-
ditions that transform individual emotions into collective and thus political must be met. 
Brewer (2000) recognises four stages in both in-group and intergroup identity formation 






                                                 
104 See also Li, 1998. 
105 See also Zhao, 1997. 
106 See also Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990. 
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Building on the argument of Brewer (2000), Gries (2005: 239-240) further argues that 
in-group identification invariably leads to a positive evaluation of the group, but does not 
inevitably lead to intergroup competition or intergroup conflict. However, Gries (2005: 
240) actually shows that the de facto social comparison takes place between stages two 
and three: “When the goodness or honour of our nations is challenged, we will compare 
our nations with other nations.” Moreover, Gries (2005, 240) identifies three conditions 
for comparison to turn into competition: that being compared must be salient, the com-
parison must be consequential and the act of comparison must be a zero-sum game. In 
other words, the competitor, the competition and the outcome must be significant in order 
to transform group behaviour. 
Regarding the Kissinger and Nobel complexes, a salient comparison would be against 
the West (especially the US).107 To be consequential, the comparison would have to have 
special meaning, in this case, recognition from a prestigious party (Kissinger/Nobel Prize 
Committee). In addition, Gries (2005: 249) argues that the cultural detail of Face, that is, 
gaining respect in the eyes of the other, would in China constitute of a zero-sum game. 
Within the framework of national comparison, there would only be winners and losers. 
Therefore status (e.g. gaining face) could be considered a zero-sum resource.108 
 
6.3.2. Group Identification Through Martial Arts  
The four phases of group identification appear in popular cultural products that the 
PRC-led Chinese cultural industry produces, for instance in martial arts films. A case in 
point are the Ip Man (叶问) and the sequel Ip Man 2 (叶问2) films produced by Mandarin 
Films, and released in 2008 and 2010, respectively. The films were successful at the box 
office, especially in Mainland China. Despite not being released in Europe and the US, 
the first film grossed $22 million and the second $15 million worldwide during their the-
atrical runs. The sequel was more popular in Hong Kong in its opening weekend than the 
popular Hollywood action film Iron Man 2, released at the same time, and went on to 
                                                 
107 Or Japan, not so much Philippines or Vietnam. 
108 see also Milner, 1994. 
120 
 
break box office records in Singapore, making the films fitting examples of PRC public 
diplomacy products.  
The films are loosely based on the biography of the famous Chinese martial artist Ye 
Wen (叶问) (1893-1972) who popularised the style of Wing Chun in Wushu.109 In the first 
film, Ye is pictured as a wealthy and well-respected martial arts teacher with a beautiful 
middle-class family and lifestyle. He is superior in martial arts and gives spontaneous 
lessons, not only in fighting, but also in high morals, to his fellow Foshan. The idyllic 
harmony is first disrupted by a group of reckless northern Chinese who arrive to challenge 
the local master (Ye) in martial arts. After much unwillingness to fight, contemplation, 
and hesitation, Ye is left no other choice but to face the northern challengers, whom he 
overcomes in both fighting skill and moral conduct. The dispute between the northern 
and southern Chinese is soon settled and moved to the background of the narrative, 
through the arrival of the Japanese occupation force. First Ye is deprived of his home and 
forced into dirty factory labour. He is then forced to pit his wits against the Japanese 
officers who practise karate. In the final fight, he beats the Japanese colonel in a public 
duel, at the end of which he is shot by the colonel’s right-hand man in most unsportsman-
like fashion. The film concludes with the badly wounded Ye barely escaping Foshan for 
Hong Kong with his family. 
The second film follows the same pattern of narrative, but is situated in Hong Kong. 
There, the family man Ye struggles to succeed with his new martial arts school, the di-
rectors of the local competing schools being unhappy and unconvinced about the new-
comer. After much physical and moral back-and-forth among the Chinese, mutual respect 
is accomplished. After this is achieved, a common enemy again appears in the form of a 
rude barbarian, a racist British boxing champion who arrives in Hong Kong. Again, after 
                                                 
109 What made Ye famous was his role as the original teacher, master and mentor of Bruce Lee, 
the famous Hong Kong and Hollywood Kung Fu actor. According to an actual biography as told 
by his son, Ip Ching, Ye grew up in Foshan, Southern China where he started the practice of 
martial arts, and later proceeded to work as a police officer. Acting as an officer of the Kuomin-
tang, Ye left Foshan for Hong Kong in 1949 after the Communist accession. During his stay in 
Hong Kong, he eventually set up a Wing Chun school where he got acquainted with Bruce Lee. 
According to one biographer of Lee, Ye financed his opium habit and addiction through teaching. 
He died in 1972 of throat cancer in Hong Kong (Clouse, 1989). 
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initial refusal to fight, Ye is forced to take over the much larger and stronger opponent in 
a public dual to revenge the death of his former Chinese opponent, with whom the inner 
dispute was earlier settled in a civilised manner. In the end, Ye is of course victorious, 
and the film ends with him delivering a lecture on noble morals to the international audi-
ence of the fight. 
The narratives of both films follow the general phases of group identity formation out-
lined by Brewer (2000) and Gries (2005). Firstly, the in-group identification takes place 
during the seemingly civilised and harmless bickering between first the northern and 
southern Chinese, and then in Hong Kong between the newcomer Ye and the already 
established martial art schools of Kowloon. These disputes are settled in a cultured fash-
ion, where harmony and high morals are in the end applied by all parties, leading to in-
group positivity. Afterwards when the goodness and honour of the in-group (Chinese) is 
challenged by first the Japanese, and then the British, the conflict leads to intergroup 
competition. In both cases the contest takes place against a salient opponent (Japan, the 
West), has consequences (the honour of the Chinese nation), and the act of comparison is 
a zero-sum game (a dual to the death). 
 In the comparative narratives of both films, there exists an exaggerated desire for ex-
ternal confirmation validating the group identity, and when the positive self-confirmation 
is denied, negative individual emotions prevail (anger, hate and desire for revenge). Need-
less to say, in this analysis Ye Wen could be seen as an analogy of the contemporary 
Chinese nation. 
It should also be stated that this type of exploitation of nationalistic sentiment, the 
fabrication of history, and the elevation of national historical figures, i.e. taking “artistic 
license”, is common for entertainment industries in general, not only for Chinese televi-
sion dramas, but also for Hollywood. Indeed, it would be hard to deny that cultural stere-
otyping is common for those industrial entertainment products that capitalise on national 
sentiments. However, the application of social psychological concepts could give further 
insight. In this light, it could be argued that the two Ip Man films represent a longing for 
balance within Chinese society between the polar opposites of archetypal modernity, 
namely the seeking of stability between the quest for “harmony” and the constant desire 
to juxtapose China with the external world. Here an Apollonian archetypal disposition is 
revealed through the character of Ye Wei as a mature father who disciplines his passions 
122 
 
and serves as an upholder of the status quo. At the other end of the spectrum, as a polar 
opposite of the Apollonian archetype, Ye Wei is also forced to act as a Faustian hero 
demonstrating the vitality of the Chinese culture in battling the more physical (salient) 
enemies of China.  
In any case, the story of the Ip Man movies did not end here. In May 2015, it was 
widely reported that a third installment in the franchise would be filmed, produced by 
Hong Kong-based Pegasus Films. The founder of Pegasus films is Raymond Wong, the 
Hong Kong film producer, whose company Mandarin films also produced the two previ-
ous Ip Man films. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in 2001 Mandarin Films listed 
on the Hang Seng (Hong Kong Stock Exchange),110 while the relationship between Hong 
Kong and the Mainland also remains convoluted in cinematic productions, making the 
concept of “Chinese cinema” anything but clear-cut. With a history of operating autono-
mously from the Mainland, Hong Kong is usually associated with a cinematic tradition 
that “defies easy categorisation as to whether it is “Chinese or not” (Rojas, 2013, 2). In 
fact, it has been argued that, from the middle of the 20th century, the Hong Kong film 
industry has had to negotiate its relationship with the Mainland and the PRC government 
with regard to the Mainland’s cultural, political and economic influence (Fu, 2013). In 
this light, it is interesting to note that, although the two previous Ip Man instalments were 
on paper produced in Hong Kong, the actual filming took place in Shanghai. 
Despite its public listing in Hong Kong, the cooperation between Mandarin Films and 
the PRC government has not been fully verified. The connection appeared clearer, none-
theless, in May 2015 when Mike Tyson, the former world heavyweight boxing champion, 
and Shi Jianxiang, a Chinese producer and entrepreneur, held a joint press conference in 
Shanghai to declare the filming of Ip Man 3. The executive producer Shi is the founder 
and the CEO of the Shanghai Kuailu Investment Group. In July 21, 2015 Shi received an 
award from the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch, for his “special contribution 
to the celebrations of Hong Kong’s 18th anniversary of returning to China”.111 According 
                                                 
110 See: http://www.mandarinfilms.com/index.php?apps=content&cid=2&layout=dis-
play&menuid=3&lang=zh-HK 
111 See Shanghai Daily July 21, 2015: http://www.shanghaidaily.com/metro/Film-producer-Shi-
Jianxiang-receives-award-from-Xinhua-News-Agency/shdaily.shtml 
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to reports, Shi convinced Tyson to play a role in the new Ip Man installation while meet-
ing him in Los Angeles early 2015, where Shi was invited to “participate in the Oscars” 
and “explore investment opportunities” as a guest of Paramount Pictures, the Hollywood 
production company behind the Transformers franchise.112 A Reuters article cited Shi:  
“I liked reading martial arts novels when I was a little child, and have been 
fascinated with Kong Fu since then […] I think of myself as macho, generous 
and bold, just like those novel characters. After talking with Tyson, I also 
found him warm and loyal to friends. That’s why we swore to be brothers.”113 
 
 
In the third film, Tyson plays a property developer/street fighter and antagonist to Ye 
Wen played again by Donnie Yen. The archetypal disposition of the films is revealed 
again in this interview: Shi as the executive producer would also like to see himself as 
both a father-figure and a hero who apparently sees the need to stand in a social hierarchy 
on an equal level with a Western “tough guy” Mike Tyson. In the article, Shi further sheds 
light on his personal motives to produce the film: 
“The movie also conveys the spirit of emotion and justice […] This year 
marks the 70th anniversary of World War II, and the 110th of the founding of 
the Chinese film industry. I feel like I’m not only publishing a movie, but 
carrying forward the Chinese spirit as well.”114  
 
It would thus seem that the earlier instalments and the upcoming Ip Man production 
are made with the consent of the PRC public diplomacy bureaucracy. Moreover, there 
was little doubt that the plot would follow the general guidelines of the previous films, 
where the character of Mike Tyson has the role of the salient Western opponent against 
                                                 
112 http://variety.com/2014/film/columns/transformers-age-of-extinction-patriotic-for-china-
1201257030/ 
113 See Yahoo Finance May 8, 2015: http://finance.yahoo.com/news/mike-tyson-joins-ip-man-
121200307.html 




the hero and father-figure to Donnie Yen’s Ye Wei. Mike Tyson was also praised by Yen 
in Xinhua coverage as a “smart actor”. 115 
Against expectations, the third Ip Man film, however, followed a slightly different 
narrative. Despite the slight variation in the plot, the film nonetheless continued the same 
themes of in-group/out-group formation of the previous instalments. This time too, the 
protagonist Yi Wei must endure opposition from both Westerners and Chinese citizens 
of Hong Kong alike. The role of the main antagonist, however, is assigned to the latter. 
After first, through fighting, gaining the respect of the Western real estate developer 
Frank, played by Tyson, the main problematics of the text turn to the question of whose 
Wing Chun is more authentic, that of Yi Wei’s or that of a local Hong Kong master. The 
question is solved in a fight that Yi Wei again is reluctant to take part in. In fact, his dying 
wife sings Yi Wei up for the fight: as we already know, he is a pacifist by nature after all. 
After the duel is done, the again victorious Yi Wei remarks: “What's most important are 
the ones closest to us”.  
The allegorical symbolism in the latest Ip Man film is quite explicit. The reading that 
I make here follows that of the earlier films. In it the character of Yi Wei symbolises the 
CCP, that of Mike Tyson the West in general and the US in particular, and the local Hong 
                                                 
115It seems, however, that Mike Tyson is not the only “actor” marginalised by Hollywood whom 
the PRC public diplomacy is willing to recruit for the cause. In July 2015, it was widely reported 
that, this time, the outcast Hollywood star Mel Gibson would be in cooperation with the producer 
Shi Jianxiang, serving as an art director for an upcoming Chinese WWII movie, entitled the Bomb-
ing. The film tackles the air raid of Chongqing by the Japanese air force during the WWII as part 
of the Sino-Japanese War. According to reports, the film will ”portray the suffering of the Chinese 
people at that time and their determination to fight against fascism.” This time the executive pro-
ducer Shi Jianxiang commented:  “I hope audiences around the world can appreciate the cruelty 
of war and our courage, determination and capability to fight against it. China needs such movies 
that deliver hope and spirit.” The film will also feature the Hollywood A-list star Bruce Willis, 
but the significance of his role remains a mystery as Willis is scheduled to film his scenes in only 
eight days. The presence of the star, nevertheless, will undoubtedly bring to the film much-
needed prestige and credibility, at least for the domestic audiences in Mainland China. 




Kong masters, Chinese opposition to the CCP, particularly the Hong Kong democracy 
movement. The problematics again revolve around in-group formation by gaining recog-
nition from a salient out-group. In the last film, the main question seems to be who has 
the right to lead the in-group and what type of in-group it should be. This is evident 
through the, this time, rather serious conflict between the ethnic Chinese over whose mar-
tial arts are the most genuine. The fact that “the ones closest to us” matter most, seems to 
imply that Hong Kong should unite with the Mainland as the PRC is both benevolent and 
powerful – and importantly, recognised and respected by the West.  The aim to depict Yi 
Wei as a restraint and calm character becomes evident through the use of a particular 
Wing Chung technic “eye gouge”. In his fight against Frank, Yi Wei deliberately misses 
the strike, whereas in the final fight the Hong Kong master executes the blow against Yi 
Wei. Giving an interview, Donnie Yen recognised that this was done on purpose to high-
light the character of Yi Wei.116 
The symbolism exhibited in the Ip Man films underlines the importance of political 
reading of the text. In this interpretation, the films highlight the type of recognition seek-
ing where outer recognition is used to create inner legitimacy. In “technical terms”, this 
could be called a Victimisation Complex. In other words, the long-standing narrative of 
victimisation by the PRC may be an indication of an autonomous compensatory process. 
A psychological conclusion would be that the distance between the opposites of inade-
quacy and superiority in the case of the PRC would not be “healthy”, and that if the com-
pensatory movements were not brought from unconscious to collective awareness, the 
complex would cause (increase) distance from reality. 
 
 
6.3.3. Defending the Wall 
The final popular culture text that I wish to examine here concerns the biggest and 
most expensive mainland Chinese film production to date. This is the action/histori-
cal/fantasy movie entitled The Great Wall. The film was released in 2016 in China by 
China Film Group and in the US by Universal Studios. It is a co-production between 
                                                 
116 See: Feng Huang (Phoenix) Entertainment. 9 March 2016. 
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Chinese and US companies. While the filming took place in China, it is an English lan-
guage film starring Western Hollywood stars such as Matt Damon, Pedro Pascal and Wil-
lem Dafoe.  
The plot is relatively straightforward, the events taking place during the Song Dynasty 
at the Great Wall and its surroundings. In the narrative two Westerners, played by Damon 
and Pascal arrive in China and go to the Wall in search of gunpowder. At the Wall, they 
are sustained by a Chinese company occupying the Wall against a threat of monsters, 
which are in habit of attacking the kingdom every sixty years.  
From the outset, the narrative underlines social differences between the two Western-
ers and the Chinese military occupying the Wall. Whilst the former are depicted as dirty 
and deceitful (they do not disclose their attempt to steal gunpowder), the Chinese are 
portrayed as clean, beautiful, efficient and ethical. The Chinese company is divided into 
five units that each portray different special skills:  the Bear Troop (close combat), the 
Crane Troop (acrobatics), the Eagle Troop (archers), the Tiger Troop (engineers), and the 
Deer Troop (horse-riding). After initial mistrust and, of course, a bath, the Westerners 
prove themselves in battle against the monsters attacking the Wall. After that, the narra-
tive revolves around the Westerners facing an inner conflict of whether go through with 
their sinister plan to steal the Chinese secrets or whether to help the imperial company to 
fight of the monsters that have now moved beyond the Wall, and are closing in on the 
emperor in Beijing. The character of the most famous celebrity, that of Matt Damon, does 
the moral act, and decides to help the Chinese in their fight against the hoard of monsters. 
The text is interesting from various points of view. The obvious symbolism again con-
cerns the in-group/out-group identity formation. The imperial military company repre-
sents the PRC and the Westerners the Western powers, which are depicted as filthy, mor-
ally questionable, but able to exercise considerable military might. The role of the mon-
sters is more open for polysomic reading. On the one hand, these attack the Middle King-
dom from the outside and thus could be seen as symbolising an external threat. On the 
other, a different reading would place them symbolising an inner power struggle between 
the CCP and Chinese opposition. In this interpretation, the Western powers have a choice 
to make: either support the CCP or face an influx of uncontrollable masses. 
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Instead of this type of symbolism, however, Western audiences and the media were 
concerned about other aspects of the narrative. It was widely suspected that the film rep-
resented what is known as “white-washing” or “white saviour narrative”.117 These refer 
to a text where a white protagonist is placed in a non-white setting to make a popular 
cultural product more appealing to Western audiences, and thus insulting to the non-
Western world. While in some instances this might occur, concerns were unwarranted in 
the case of the Great Wall, for the above-mentioned reasons. It should also be pointed out 
that the film was produced by the China Film Group, the Chinese state-owned media 
corporation, and was financed by the Wanda Group, closely connected to the central gov-
ernment. In an interview with Indiewire, the director, Zhang Yimou, confessed that white- 
washing was not the intention of the film, but that: “In many ways The Great Wall is the 
opposite of what is being suggested”.118 To underline the point, after the film received 
critical reviews in mainland China (for poor special effects), the People’s Daily, the offi-
cial newspaper of the state, ran an article criticising the reviews, after which these were 
taken down.119 
 
6.4. Summarised Findings 
This chapter set out with the intention of clarifying what type of propensities the per-
ception of ‘self’ and ‘other’ introduce to PRC public diplomacy. Again, I will first restate 
the research questions outlined at the beginning of the chapter, and then address each. 
   
RQ#2: What type of propensities does the PRC perception of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ introduce 
to China’s soft power communication?  
Regarding in-group formation, peculiar blurring of media demarcations as one im-
portant propensity is used to achieve a perception of out-group validation. In doing this, 
                                                 
117 See: The Guardian. (29 July 2016). "Asian Americans decry 'whitewashed' Great Wall film star-
ring Matt Damon".  
BBC. (29 July 2016). "The Great Wall: Is Matt Damon 'whitewashing' or good business?". 
The Diplomat. "Matt Damon Film Sparks New Round of 'Whitewashing' Controversy".  
118IndieWire. "The Great Wall Director Addresses Matt Damon Whitewashing Controversy”.  
119 See: 遭人民日报批评后 猫眼专业影评人评分下线". 网易. 
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one aim of the communication is to question borderline in-group identities. This is evident 
for instance through the references to “some people” as well as the assuring of Hong Kong 
of the benevolent but powerful character of the PRC. 
 
RQ#2.1: How are in-group/out-group dichotomies used in PRC public diplomacy pro-
ductions? 
Giving attention to in-group/out-group identity formation further clarifies the narra-
tives of PRC public diplomacy products, as analysed here through the reading of the Ip 
Man texts. The question concerns in-group formation and intergroup competition: the 
disposition is revealed in the negative narrative dichotomies between China and those 
external opponents that are considered salient enough, with dire consequences.  
Based on the above analyses, the diagnostic of the PRC seems to be based on an iden-
tity that lacks outer recognition and inner legitimacy. This disposition introduces recur-
ring themes to popular culture, which aim to reinforce the inner social coherence of the 





















7. ANALYSIS: CHINA’S AGGREGATE WESTERN MEDDIA IMAGE 
 
As argued throughout the dissertation, Chinese public diplomacy is media-centric, 
whereby it aims to better the image of China in Western news media. Moreover, China’s 
international status seems to be a question of heightened national identity and pride in the 
PRC. Chinese leadership consequently appears to be concerned about the alleged negative 
perception of China in European and US news media. Therefore, Chinese state media and 
PRC government spokespersons frequently claim that Western media is biased against 
China.120 This victimisation discourse has broadly speaking two overlapping but separate 
purposes. On the one hand, it creates domestic legitimacy for the Communist Party (John-
ston, 1999: 292), on the other, it gives both reason and meaning to PRC public diplomacy 
communication. This includes the improvement of China’s image in the Western media 
from negative to positive (Wang, 2008). 
 
In reviewing the literature (Chapter 1), very little was found in terms of automated 
statistical tools to analyse the development of country- and topic-specific sentiment over 
time in news coverage. The bulk of prior studies that specifically focus on China’s media 
image consists of small-to-moderate-N methods. In these studies, the range of examined 
N varies between 63 (Zhong and Zhang, 2016) and 4,250 (Xiang, 2013). To examine 
China’s media image, this chapter proposes an automated content method, previously 
applied to other large-n textual analysis within political science (Monroe and Schrodt, 
2008). The specific research questions for the analysis are: 
 
RQ#3: To what extent, if at all, does a negative bias against China appear within Western 
news media? 
 
RQ3.1#: How has the sentiment of China-related Western news coverage developed since 
2003? 
 
                                                 
120 Chinese state media has recently accused Western news outlets of bias against the BRIC coun-
tries (Xinhua, 2015), China’s engagement in the South China Sea (Global Times, 2016), and even 






RQ#4: Which news category - culture, politics or economy - within China-related cover-
age has the most positive/least positive tone within Western news coverage?  
 
I expect that comparing the coverage of China with other East Asian countries and 
regions will clarify the extent of the assumed news media slant. The selection of the com-
parison group (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) reflects the difference in 
systems of governance, which are democratic as opposed to the authoritarian China, ad-
hering mostly to human rights such as freedom of speech, valued among Western democ-
racies and international journalists. Consequently, if the sentiment of the China-related 
content is similar to or more positive than that of the comparison group, this should dis-
miss the existence of a slant against China. 
I also assume that the mostly liberal Western media does not support authoritarian 
governance, so coverage addressing Chinese culture is expected to be more positive in 
tone than politics. While it is difficult to outline clear assumptions relating to coverage 
addressing economics, any related expectations are at this point left ambiguous. 
 
7.1. Automated Content Analysis: Methodology  
 
Today, there is a growing interest among social sciences in the tone (or sentiment) of 
political writing. This has coincided with the development of information technological 
methods and a rapidly expanding volume of information in electronic form. The availa-
bility of electronic texts presents opportunities and challenges for political science: large-
scale data has the potential for novel approaches but its manual inspection is impractical. 
For this reason, computer scientists have developed methods for automated content anal-
ysis, which has become a commonly used form of empirical research in the study of po-
litical content (for instance, Hillard et al., 2008; Spirling, 2012). 
A recent methodological contribution to the use of automated content analysis for in-
terpretation of political texts is Grimmer and Sterward (2013), who overview methods for 
scaling and classification.  The study emphasises that the complexity of language implies 
that all automated content analysis necessarily fails in providing an accurate account of 
the data-generating process used to produce texts. However, Grimmer and Steward (2013: 
3-4) suggest that, in developing models that are helpful in making inferences from the 
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data, content analysis can be useful. They also suggest that these models should be eval-
uated based on their ability to perform basic social scientific tasks, such as assigning doc-
uments to predetermined categories, discovering new category schemes or measuring the-
oretically relevant quantities from large data sets. 
While automated content analysis makes inferences about communication in general, 
scaling situates an actor in a political space, and classification categorises textual content 
for predetermined or non-predetermined sets. Applying classification, the dictionary 
method uses relative frequency of key words to measure the presence of given categories 
in textual data. The mapping function is the “word list”, found in “lexicons” or “diction-
aries”. A dictionary for a specific category can assign a textual unit to that category if the 
text contains a word on that list (Atteveld, van Noije and Vliegenthart 2005: 3), or a dic-
tionary can use the rate at which key words appear in a text to measure the extent to which 
a document belongs to a given category (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 8).  The function 
is more complex if the text is analysed as a whole entity instead of individual words, for 
instance using a formula entailing the frequency of both negative and positive words in a 
document. In any case, instead of fully manual coding or supervised machine learning 
with annotated data, a word list of a priori categories is used in the dictionary method for 
automated classification. 
In counting the frequency of definitive keywords in a text, the crucial element is the 
composition of the machine-readable dictionary. The oldest and most expansive diction-
ary for political science remains the General Inquirer (GI), developed by Philip Stone and 
colleagues at Harvard during the 1960s (Stone et all 1966). Since then various lexicons 
for different purposes have been developed.121 Young and Soroka (2012: 218) merge 
three previous dictionaries (Roget’s Thesaurus, GI, and RID) into the Lexicoder Senti-
ment Dictionary (LSD) and evaluate the effectiveness of all four relative to hand-coding. 
                                                 
121 For instance, from communication the DICTION (Hart 2000), from psychology the Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker, Francis and Booth 2001), the Regressive Imagery Dic-
tionary (RID) (Martindale 1975; 1990), from behavioural science the Affective Norms for English 
Words (ANEW) (Bradley and Lang 1999), from literature the Whissell’s Dictionary of Affect in Lan-
guage (DAL) (Whissell 1989), and from computational linguistics the Pointwise Mutual Information 
Workdlist (PMI) (Turney and Littman 2003), the Roget’s Thesaurus (Roget 1911). 
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The validated results show that the LSD has capacity to establish the overall tone of news-
paper articles. In this, the correlations were relatively high with all four dictionaries, and 
especially with the GI (0,67). As does the LSD, the GI provides categories also aimed at 
capturing the positive-negative sentiment of a text. In addition, however, the GI has word 
list categories for, among others, “culture”,122 “economy” and “politics”. 
As Paisley (1968) notes, most content analysis research is more descriptive than infer-
ential. Following Grimmer and Steward (2013), automated content analyses methods 
model political texts to help researchers make inferences. Therefore, the goal of building 
text models is different to the usual political science model implying causality. Unlike in 
this traditional causal model, including all possible realistic details might not make the 
text model more useful. Rather, “subtleties of applying the methods to any one data set 
mean that models that are less sophisticated in the use of language may provide more 
useful analysis of texts.” (Grimmer and Steward 2013: 4). 
Existing studies also recognise further challenges of the dictionary method. Among 
the most notable is the fact that the automation processes words regardless of order or 
context as a “bag of words”. It assumes “semantic independence” not considering psy-
chological information above the literal meaning (Young and Soroka, 2012: 205-210). 
On the other hand, there is evidence that the tone is far more dependent on the relation 
between words than topic.123 A second major concern is the assumption of additivity, 
meaning that every instance of every word contributes isomorphically to the output. For 
instance, “evil” has more weight than “bad”. This, however, would seem to be less of an 
issue with content analyses than psychology, while it must be recognised that different 
weighing of words can present a potential problem for automated word frequency anal-
yses (Young and Soroka 2012: 210).  
As the necessary component of the dictionary method, prior research recognises the 
validation process (especially Grimmer and Steward, 2013). Due to the automated nature 
of the method, it is not given that a particular dictionary would give correct results, even 
                                                 
122 The category ’Exprsv’ containing 205 words associated with the arts, sports, and self-expres-
sion is interpreted as ‘”culture” in this study. See Appendix 1. 
123 For instance Thomas, Pang and Lee (2006); Wilson, Wiebe and Hoffman (2005). See Young and 
Soroka 2012, 209.   
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if developed for that particular purpose (for instance the GI for political content). This is 
especially important using dictionaries with a priori defined categories where wordlists 
produce results both with annotation (machine learning) and without annotation (non-
machine learning). The aim of the validation in both cases is therefore to ensure that the 
values correspond with the assumed categories. This can be done using predictive validity 
(for instance statistical correlation) and/or by hand-coding (using human coders). 
The analysis documented below applies the GI dictionary for its benefits in analysing 
political texts. For validation of the method, the study applies both predictive validation 
and hand-coding. The former seeks correlations with the results of the analysis and 1) the 
World Bank GDP/capita rankings and, 2) the Corruption Perception Index for respective 
years. It is predicted that the country list of ranked sentiment as the result of the analysis 
correlates with both indicators. Prior studies suggest that there exists a negative correla-
tion between corruption and GDP/capita (e.g. Aidt, 2009; Mustapha, 2014). By selecting 
these indicators for statistical validation, it is predicted that ranked results will correlate 
with both indicators.  
The AUC values, in the context of this dissertation, analyse whether the tendency of 
the documents concerning the target region have more positive (or negative) sentiment 
than the other documents. The AUC values are thus used to determine whether the ob-
served changes in Chinese coverage can be explained solely by the overall changes of 
tone in the two corpora. In other words, the AUC analysis aims to rule out possible macro-
level explanations for changes in sentiment regarding China-related coverage, including 
developments in areas such as “world politics” or “journalistic habits”. 
The research questions concern regional, thematic and temporal aspects of China’s 
image in Western media. To analyse the regional and thematic aspects, the documents in 
the data set were geocoded into China, Japan, South-Korea and Taiwan regions124 and 
                                                 
124 In the preliminary experiments, Hong Kong was also considered a region but was dropped 
from the analysis after observing that it could not be reliably categorised by the automated 
method. This is not very surprising since Hong Kong has been the regional base for Western 
outlets to cover Asia Pacific, East and South-East Asia. 
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further categorised under culture, economics and politics topics. To address the temporal 
aspect, the data set was selected to be composed of documents from two time periods. 
I consider 2003 and 2004 as the key years in relaxing the restrictions on foreign jour-
nalists in China (see Chapter 6.2.). Therefore, The Reuters Corpus, Volume 1 (RCV1) 
and Thomson Reuters Text Research Collection (TRC2) were selected for analysis. They 
consist of news articles ranging from 20 August 1996 to 19 August 1997 and 1 January 
2008 to 28 February 2009, respectively.125 These time periods are located before and after 
the beginning of the policy changes with a sufficient margin, and should therefore reflect 
the development of the image of China due to PRC public diplomacy efforts. 
 Instead of causality, a relational correlation is assumed. The reason for selecting Reu-
ters data for the analysis is twofold: 1) Reuters is one of the three major Western news 
agencies that not only produces and gathers reporting but also sells it to subscribing news 
organisations126 and, 2) Reuters News (headquarters in London, England) is a subsidiary 
of the Thomson Reuters Corporation (headquarters in New York, US and Toronto, Can-
ada) making the agency transnational, transcending individual countries and individual 
newspapers. 
The analysis is validated by domain experts and uses a predictive validity by correlat-
ing the results with the Transparency International Corruption Index and the World Bank 
GDP/Capita rankings. The limiting factor is that Thomson Reuters has made available for 
research purposes only these two data sets. More recent data would have the possibility 
to examine the tendencies over a longer time span. The years between 1996 and 2009 are 
nevertheless considered adequate since the initial PRC public diplomacy push took place 





                                                 
125 The origins and characteristics of RCV1 made available by Reuters are discussed by Rose et. 
al. (2002) and Lewis et. al. (2004) while TRC2 was originally released by Thomson Reuters for the 
TREC-2010 Blog Track (Ounis et al. 2011). 
126 Others being Associated Press (US) and Agence France-Presse (France).  
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7.2. The Quantification 
 
In the actual analysis, classification was applied to obtain meaningful document sub-
sets for comparison: documents concerning a particular topic had to be separated from 
those that did not and documents had to be grouped by the nation they discussed. The 
overall sentiments of these groups were quantified, following the approach taken by 
Young and Soroka (2012), discussed by Grimmer and Steward (2013), and statistically 
analysed. While state-of-the-art machine learning techniques may be adapted in future 
studies, this study applied dictionary methods because the availability of sentiment dic-
tionaries minimises the need for manual effort and the large-scale, comparative nature of 
the analysis is expected to mitigate the general weaknesses of dictionary methods. Given 
the similarity of the GI and the LSD along with the expectation of diminished differences 
between dictionaries in a comparative study, the GI was selected over the LSD because 
it provides both topic and sentiment categories. The usage of the LSD dictionary would 
also be suboptimal without the accompanying pre-processing steps of Lexicoder. 
The development of sentiment from 1997 to 2008 was evaluated by comparing two 
large-scale corpora: Reuters Corpus, Volume 1 (RCV1) and Thomson Reuters Text Re-
search Collection (TRC2). They consist of news articles from 20 August 1996 to 19 Au-
gust 1997 and 1 January 2008 to 28 February 2009, respectively. The analysis was first 
performed on the full (pre-processed) data set and then repeated on three subsets that only 
consist of documents concerning one of the three selected topics: economy, politics or 
culture. Four East Asian countries and regions – China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
were examined. The analysis was performed in the following steps: text pre-processing, 
document classification, document filtering, variable selection and sentiment analysis. 
The first two steps were executed at document level and the data was aggregated in the 
last two steps in order to analyse the development at a nation level. In addition, the valid-
ity of the analysis was evaluated. 
In the text pre-processing step, the documents were cleaned of inline metadata and 
tokenised. The words were then lemmatised and converted to lower case. Lemmatisation 
is more accurate than stemming and particularly important in this study because the GI 
consists of lemmas. Punctuation tokens (i.e. tokens without a letter or a digit) were filtered 
out along with common stop words. The documents were then represented as vectors in 
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which the elements denote the frequencies of the words belonging to the selected catego-
ries of the GI as well as the total number of words. 
In the document classification step, each document was assigned to exactly one nation 
and zero or more topics, which describe the content. While RCV1 includes the topic and 
nation classifications in its metadata (Rose et al., 2002), TRC2 does not have such infor-
mation. To produce comparable results, the nation information was extracted from TRC2 
documents by automatically detecting the city–date pattern in the dateline – such as “TO-
KYO, Jan 1 (Reuters)” – and determining the nation from the city. The corresponding 
information in RCV1 is readily available as the location of the document creator as a 
piece of metadata. The nation names were normalised by manually matching the variants 
encountered in the two corpora and in the Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tions Index (CPI) data used in the validation (see below). For both corpora, a document 
was assigned to a particular topic if its headline contained at least one word belonging to 
the corresponding GI category. The Econ*, Polit*, and Exprs categories were chosen to 
represent the topics of economy, politics and culture, respectively. This procedure is 
likely to produce a classification that is less accurate than the metadata of RCV1 but it is 
obtainable for both corpora. 
After the classification step, the data sets were filtered to improve the reliability of the 
analysis. First, the documents that could not be assigned to a nation were excluded be-
cause the analysis depends on the ability to aggregate documents by nation. Such docu-
ments in the news stream of TRC2 are, for example, service alerts and commodity price 
updates. Documents without any full sentences were excluded from RCV1 for a similar 
reason. Second, the nations that contributed less than 0.1% to the number of documents 
were removed because the sentiment value for those nations would have been determined 
by a small number of documents producing only noise for the analysis. 
Two variables were selected for analysis, both of which reflect the polarity of the doc-
uments and the strength of the polarity. They are derived from the frequencies of the 
words with positive and negative connotation, represented by the GI categories Pos and 
Neg, respectively, and the total number of words. 
The variable q measures the tone of a textual unit and, following Young and Soroka 
(2012), is defined as the difference between positive and negative words normalised by 




where the frequencies of the positive, negative and all words of the document are de-
noted by w + d , w − d , and wd, respectively. For example, the value −0.02 indicates that, 
on average, there are two negative words more than positive words in a passage 100 words 
long. In the analysis, a value was produced for a nation by treating the concatenation of 
its documents as a single document. The selected nations were also evaluated using the 
rankings of the nations within the corpora, which alleviates the issues arising from the 
two corpora having unequal distributions of q. 
The variable r reflects how well the documents concerning one nation are separated 
from the others when ranked by q. In an extreme case, each document concerning the 
target nation has a higher (or lower) q value than any document not concerning the nation 
which yields r = 1 (or r = 0). If the two groups of documents are not separated, r = 0.5. 




where D is a set of documents and the function A calculates AUC, the area under the 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, given the documents and the functions c 







Sentiment distributions and ROC curves are illustrated in Figure 7. 
Figure 7 An exaggerated example of sentiment distributions and ROC curves for 
illustrative purposes. Upper left: the sentiment distributions are close to each other in 
RCV1. Lower left: the sentiment distribution of China-related content has shifted to the 
right (i.e. become more positive) relative to non-China content in TRC2. Right: the higher 
the ROC curve is located, the more China-related content has been separated in a positive 
direction from the non-China content. The dotted diagonal line indicates the case of no 
separation. The ROC curve of TRC2 is located higher than that of RCV1 because China-
related content (relative to non-China content) is more positive in TRC2 than in RCV1.  
 
AUC is equivalent to the well-known Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U statistics, first pro-
posed by Wilcoxon (1945), which are used in testing whether observations from one dis-
tribution tend to be greater (or less) than those from another. Its value can be interpreted 
as the probability that a random observation from the first distribution will have a higher 
value than a random observation from the second (Hanley and McNeil, 1982). 
The advantage of r over q is the fact that the unequal distributions of q are implicitly 
addressed by r because one nation is always compared to the others within a corpus. The 
statistical test developed by DeLong et al. (1988) examines two ROC curves to determine 
whether their AUC values can be considered unequal. In the context of this study, it anal-
yses whether the tendency of the documents concerning the target nation to have more 
positive (or negative) sentiment than the other documents has changed between the cor-
pora. Hence, it assesses the development of sentiment over time. The test was originally 
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developed for paired observations but later extended to unpaired observations in the 
pROC package for the R programming language that was utilised in the analysis. 
The document selection step was validated with hand-coding by domain experts. A 
stratified random sample of documents was selected from the computer-classified data 
set such that there were 15 documents for each of the 30 possible corpus-topic-nation 
combinations. Three coders127 examined each document and assessed whether the given 
topic and nation were correct. The proportion of correctly assigned documents was esti-
mated from the consensus, determined by a simple majority vote. The quality of the hand-
coding was evaluated with Cohen’s κ (Cohen, 1960), which measures an inter-coder 
agreement and takes into account the agreement by chance. That is, Cohen’s κ is zero if 
there is no agreement beyond what is expected to occur by chance. The variable selection 
was validated by calculating the Spearman’s rank correlations (Spearman, 1904) between 





The numeral output of the analysis is divided into validation values (Table 1) and ac-
tual tone measurement statistics (Table 2 and Table 3). Table 1 provides validation values 
as the percentages of correctly classified documents whereas Table 2 and 3 display the 
absolute and relative numbers of articles (column 1), the absolute sentiment ranks (col-
umn 2), the relative sentiment ranks (column 3, defined as the percentage of countries 
with equal or better rank), and the AUC-values (column 4).  
Reviewing the validation values in Table 1, it can be found that the human coding 
corresponds well to the automated analysis regarding countries. The most likely reason 
for the high country agreement is that the country information is included in the metadata 
of RCV1, and the place of writing is provided in a standardised form in TRC2. Therefore, 
it is surprising that the values are not higher, for which a number of factors can be sug-
gested: 1) even though the place of writing is correct, the article itself addresses another 
                                                 
127 These were three Finnish political science majors. 
128 The Python programming language with the modules NLTK, Numpy, Scipy, Scikit-learn, Pan-
das, and rpy2 were utilised in the analysis. 
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country (for instance Japan), or 2) the upper limit of human capability to attribute articles 
to given countries could be approximately 80% (automated analysis making the correct 
assignment). 
The results of the hand coding (Table 1) show that all regions were categorised with 
high precision (80%-93%). This validates the assumption of the analysis that the region 
from which the report originates reflects the perspective of the article and hence the sen-
timent should associate to that region instead of all regions mentioned in the article. In 
contrast to regions, there was variation in the precision of the topic categorisation. The 
economy topic was well categorised (89%) but notably small proportions of documents 
in the politics-specific and culture-specific subsets of documents were in fact about those 
two topics (47% and 21%, respectively). It is worth noting, however, that the culture topic 
of China has 37% precision, which is notably higher than those of other regions. Low 
precision values do not necessarily lead to unreliable AUC analysis (see Discussion), but 
they do decrease the sensitivity of the analysis to detect differences. Therefore, the subsets 
with low precision values should be analysed with a heightened level of scepticism.  
 
    Economy   Politics   Culture   Country 
































Topic   89.3% (0.93)   51.3% (0.73)   21.3% (0.78)     
 
Table 1 The precision of automated classification as evaluated by the majority of 
human annotators. The values in parenthesis are the highest of the three pairwise Co-
hen’s κ values and reflect the reliability of the manual annotation. The values for regions 
are China: 91.1%, Japan: 80.0%, South-Korea: 93.3%, Taiwan: 90.0%, and for topics 
Economy: 89.3%, Politics: 51.3% and Culture:  21.3%, respectively. 
 
Surveying the values further in Table 1, in comparison to the country agreement there 
is less confidence in the automated analysis assigning correct thematic categories. On the 
other hand, large variation is observed: economy is well validated while politics is limit-
edly and culture only poorly validated. For this reason, some scepticism is warranted: if 
a large proportion of the included articles within the cultural topic address other themes, 
the values do not reflect the development of the sentiment within cultural content.  
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The Cohen’s κ values in Table 1 indicate that, with the exception of the culture of 
Japan, manual annotation can be considered reliable. 
It is also interesting to note that there is country-related variation within culture. For 
instance, China is well above the average while Japan is near the zero level, even though 
Japan as a country was well validated. Similar variation is also seen in other categories. 
For example, Chinese economy is well classified by the automated analysis (76.7%) but 
Chinese politics is more problematic (53.3%).  
The correlation of the Corruption Index with the q-variable (0.59 for RCV1, 0.37 for 
TRC2) and with the AUC-variable (0.55 for RCV1, 0.41 for TRC2) implies that both 
variables are appropriate. A similar observation can be made with the World Bank GDP 
per capita rankings: AUC-variable (0.54 for RCV1 and 0.54 for TRC2) and q-variable 
(0,5 for RCV1 and 0.53 for TRC2). The correlations are also statistically significant 
(p<0.01) regarding both corpora and both variables.129 
 
 
7.4. The Volume of China-Related Content 
 
Regarding the volume of China-related content, reviewing Table 4 the document 
counts in TRC2 are approximately two-fold in economy, one-and-half-fold in politics, 
and three-fold in culture as compared to RCV1. The relative increase in the Chinese cul-
ture category being notably higher than those of the other categories (excluding the econ-
omy of South-Korea) is consistent with the PRC cultural soft power push. 
The numbers indicate a growth of interest in China in general and Chinese culture in 
particular. The observed trends, however, could be mostly attributed to the increase in 
                                                 
129 The observation also has general socio-economic interest since the level of corruption would 
seem to correlate negatively with the development of either the actual GDP per capita (Mustapha 
2014) or genuine wealth per capita (Aidt 2009). Both the Corruption Index and the country rank-
ing of this research are based on subjective human perceptions measured from different data 
using completely different methods, where any statistical correlation would be estimated to have 
a low probability. 
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sentiment of economy because the weight of culture is small: reviewing table 5, the num-
ber of economy documents is ten times greater than that of culture documents in both 
corpora. Therefore, considering the high proportion of economy and the low validation 
values of culture (even though above average for China), the values of the culture topic 
may be more indicative of the tone shift in economy than in culture. 
 
7.5. China’s Country Image 
 
The overall sentiment of the data seems to indicate a neutral tone of articles (the value 
of q-variable is at most 0.027. In the large data, however, minor differences also emerge. 
Due to a number of different factors of global scale (e.g. in “world events” and “journal-
istic approaches”) spanning a decade, the examination of absolute sentiments would not 
be relevant. Instead, the relative sentiment ranks are significant: due to a different total 
number of countries included in the analysis between the two corpora, a change in abso-
lute rank may be fully attributed to this variation. In addition, the relatively dense East 
Asian context offers a reasonable comparison of the country development.  
 
             
  Document Count   Absolute Rank   Relative Rank   AUC 
  RCV1 TRC2   RCV1 TRC2   RCV1 TRC2   RCV1 TRC2 p-value 
China 





0.48 0.51 4.20-10-17 (1.54%) (3.21%)    
Japan 














0.42 0.43 2.40-10-01 
(0.83%) (1.79%)    






0.41 0.50 1.36-10-73 
(0.60%) (0.88%)    
Total 742323 643715  82 58        
 
Table 2 The overall document counts, absolute ranks, relative ranks (the percentage 
of countries with equal or better rank) and AUC values for each analysed country 
and corpus. The p-values refer to the DeLong test. 
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In the overall results of Table 2, the sentiment rank of China was quite high in both 
corpora. Most importantly, the tone shifted positively between the data sets (the relative 
rank improved from 41.5% to 31.0%), which verifies the second hypothesis. Only Taiwan 
had a larger increase in sentiment, but since its RCV1 value was lower than that of China, 
their TRC2 values settled close to each other. More specifically, of the thematic catego-
ries displayed in Table 3, China-related economic and cultural content shows a clear pos-
itive trend while the political category displays a negative trend. In comparison, the sen-
timent of Taiwan increased in all categories whereas the sentiment of Japan decreased. 
The analysis of the AUC values leads to the same conclusions as above, because the 
q-variable and the AUC-variable follow each other closely: the higher the AUC, the 
higher the rank. This is not surprising because they rely on the same underlying sentiment 
analysis. The p-values indicate that most of the observed trends are statistically signifi-
cant, even if the Bonferroni correction (n=16) is applied. The data provides strong evi-
dence for a change in AUC in all cases except South Korea in general, the economy and 
politics of Japan and the culture of Taiwan. Table 2 shows that, regarding the numbers of 
news articles, there is an increase for China and South Korea, a decrease for Japan and 
no notable change for Taiwan when moving from RCV1 to TRC2. This is consistent with 
the reports concerning the popularity of the respective national industrial and cultural 
products (see Hong 2012).130   
Table 3 The document counts, absolute ranks, relative ranks (the percentage of 
countries with equal or better rank), and AUC values for each analysed country 






                                                 
130 This is especially true concerning South Korea and Japan, who compete in the market and 
audience shares of not only popular culture but also consumer electronics products. Following 
its national strategy, since early 2000 the South Korean government in particular has invested 
aggressively in consumer industries and popular culture (Chua 2012; Hong 2012). There is reason 




Economy Document Count  Absolute Rank  Relative Rank  AUC 
 RCV1 TRC2  RCV1 TRC2  RCV1 TRC2  RCV1 TRC2 p-value 
China 





0.45 0.51 1.27-10-36 (1.72%) (3.21%)    
Japan 





0.46 0.46 2.88-10-02 (3.56%) (3.65%)    






0.43 0.43 4.55-10-05 
(0.93%) (1.85%)    






0.40 0.50 1.29-10-46 
(0.71%) (0.85%)    
Total 349761 344993  82 54        
             
             
Politics Document Count  Absolute Rank  Relative Rank  AUC 








0.49 0.46 2.25-10-04 








0.48 0.46 1.52-10-02 








0.36 0.41 2.13-10-05 








0.42 0.53 1.35-10-10 
(0.50%) (0.49%)    
Total 110554 84221  90 72        
             
             
Culture Document Count  Absolute Rank  Relative Rank  AUC 








0.46 0.52 4.25-10-05 








0.56 0.44 7.06-10-21 








0.59 0.39 7.84-10-18 








0.41 0.46 8.23-10-02 
(0.51%) (0.82%)    







7.6. Summarised Findings 
The aim of this chapter was to quantify China’s media image in Reuters news. Two 
main questions and one additional research question are presented in the introduction to 
the chapter. Below I will address RQ#3 and RQ3.1. together, and after that RQ#4.   
 
RQ#3: To what extent, if at all, does a negative bias against China appear in Western 
news media? 
 
RQ3.1#: How has the sentiment of China-related Western news coverage developed since 
2003? 
 
The results show that in total the sentiment of China-related content was relatively 
positive. The results of the automated content analysis reveal a positive development of 
tone in China-related overall coverage between 1996 (AUC: 0.48) and 2008 (AUC: 0.51). 
To get a sense of the magnitudes, as an illustrative example, it can be considered that 
Belgium (a first-world country with high GDP and low corruption) has AUC 0.57 (1996) 
and AUC 0.66 (2008) while the corresponding values for Kenya (a third-world country 
with low GDP and high corruption) are 0.33 and 0.4. 
In comparison to East Asia, only Taiwan-related content increased more in positivity, 
but despite the increase remained at similar level to China in 2009. The data does not 
therefore confirm negative bias towards China within the examined Reuters data in com-
parison with other East Asian nations and regions. 
   
RQ#4: Which news category - culture, politics or economy - within China-related cover-
age has the most positive/least positive tone in Western news coverage? 
 
According to the results, Chinese culture is perceived more positively in the West than 
politics or economy, and both the interest (document count) and positive sentiment would 
have increased within the cultural coverage. However, due to the disagreement between 




  CONCLUSION 
 
Social identities as explanations for state behaviour offer alternative explanations to 
rational models. It is what Martha Cottam (1992) referred to as “The Metaphor of 
Drama”.  In this study, I wished to make the case that China’s public diplomacy is driven 
by emotional factors rather than rational calculation. To be more precise, this dissertation 
attempts to offer insights into PRC public diplomacy from the viewpoint of recognition-
seeking. The ‘struggle for recognition’ as a particular identity, I argued, has relevance in 
explaining China’s attempts to create ‘soft power’, that is, self-confidence and attraction 
among her peers. 
In this final chapter, I shall proceed in the following manner. I will first provide a short 
recap of the proceedings of the analysis. I will then summarise the empirical result and 
discuss methodological and theoretical issues before finally offering concluding remarks. 
 
Recap of the Analysis 
 
As its theoretical framework, the study applied the English School of IR. The reason 
for this was that, within the approach, the international arena is conceptualised consisting 
of a ‘society of states’, so the application of social psychological concepts was well suited. 
In this framework, I showed how individual emotions can be transferred to group- and 
international levels, including the need for recognition. According to Hegel and following 
him Axel Hoenneth, if this need was denied, emotions of disrespect would arise. Actor 
perception and propensity components borrowed from the social identity theory then pro-
vided the particular theoretical model to study the struggle for recognition in the context 
of China’s public diplomacy.  
To be more precise, the analysis proceeded in the following manner: in Chapter 1, I 
built the concepts up from social psychology giving particular focus to the transference 
of the concepts from the individual level to group and mass levels. Next, in Chapter 2, I 
constructed a theoretical model of communication by introducing the components ‘Others 
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intentions’, ‘Cultural Status’, ‘Situational Assessment’, and ‘Actor Choice’. In this con-
text, I also briefly provided examples from the Chinese case. 
Before the empirical analysis, in Chapter 3 I first discussed the ways in which PRC 
understandings of China’s social identity have evolved. Borrowing from Chinese histori-
ans, a collective PRC ‘self-reflection’ was then conceptualised to have begun during the 
defeats in the Opium Wars. The technological hegemony of the Western powers, it was 
argued, gave the Chinese imperial elite a sense of inadequacy, having influenced recent 
Chinese history and nation-building. According to Chinese historical interpretations, this 
self-reflection would have had different natures during different periods. Firstly, as stated, 
the defeats in the Opium Wars led to technological re-evaluations; during the revolution 
and overthrow of the Qing court, the nature would have been political; and finally, the 
May Fourth Movement as part of New Cultural Movement would have evoked cultural 
considerations -- again in the form of localised Western ideas. 
Moving from theory to empirical analysis, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 I borrowed the meth-
odological pluralism of the English School in applying different methods to study the 
perception and propensity components of the model outlined in Chapter 3.  In Chapter 5, 
the rhetorical analysis found that the localised soft power approach by the PRC cultivated 
an enemy image of Western culture and considered Chinese international status as rela-
tively low. Based on the PRC language, soft power rhetoric aims to create communal 
acceptance internationally and legitimacy domestically. In Chapter 6, I showed through 
a media analysis how the out-group/in-group identity formations found in the rhetorical 
analysis were in practice implemented in relevant PRC-sponsored popular cultural prod-
ucts.  
Chapter 7 set out with the aim of assessing the image of China in Western media. The 
analysis was designed to determine the tone of overall China-related coverage, to detect 
specific topics and determine their tone in China coverage in a large-N setting. Regarding 
pre- and post-policy change and the related increase in in PRC public diplomacy activities 
discussed above, this paper did not assume causality but focused on positive correlation. 
The large-scale analysis, covering nearly 1.5 million news articles published by Thomson 
Reuters during the years 1996-1997 and 2007-2008 also measured the sentiment for Ja-
pan-, South-Korea-, and Taiwan-related content. The comparative perspective revealed 
that China-related content was neutral or positive. Moreover, by dividing the large-scale 
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data into further categories of “politics”, “economics”, and “culture”, the analysis found 
that precisely the “culture”-related China content was particularly positive in tone but, 
due to poor disagreement between the validation by domain experts and automated clas-
sification, this part of the empirical results could not be considered fully verified. Instead, 
the findings indicated that the category “economy” carried the most weight in Chinese 
overall tone, which, as stated, was relatively positive in comparison to other East Asian 
regions and was found to increase between the data sets. 
 
 
 Summary of Empirical Findings 
I will restate here the main research questions and sub-questions, and answer them in 
the order they were presented in the introduction. 
RQ#1: What underlining perceptions guide the Chinese soft power phenomenon? 
  RQ#1.2: Which ‘category arguments’ and classifications define PRC soft 
  power rhetoric? 
  RQ#1.3: To what extent, if at all, can the intensity of this type of disrespect 
  be evaluated? 
 
I find that China’s soft power and public diplomacy communication are driven by an 
out-group bias and an outright cultivation of an enemy image. In the analysis, these were 
observed to fall under the category arguments of ‘anti-Westernisation’ and ‘cultural se-
curity’. These accord with China studies literature by providing an indication of the PRC 
still attempting to restore a coherent international social identity for China (e.g. Johnston, 
1990; Shih, 1992, 2011; Breslin, 2013; Callahan, 2015; Ford, 2015; Ferdinand, 2016).  
The analysis also showed that the soft power advocates among the Chinese policy elite 
are eager to juxtapose China with the US, and link the “West” with the policy ambitions 
of the US. This implies that the PRC would seem to be targeting superpower status by 
seeking parallels between China and the US – ironically, by accusing the US of seeking 
hegemony through individualism, globalisation and the spreading of market economy. I 
do not wish to say that the PRC would not have a right to safeguard Chinese culture from 
consumerism, Western values or liberal democracy. Instead, I would merely like to un-
derline a certain inconsistency on the part of the PRC which has greatly benefitted from 
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the spreading of global market economy, which, in fact, most of the Chinese population 
appear eager to embrace.   
Based on statistical evidence, the present results suggest that the intensity of the recog-
nition-seeking through soft power seemed to intensify during the turn of the millennium, 
so far peaking in 2014-2015. This observation is in accordance with the inauguration of 
Xi Jinping first as CCP General Secretary in October 2012 and as President in March 
2013. 
 
RQ#2: What type of propensities do the perceptions introduce into China’s public di-
plomacy communication? 
  RQ#2.1: How in-group/out-group dichotomies are used in PRC public 
  diplomacy productions? 
 
 
I find that, through reinforcing the category arguments of ‘anti-Westernisation’ and 
‘cultural security’ through public diplomacy, the PRC aims to maintain party control over 
articulations of Chineseness, China’s external enemies and inner orthodoxies. The Ip Man 
and the Great Wall films are good examples of this type of propensities appearing in PRC 
public diplomacy. I also interpreted the symbolism found in the analysed texts as signal-
ling to those on the periphery of central government to embrace the identity of Chinese-
ness crafted by the CCP. This was evident for instance through the assurances given to 
population of Hong Kong through the Transformers film.  
Typically in the analysed texts, particularly in the Ip Man films, in-group cohesion is 
achieved through inner dialogue, whereas the out-group competition is depicted to take 
place against a salient opponent with dire consequences. An exception to this was made 
in the third Ip Man film, which focused on Hong Kong, and rather turned the setting 
upside down, making the Westerner the respected in-group member and the ethnic Chi-
nese from Hong Kong the salient opponent. I interpret this to be reference to the democ-





RQ#3: To what extent, if at all, does a negative bias against China appear within Western 
news media? 
 
As Chapters  4, 5 and 6 show, the PRC policy elite would seem to consider Western 
mainstream media as “hate media” towards China (see also Wang, 2008). This position 
is not entirely without a factual base. A mostly “cosmopolitan” and liberal Western media 
no doubt is highly critical of the many aspects of Chinese society that do not resonate 
with their normative base. These include the non-democratic, authoritarian system of gov-
ernment, and lack and violation of individual human rights and freedom of speech. Since 
the Chinese domestic media under state control does not criticise the establishment, the 
coverage of non-Chinese media might give Chinese officials an impression of overly ag-
gressive, offensive and critical Western journalism.  
Regarding Western demonisation of China, the findings did not support the premise of 
PRC public diplomacy or the multitude of prior research supporting this view (for in-
stance Chang, 1988; Dorogi, 2001; Peng, 2004; Stone and Xiao, 2007; Willnat and Luo, 
2011; Golan and Lukito, 2015).  However, findings from samples that greatly differ in 
size and in the type of source material they concern are not directly comparable. A small-
N study using a manual analysis can discover negative tone in some specific forum or 
topic, while a statistical large-N study, such as the one presented here, can still be correct 
in maintaining that the overall tone is positive.  The results of the automated content anal-
ysis of this dissertation are thus not necessarily contradictory to all existing studies argu-
ing for negative portrayal, but rather only to those that point to an overall negative framing 
of China (e.g. Peng, 2004; Willnat and Luo, 2011), including Chinese studies conceptu-
alising time periods of Western negative media slant (e.g. Li, 1996; He, 2004). In any 
case, this study agrees with the study by Xiang (2013) that China-related economic and 
cultural topics are more favourably presented than political ones. 
 
RQ#4: Which news category: culture, politics, or economy within China-related coverage 
has the most positive/least positive tone within Western news coverage? 
 
Contrary to expectations, China’s culture and economy were equally favourably re-
ceived in Western media and had similar positive development from 1996 to 2008. The 
positive development likely relates to the increase of China’s economic weight between 
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1996 and 2008. Taking into consideration high validation values of the economy content, 
the present findings are consistent with those of Ahern (1984) and Kim and Barnett 
(1995), who found that the amount of economic clout is positively related to the amount 
of coverage a country receives in foreign media. 
 
RQ#5: What type of disrespect does the Chinese soft power phenomenon address? 
The various forms of disrespect conceptualised in the literature were discussed in 
Chapter 1. Following Greenhill (2008), I first made the distinction between formal and 
informal recognition-seeking. Clearly, in the Chinese case the question concerns the lat-
ter. There is, however, a case to be made that while China and the PRC are officially 
recognised by the international community, some formal territorial disputes remain, most 
notably in the case of Taiwan and Tibet.  
Therefore, Chinese recognition-seeking seems mostly to fall into the informal cate-
gory. In this, the struggle appears to be emotional rather than rational. I make this distinc-
tion to point out that China by numerous indicators is in fact informally recognised and 
respected, one could say feared, within international society. This is in contrast to, for 
instance, sub-Saharan Africa, where emerging regional powers have a rational case for 
their national grievances (see Nel, 2010).  
As I have argued in this dissertation, the struggle for recognition is about perception. 
Bull (1984) argued that Western dominance peaked at the turn of the century in 1900, not 
in technological nor cultural but psychological supremacy. Bull (1984: 219-220) went on 
to define further forms that the struggle for recognition represented. These were 1) equal 
sovereignty, 2) post-colonial liberation, 3) racial equality, 4) economic justice, and 5) 
cultural liberation. In the case of China, by looking at the data analysed in this disserta-
tion, we can easily dismiss numbers 1 and 4, as discussed above, neither did I find any-
thing in the soft power data that would imply or point in the direction of number 3. What 
remain are numbers 2 and 5.  
References that could imply a need for post-colonial and cultural liberation do appear 
in Chinese soft power discussions. These are of course relatively straightforward counter-
arguments to Western demands for civil rights and political freedom. Again, the irony 
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here is that the PRC might be deploying its own version of ‘soft power’ in order to repress 
that particular part of society that would have the capacity to create genuine attraction, 
that is, civil society. 
Overall, then, on the question of public diplomacy perception and propensities, the 
results support the view that China applies an enemy image to Western media and con-
siders China’s international status as inferior to other states. This, however, is not very 
surprising as the concept may stem from emotional rather than rational factors and has its 
use mainly in the domestic propaganda of China. The practical issue emerging from the 
findings, however, is that while China’s Western media image was found to be relatively 
neutral and the tone of China-related news more positively developed between the ob-
served pre- and post-policy change, the results indicate that the economy rather than cul-
ture is where China is received most favourably in Western media.  
Finally, it appears that the crumbling and declining general morality of the Chinese 
population, including ‘domestic anaemia’, was defined in the PRC soft power language 
as a central problem of Chinese society. This, according to the analysed rhetoric, was seen 
as the result of proliferation of Westernisation, rapid economic reforms, market economy 
and the declining cultural weight of traditional Chinese values, that is, not only the Con-
fucian politico-moral framework, but also the dispersion of a socialist value base. As a 
policy measure to counter this perceived social decay, the rhetoric envisioned the reintro-
duction to Chinese society of popularised Marxism alongside traditional values. This 
could be seen as representing a policy move of “creative conservatism” (Elvin, 1990), 
holding that a modern society would be best achieved not by disregarding traditions but 
by combining older values with more recent ones instead of antagonising them. Any dis-
cussion of whether this would in the future include a freer Chinese civil society including 
free non-state media and a popular culture sector producing soft power, was not present 
in any data analysed here. Furthermore, I did not detect any considerations as to what 
future Chinese public diplomacy would look like once China’s Western media image was 
corrected to equate China’s international cultural, political and economic significance. It 






I will here discuss a few methodological and theoretical limits of the study and point 




First, regarding the rhetorical analysis, it remains to an extent unclear whether the for-
mal political language can be interpreted linearly. In other words, the nature of the official 
language could considerably limit the amount of information that can be distilled without 
a more detailed analysis of the different contexts. Secondly, the reading of popular culture 
texts is challenging. Prior studies show (e.g. Kellner, 2010) that the symbolic nature of 
the interpretation makes it difficult to repeat, especially with cross-cultural data (e.g. Chu, 
2014). However there seems to be some consensus in that ‘better’ and ‘worse’ readings 
of texts exist (Fiske, 1987; Schulzke, 2017). In the dissertation, I attempted to accomplish 
the former rather than the latter.    
Although the results of the automated content analysis proposed in this study show 
promise in quantifying China’s media image, it is challenging to assess the general ap-
plicability of the method, and there is certainly room for improvement. Firstly, since the 
results are directly affected by the assignment of topics and nations to documents, an 
improvement in the classification accuracy will increase the reliability of the analysis. 
This could be achieved by machine-learning methods. For example, Naive Bayes classi-
fiers (McCallum and Nigam, 1998) have been successfully applied to similar tasks, such 
as filtering spam e-mails (Sahami et al., 1998) and assigning terms from Medical Subject 
Headings (MeSH) to scientific articles in the field of biomedicine (Sohn et al., 2008). 
Second, a method that utilises sophisticated linguistic analyses is likely to outperform its 
simple counterparts in accuracy. For example, Lexicoder (Young and Soroka, 2012) con-
siders short sequences of words to address negation and multi-toned phrases. One step 
further is to utilise syntactic analysis to capture relationships between words, regardless 
of the word order of a sentence, in order to analyse not only negations but also other 
linguistic structures that affect the overall sentiment (e.g. Di Caro and Grella, 2013).  
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Regarding the differences between an aggregate and an individual campaign level of 
analysis, there is a difference in the method: a small-n study can discover negative tone 
in some specific forums or topics, while at the same time a numeric large-n study is cor-
rect in maintaining that overall coverage is relatively positive. While studies with small 
data sets will likely benefit from advanced methods, large-scale data analysis may be 
primarily influenced by the quality and scope of the applied dictionary or hand-coded 
examples. The dictionary refinement efforts (e.g. Young and Soroka, 2012) are therefore 
important. 
Finally, the validation process could be improved upon as it is crucial for the reliability 
of the conclusions. The challenges arise from the complexity of the phenomena studied 
in Political Science. On the one hand, it is difficult to assess the exact implications of the 
results of a statistical validation method. On the other, manual annotation is likely affected 
by the sociological background of the coders (and coding instructions) when studying 
phenomena that are difficult to reduce into simple coding guidelines. I consider the vali-
dation through the correlation with Corruption Perceptions Index and World Bank 
GDP/capita proposed here nonetheless intriguing: the observed correlations indicate an 
interesting prospect. The observation that the AUC ranking clearly correlates both with 
the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and with the World Bank 
GDP per capita ranking strongly suggests that AUC quantifies the tone of document sets. 
The correlation may have a connection to the observation that the weight of economic 
topics was high in determining the overall tone of Reuters coverage.  
The conclusions regarding China’s culture coverage should be treated with caution. 
The failure to find statistically significant differences between the tones of China’s culture 
coverage and economy coverage may be due to the small number of culture-related doc-
uments retrieved for analysis and due to the low precision of the automated categorisation 
of culture documents. For this reason, scepticism is warranted: if a notable proportion of 
the retrieved articles within the culture topic actually concern economy, the AUC values 
only partially reflect the tone of culture coverage.  
The negative trend in Chinese political content could be attributable to several factors. 
A mostly “cosmopolitan” Western media would have a negative view of the “rigid” Chi-
nese authoritarianism, which would also feed the “rise of China threat” discourse. The 
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question remains whether the discourse increased in volume or the negative tone strength-
ened between 1996 and 2009. It is accordingly difficult to assess the impact of individual 
events, for instance, the nuclear explosion test by China in late July 1996, the handover 
of Hong Kong in July 1997, the Tibetan unrest in March 2008, the Sichuan earthquake in 
May 2008, and the Beijing Olympics in the summer of 2008. In any case, the comparative 
large-scale research setting shows that, within the East Asian context, in the political sen-
timent, too, China ranks above Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in the RCV1 corpus, and 
above South Korea (and on par with Japan) in the TRC2 corpus. This does not indicate 
any strong Western negativity towards China. 
While the relation between China and Western media remains a particular case in 
which the employment of a large-scale approach can be justified, it is challenging to as-
sess the general applicability of the proposed method. In any case, there are several viable 
research directions to further develop the method.  In addition to the above discussion, 
the AUC analysis could be applied to a variety of research designs in political settings 
that use text as primary data.  It could be particularly beneficial in testing hypotheses that 
address the longitudinal development of categorised content that requires adjustments for 
dissimilar baselines. To give an example, the AUC analysis could be used to test whether 
senatorial speeches by republican representatives grew more hostile between the Bush 
and the Obama administrations in comparison to the speeches held by their democratic 
colleagues. In this setting, it would be problematic to conceive an appropriate measure-
ment baseline for the development of tone. The application of an AUC analysis, on the 
other hand, would enable this. 
 
Theoretical Issues 
The results of the study would seem to indicate a paradoxical position of the PRC. On 
the one hand, the discourse analysis revealed a certain neoliberal angst in the soft power 
language of the Chinese soft power advocates. On the other, the above-discussed strate-
gies and case studies show how the PRC takes major advantage of the contemporary 
transnational neoliberal media organisation. Most importantly, the automated content 
analysis found that the major source of Chinese soft power would not in fact be traditional 
culture, despite its heavy promotion by the state bureaucracy, but the growing economic 
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attention China has enjoyed in the West. In other words, the relative weight of “economy” 
in the overall perception of China would seem to outperform the “cultural” aspect. 
The changes in the volume of China coverage indicate a growth of interest in China in 
general and in Chinese culture in particular. The observed abundance of economy cover-
age over culture coverage in the Reuters data, however, suggests that culture is a marginal 
topic in global news coverage. This supports Wu’s (2000: 503) meta-study, which showed 
both economic issues and political affairs dominating international news agenda. As a 
result, it may be that it is the economy that has driven the development of China’s Western 
media image. Some of the consequences that emerge from this finding relate particularly 
to PRC decision-making. In terms of choice propensity, it may be that cultural topics play 
a smaller role than expected as determinants of China’s country perception in Western 
media. In particular, the employment of culture may not have a significant effect on the 
overall outcome. The same conclusion can be reached for political topics: regarding na-
tional image, issues of governance may not represent a major factor in China’s overall 
perception. It could conceivably be hypothesised that highlighting, for instance, economic 
success stories has a greater net positive effect on China’s national perception than the 
promotion of culture. It is therefore interesting to note Brady’s (2006) observation, ac-
cording to which the guidelines of the Central Propaganda Department overseeing PRC 
public diplomacy also include the talking up of economy. The broader argument of Fer-
dinand (2016) should also be noted, according to which economic reformers within the 
PRC have south to use economic reforms as a source of China’s international attractive-
ness. 
This observation begs a question: how surprising, in the context of Western modernity 
that is built on principles of market economy, transnational capitalism and consumerism, 
is the fact that the perception of China is based on economic performance? As argued, the 
positive tone in news reporting correlated with the International Corruption Perception 
Index and with the GDP per capita ranking (the World Bank), a central indicator of eco-
nomic success. While there is less evidence of the PRC successfully exporting or promot-
ing its political values to be the norm in international society, through its economic weight 
international society is already facing a Chinese soft power push. This is evident for ex-
ample through the latest financial institutional developments, and the subsequent soft 
power agenda of the PRC towards the developing countries. This includes the growing 
157 
role and influence of China through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the One 
Belt One Road Initiative and the BRIC grouping (see e.g. Ferdinand, 2016, Wang, 2016). 
Finally, the present results lead to the question of why the basic assumption of Western 
media bias has gone largely unchallenged. Studies on political psychology should provide 
insight into the reasons why the concept remains common. First, images are change-re-
sistant (Elgström, 2000). Contradicting information may also be ignored in light of exist-
ing knowledge structures (Jönssön, 1990), where culture is found to influence cognition 
and emotion (Heinrich, 2000). Finally, psychological mechanisms that resist change in-
clude rejecting the validity of new information, discrediting the source, bolstering and 
undermining (Jervis, 1976: 291-296). Moreover, some China experts have provided more 
pragmatic explanations for the tension between Western journalists and the PRC public 
diplomacy bureaucracy that may partly explain the existence of the concept: 1) reinforc-
ing the concept of Western media bias is important for the PRC domestic propaganda: the 
premise allows the government to categorise under “hate” messages all unwanted West-
ern ideas, including democracy (Callahan 2015: 220), 2) Western journalists are trained 
not to trust any government, including their own, which is not widely understood in China 
(Sun, 2014: 1904), and 3) inherent Confucian hierarchical obedience as a “cultural meta-
rule” views Western critique with strong scepticism (Chu, 2012).  
The question of whether China is demonised in the Western media, nonetheless, has 
relevance outside Chinese domestic propaganda. While it could be argued that the as-
sumption mainly works as a rhetorical tool for the PRC to fight for domestic control over 
national narrative, following Chu (2014: 161), there is a difference between the need of 
the PRC to domestically create a “collective imagination” and internationally to “brand 
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Appendix A lists below 200 entries in the Harvard General Inquirer Dictionary as ex-
amples of the words associated with “positive” sentiment. 
 
1 ABIDE 
2 H4 Positiv Affil Active Doctrin IAV SUPV 
3 ABILITY 
4 H4Lvd Positiv Strong Virtue EVAL Abs@ ABS MeansLw Noun 
5 ABLE 
6 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Virtue EVAL MeansLw Modif adjective: Having neces-
sary power, skill, resources, etc. 
7 ABOUND 
8 H4 Positiv Passive Increas IAV SUPV 
9 ABSOLVE 
10 H4 Positiv Active SocRel ComForm IAV SUPV 
11 ABSORBENT 
12 H4 Positiv Increas IndAdj Modif 
13 ABSORPTION 
14 H4 Positiv Affil Increas Noun 
15 ABUNDANCE 
16 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Ovrst ECON Quan WltOth WltTot Noun 
17 ABUNDANT 
18 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Ovrst Quan WltOth WltTot Modif 
19 ACCEDE 
20 H4Lvd Positiv Affil Active ComForm IAV PowGain PowTot SUPV 
21 ACCENTUATE 
22 H4 Positiv Active Ovrst IAV SUPV 
23 ACCEPT 
24 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Submit Passive SocRel IAV PosAff SUPV verb: To take, re-
ceive or accede to something 
25 ACCEPTABLE 
26 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue EVAL PosAff Modif 
27 ACCEPTANCE 
28 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Affil Passive SocRel PosAff Noun 
29 ACCESSIBLE 
30 H4 Positiv Virtue IPadj Modif 
31 ACCESSION 
32 H4 Positiv Strong Increas Noun 
33 ACCLAIM 
34 H4 Positiv Virtue ComForm Noun 
35 ACCLAMATION 
36 H4 Positiv Virtue ComForm Noun 
37 ACCOLADE 
38 H4 Positiv Virtue ComForm Noun 
39 ACCOMMODATE 
40 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Active Vary IAV PowCoop PowTot SUPV 
41 ACCOMMODATION 
42 H4Lvd Positiv Virtue PLACE PowCoop PowTot Noun 
43 ACCOMPANIMENT 
199 
44 H4 Positiv SocRel Noun 
45 ACCOMPLISH 
46 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Power Active Complet IAV EndsLw SUPV verb: To 
bring to its goal or conclusion 
47 ACCOMPLISHMENT 
48 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Power Active Goal EndsLw Noun 
49 ACCORD#2 
50 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv SocRel IAV PosAff SUPV 3% verb: "Accord with" to be con-
sistent with 
51 ACCORD#3 
52 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Power SocRel IAV TrnGain SUPV 8% verb: To grant, bestow 
53 ACCORD#5 
54 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Means PowOth PowTot LY 3% adv: "Of one's own accord"--
voluntarily 
55 ACCORDANCE 
56 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Know PowCoop PowTot Noun 
57 ACCOUNTABLE 
58 H4 Positiv Causal IndAdj Modif 
59 ACCRUE 
60 H4 Positiv Active Econ@ ECON Increas DAV SUPV 
61 ACCURACY 
62 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Ovrst Abs@ ABS EnlOth EnlTot Noun 
63 ACCURATE 
64 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Ovrst EnlOth EnlTot Modif 
65 ACCURATENESS 
66 H4 Positiv Virtue Ovrst Noun 
67 ACHIEVE 
68 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Active Complet IAV EndsLw SUPV verb: To accom-
plish or carry through 
69 ACHIEVEMENT 
70 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Power Active Goal EndsLw Noun 
71 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
72 H4 Positiv Ovrst ComForm Noun 
73 ACQUAINT 
74 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Solve IAV EnlGain EnlTot SUPV 
75 ACQUAINTANCE 
76 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Affil Role HU AffOth AffTot Noun 
77 ACQUIT 
78 H4 Positiv Legal Solve DAV SUPV 
79 ACQUITTAL 
80 H4 Positiv Legal Solve Noun 
81 ACTUAL#1 
82 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Ovrst SureLw Modif 27% adjective: Existing in act or 
fact, real. 
83 ACTUAL#2 
84 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Ovrst SureLw LY 73% adverb: "Actually"--really 
85 ACTUALITY 
86 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Doctrin SureLw Noun 
87 ADAMANT 




90 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue Vary Noun 
91 ADAPTABLE 
92 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue Vary IndAdj Modif 
93 ADAPTATION 
94 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue Vary Noun 
95 ADAPTIVE 
96 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue Vary IndAdj Modif 
97 ADEPT 
98 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Virtue EVAL SklOth SklTOT Modif 
99 ADEPTNESS 
100 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue Noun 
101 ADEQUATE 
102 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Undrst EVAL EndsLw Modif PFREQ adjective: Suffi-
cient. 
103 ADHERENCE 
104 H4Lvd Positiv Affil RcEthic RcTot Noun 
105 ADHERENT 
106 H4 Positiv Affil IndAdj Modif 
107 ADHESION 
108 H4 Positiv Rel Noun 
109 ADHESIVE 
110 H4 Positiv Rel IndAdj Modif 
111 ADJUNCT 
112 H4 Positiv Increas Rel Noun 
113 ADJUST#2 
114 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Submit Virtue WlbPsyc WlbTot Modif 23% adj: "Adjusted"--
adapted 
115 ADJUSTABLE 
116 H4 Positiv Vary IndAdj Modif 
117 ADJUSTMENT 
118 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Virtue Noun 
119 ADMIRABLE 
120 H4Lvd Positiv Virtue Eval@ IPadj RcTot RspOth Modif 
121 ADMIRATION 
122 H4Lvd Positiv Strong Pleasur EMOT Virtue RspOth RspTot Noun 
123 ADMIRE 
124 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Affil Submit Passive Pleasur SV RspGain RspTot SUPV 
125 ADMIRER 
126 H4 Positiv Strong EMOT HU Noun 
127 ADMIT#1 
128 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Weak Submit Passive ComForm IAV RspLoss RspTot 
SUPV 63% verb: To acknowledge, confess, agree 
129 ADMIT#2 
130 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Power Passive SocRel DAV PowOth PowTot SUPV 33% verb: 
To grant entry, membership or access to something 
131 ADMIT#3 
132 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Weak Submit Passive Ovrst ComForm RspLoss RspTot 
FormLw LY 3% adv: "Admittedly"--adverbial form of sense 1 
133 ADMITTANCE 
134 H4 Positiv Active Travel Noun 
135 ADORABLE 
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136 H4 Positiv Virtue Eval@ IndAdj Modif 
137 ADORE 
138 H4 Positiv Active Pleasur EMOT SV SUPV 
139 ADORN 
140 H4 Positiv Strong Active Eval@ IAV SUPV 
141 ADORNMENT 
142 H4 Positiv Virtue Eval@ Noun 
143 ADROIT 
144 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue IndAdj Modif 
145 ADROITLY 
146 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue Modif 
147 ADULATION 
148 H4 Positiv Strong Pleasur EMOT ComForm Eval@ Noun 
149 ADULT#2 
150 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Virtue Modif 30% adj: Mature, of or pertaining to 
adults 
151 ADVANCE#1 
152 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Active Travel IAV EndsLw SUPV 47% verb: To move 
or bring forward, improve, promote 
153 ADVANCE#2 
154 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Active Means EndsLw Noun 20% noun-adj: A moving 
forward, improvement, approach, in front, prior 
155 ADVANCE#3 
156 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Virtue EndsLw Modif 20% adj: "Advanced"--forward, 
in front, progressive 
157 ADVANCEMENT 
158 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Increas EndsLw Noun 
159 ADVANTAGE 
160 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Virtue ECON Abs@ ABS MeansLw Noun noun: Any 
state or opportunity favourable to success, benefit, gain, position of superiority. 
161 ADVANTAGEOUS 
162 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Virtue MeansLw Modif 
163 ADVENT 
164 H4 Positiv Begin Noun 
165 ADVENTURESOME 
166 H4 Positiv Strong Active IndAdj Modif 
167 ADVENTUROUS 
168 H4Lvd Positiv Strong Active IndAdj PosAff Modif 
169 ADVISABLE 
170 H4Lvd Positiv Know Eval@ Quality IPadj PosAff Modif 
171 ADVOCACY 
172 H4Lvd Positiv Affil ComForm Noun 
173 AFFABILITY 
174 H4 Positiv Virtue Noun 
175 AFFABLE 
176 H4 Positiv Virtue IPadj Modif 
177 AFFECTION 
178 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Affil Arousal EMOT AffOth AffTot Noun 
179 AFFECTIONATE 




182 H4Lvd Positiv Affil Active IAV PowCoop PowTot SUPV 
183 AFFILIATION 
184 H4 Positiv Affil Noun 
185 AFFINITY 
186 H4 Positiv Strong Virtue Noun 
187 AFFIRM 
188 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Power ComForm IAV TrnGain SUPV 
189 AFFIRMATION 
190 H4 Positiv ComForm Eval@ Noun 
191 AFFIRMATIVE 
192 H4 Positiv Noun 
193 AFFIX 
194 H4 Positiv Affil Active Exert DAV SUPV 
195 AFFLUENCE 
196 H4Lvd Positiv Econ@ Quality WltOth WltTot Noun 
197 AFFLUENT 
198 H4 Positiv Econ@ Quality IndAdj Modif 
199 AFLOAT 
200 H4 Positiv Strong Econ@ IndAdj Modif 
 
 
Appendix B lists below 200 entries in the Harvard General Inquirer Dictionary as ex-
amples of the words associated with “Exprs” category used in the dissertation to content 
analyse “cultural” content. 
 
205   ACTOR 
201 H4Lvd Active Exprsv Role MALE HU PowPt PowTot Noun 
202 AESTHETIC 
203 H4Lvd Doctrin Exprsv SklAsth SklTOT Modif 
204 ANECDOTE 
205 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM FormLw Noun 
206 ARCHITECT 
207 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun 
208 ARCHITECTURE 
209 H4Lvd Doctrin Exprsv SklAsth SklTOT Noun 
210 ART#1 
211 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Exprsv Object ComnObj COM SklAsth SklTOT Noun 63% 
noun-adj: Painting, and more generally all the 'fine arts,' having to do with beauty 
212 ART#4 
213 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Doctrin Exprsv SklOth SklTOT Noun 13% noun: The particu-
lar skill of--'the difficult art of rowing' 
214 ARTIST 
215 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun noun: One who creates works of art, 
especially a painter 
216 ARTISTIC 
217 H4Lvd Doctrin Exprsv SklAsth SklTOT Modif 
218 ASSIGNMENT 
219 H4Lvd Active Exprsv ComForm PowOth PowTot Noun 
220 ATHLETIC 
221 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Virtue Exprsv Modif 
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222 AUTHOR 
223 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU EnlPt EnlTot Noun 
224 BALL#2 
225 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual Noun 25% noun-adj: A game which is played with a ball 
226 BALL#3 
227 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual RspOth RspTot Noun 4% noun: A formal social dance 
228 BANDSTAND 
229 H4Lvd Exprsv PLACE Social SklAsth SklTOT Noun 
230 BAR#3 
231 H4Lvd Active Exprsv Object Tool Noun 0% noun: Athletic equipment 
232 BARD 
233 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun 
234 BASEBALL 
235 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual Noun noun-adj: Popular team sport or the ball used in same, 
having to do with that sport 
236 BAT#2 
237 H4Lvd Exprsv Exert DAV SUPV 
238 BEAT#1 
239 H4Lvd Exprsv Time@ Noun 3% noun-adj: Rhythm, a blow, stroke or throb, as of 
the heart (1); hip (1); exhausted (0) 
240 BIOGRAPHY 
241 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM FormLw Noun 
242 BLUE#3 
243 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM WlbPsyc WlbTot FormLw Noun 0% noun: 
"Blues"--type of music, depression 
244 BOWL#2 
245 H4Lvd Exprsv Exert IAV SUPV 
246 BOX#4 
247 H4Lvd Strong Active ECON Exprsv Ritual SklOth SklTOT Noun 4% noun-adj: 
"Boxing"--the sport 
248 BOXER 
249 H4Lvd Strong Active Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun 
250 BRIDGE#2 
251 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual COM SklOth SklTOT Noun 13% noun: A card game 
252 CAMERA 
253 H4Lvd Exprsv Object Tool Noun 
254 CAMP#3 
255 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual WlbPhys WlbTot Noun 3% noun-adj: "Camping"--descrip-
tive of establishing temporary shelter, the activity of going into the woods 
256 CATCHER 
257 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun 
258 CHARACTER#3 
259 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU PtLw Noun 51% noun: A person, often as in a play or 
other piece of writing 
260 COMEDY 
261 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Exprsv Ritual Noun 
262 COMPOSER 
263 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun 
264 CONCERT 




267 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun 
268 CONJURE 
269 H4 Positiv Strong Active Exprsv Begin IAV SUPV 
270 CREATE 
271 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Strong Active Exprsv Begin IAV EndsLw SUPV verb: To 
cause to come into being, to happen, to bring about. 
272 CREATIVE 
273 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Active EMOT Virtue Exprsv EndsLw Modif adj-adv: Innova-
tive, artistic; "creatively"--in a creative manner 
274 CREATOR 
275 H4Lvd Strong Active Exprsv Role HU RcEnds RcTot Noun 
276 CRITIC 
277 H4Lvd Negativ Ngtv Hostile Exprsv Role HU EnlPt EnlTot Noun 
278 CUBISM 
279 H4Lvd Doctrin Exprsv SklAsth SklTOT Noun 
280 DANCE#1 
281 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Exprsv Ritual AffOth AffTot Noun 38% noun-adj: A social 
event at which people move rhythmically to music; the rhythmic movement itself 
or a specific form of it (0) 
282 DANCE#2 
283 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Active Exprsv Travel DAV AffGain AffTot SUPV 49% verb: 
To move rhythmically 
284 DANCE#3 
285 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Active Exprsv Travel AffOth AffTot Modif 13% noun-adj: 
"Dancing"--moving rhythmically 
286 DANCER 
287 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun 
288 DERBY 
289 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual Noun 
290 DONATE 
291 H4 Positiv Active Econ@ Exch Exprsv Fetch DAV SUPV 
292 DONATION 
293 H4 Positiv Econ@ Exch Exprsv Fetch Noun 
294 DRAMA 
295 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual Noun 
296 DRAMATIC 
297 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual EVAL FormLw Modif 
298 DRAW#2 
299 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm DAV SUPV 16% verb: To sketch, depict, compose; to 
form or make (abstract)--"to draw a conclusion or analogy 
300 DRUM 
301 H4Lvd Exprsv Object Tool Noun 
302 ELOQUENT 
303 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Exprsv EVAL IndAdj FormLw Modif 
304 ENTERTAIN#1 
305 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Affil Active Exprsv SocRel EVAL Modif 
306 ENTERTAINMENT 
307 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Exprsv Ritual WlbPsyc WlbTot Noun 
308 ESSAY 
309 H4Lvd Academ Exprsv ComForm COM Noun 
310 EXPRESS 
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311 H4Lvd Active Exprsv ComForm IAV EnlGain EnlTot SUPV verb: To render in 
communicable form ideas, opinions, or feelings-- to manifest, show or reveal 
312 EXPRESSION#1 
313 H4Lvd Active Exprsv ComForm COM Abs@ ABS EnlGain EnlTot FormLw 
Noun 67% noun: The act or process of expressing 
314 EXPRESSION#2 
315 H4Lvd Passive Exprsv ComForm COM EnlGain EnlTot FormLw Noun 30% noun: 
A look, expressing personal reaction or feeling 
316 EXPRESSIVE 
317 H4Lvd Passive Exprsv ComForm EnlGain EnlTot Modif 
318 FAIR#5 
319 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Exprsv Ritual Noun 0% noun: Carnival 
320 FASHION 
321 H4Lvd Doctrin Exprsv SklOth SklTOT Noun 
322 FENCE#3 
323 H4Lvd Active Exprsv Ritual Noun 0% noun-adj: The art of self-defense with a foil 
324 FICTION 
325 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM EnlOth EnlTot FormLw Noun 
326 FIELD#2 
327 H4Lvd Exprsv Work IAV SUPV 1% verb: To handle or answer, to catch in base-
ball, to put on a field 
328 FIGURE#4 
329 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM WlbPsyc WlbTot FormLw Noun 1% idiom-noun: 
"Figure of speech" 
330 FOOTBALL 
331 H4Lvd ECON Exprsv Ritual Noun 
332 FUN#1 
333 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Pleasur Exprsv WlbPsyc WlbTot Noun PFREQ 97% noun-adj: 
Enjoyment, enjoyable 
334 GALLERY 
335 H4Lvd Exprsv PLACE Social Noun 
336 GAME#1 
337 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual SklOth SklTOT Noun 75% noun: An amusement or competi-
tive activity played by various persons according to a set of rules 
338 GIANT#3 
339 H4Lvd Exprsv COLL HU Noun 0% noun: (the baseball team) 
340 GUITAR 
341 H4Lvd Exprsv Object Tool Noun 
342 GYMNAST 
343 H4Lvd Active Exprsv Role HU Noun 
344 GYMNASTIC 
345 H4Lvd Active Doctrin Exprsv Modif 
346 HIDE#5 
347 H4Lvd Exprsv Ritual Noun 0% noun-idiom: "Hide and seek" 
348 HOP#1 
349 H4Lvd Active Exprsv Travel Noun 
350 HORN#1 
351 H4Lvd Exprsv Object Tool Noun PFREQ 88% noun: The animal bodypart of anal-




353 H4Lvd Negativ Ngtv Hostile Active Exprsv Role HU SklPt SklTOT Noun noun: 
One who chases and kills animals 
354 IMAGE#2 
355 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM Noun 42% noun: A visual or mental representa-
tion, a picture 
356 IMAGERY 
357 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM FormLw Noun 
358 IMAGINABLE 
359 H4Lvd Exprsv Know SklOth SklTOT Modif 
360 IMAGINARY 
361 H4Lvd Passive Exprsv Know Modif 
362 IMAGINATION 
363 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Exprsv Know SklOth SklTOT Noun 
364 IMAGINATIVE 
365 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Virtue Exprsv EVAL SklOth SklTOT Modif 
366 IMAGINE 
367 H4Lvd Passive Exprsv Solve IAV SUPV verb: To form a mental image, to specu-
late, conjecture, suppose, or fantasize 
368 INVENT 
369 H4Lvd Active Exprsv Work IAV SklOth SklTOT SUPV 
370 JAZZ 
371 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM FormLw Noun 
372 JOKE#1 
373 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Exprsv ComForm FormLw Noun PFREQ 85% noun-adj: A 
jest, funny story 
374 JOKE#2 
375 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Exprsv ComForm IAV SUPV 10% verb: To jest, be funny 
376 JOKER 
377 H4Lvd Exprsv Role HU Noun 
378 KEYBOARD 
379 H4Lvd Exprsv Object Tool Noun 
380 KID#2 
381 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Affil Exprsv ComForm IAV SUPV 3% verb: To jest 
382 LAUGH#1 
383 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Exprsv ComForm COM WlbPsyc WlbTot FormLw 
Noun 3% noun: Expression of mirth or amusement 
384 LAUGH#2 
385 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Exprsv ComForm DAV WlbPsyc WlbTot SUPV 40% 
verb: To express mirth or amusement by laughter 
386 LAUGH#5 
387 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Exprsv ComForm WlbPsyc WlbTot Modif 2% noun-
adj: "Laughing" - laughter, expressive of amusement 
388 LAUGH#6 
389 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Exprsv ComForm COM WlbPsyc WlbTot FormLw 
Noun 45% noun: Same as sense 1, but inserted into text as editorial comment, pa-
renthesised. 
390 LAUGHTER 
391 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Exprsv ComForm COM WlbPsyc WlbTot FormLw 
Noun noun: The act or sound of laughing, an expression of amusement. 
392 LEGEND 
393 H4Lvd Exprsv ComForm COM FormLw Noun 
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394 LEISURE 
395 H4Lvd Positiv Pstv Passive Virtue Exprsv Noun 
396 LITERARY 
397 H4Lvd Academ Exprsv ComForm SklAsth SklTOT Modif 
398 LITERATURE 
399 H4Lvd Academ Exprsv ComForm COM SklAsth SklTOT FormLw Noun 
 
 
 
 
 
